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Glossary of terms
Advancement Support Adviser Employment specialist holding a 
(ASA)  position specifically created as part of ERA 
 These individuals provide ERA participants 
 with continuing advice and assistance 
 intended to help them overcome obstacles to 
 steady employment and find pathways to 
 better job opportunities and higher wages.
Employment Retention and  A demonstration programme offering a 
Advancement programme  combination of employment counselling 
(ERA) services and financial supports to certain 
 recipients of Government benefits or lone 
 parents claiming Working Tax Credit (WTC). Its 
 purpose is to help people stabilise and improve 
 their work situations.
Income Support (IS)  Benefit available to low-income adults 
 working less than 16 hours per week.
Jobcentre Plus  The UK governmental institution, 
 an agency of the DWP, which provides help 
 and advice on employment and training 
 for people who can work and financial 
 support for those of working age who 
 cannot.
Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA)  Benefit available to unemployed individuals 
 who are actively seeking work
New Deal programme  The UK’s main welfare-to-work initiative. 
 New Deal services include the development of 
 individual action plans outlining customers’ 
 work goals and job search assistance and 
 training to help them achieve these goals.
xiv
New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+) Mandatory New Deal programme that serves 
 longer-term unemployed people (mostly 
 males) over the age of 25, specifically those 
 who have been unemployed and receiving 
 JSA for at least 18 out of 21 months. 
New Deal for Lone Parents  Voluntary New Deal programme that serves 
(NDLP) lone parents (mostly females) who are in 
 receipt of IS. 
Personal Adviser (PA)  Employment specialists, working in Jobcentre 
 Plus offices, who provide job advice and 
 assistance to New Deal customers who were 
 not randomly assigned to the ERA programme 
 group.
Post-Employment Team (PET)  A group of ASAs whose sole task in the ERA 
 programme is to work with in-work 
 customers.
Technical Adviser (TA)  Staff position specifically created as part of 
 ERA. These individuals, posted in each ERA 
 district, ensure that ERA services are delivered 
 in accordance with the policy design and 
 provide general support for the evaluation 
 effort.
Working Tax Credit (WTC)  Lone parents working less than 30 hours per 
 week are eligible to receive this credit.
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Abbreviations and acronyms
ADF Adviser Discretion Fund
ASA Advancement Support Adviser
CTC Child Tax Credit
DWP Department for Work and Pensions
EDF Emergency Discretion Fund
ERA Employment Retention and Advancement 
 programme
FACS Families and Children Survey
FC Family Credit
FIS Family Income Supplement
GCSE General Certificate of Secondary Education
GMS Generalised Matching Service
HB Housing Benefit
IB Incapacity Benefit
IS Income Support
JOT Job Outcome Target
JSA Jobseeker’s Allowance
JUVOS Joint Unemployment and Vacancies Operating 
 System
ND25+ New Deal 25 Plus
NDLP New Deal for Lone Parents
xvi
PA Personal Adviser
PET Post-Employment Team
QAF Quality Assurance Framework
TA Technical Adviser
WASC Work Advancement and Support Center 
 demonstration
WFTC Working Families’ Tax Credit
WPLS Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study
WTC Working Tax Credit
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Summary
Introduction
This report presents new findings on how an innovative post-employment 
programme in Britain is affecting the employment, earnings and benefits receipt 
of long-term unemployed individuals. This initiative, called the Employment 
Retention and Advancement (ERA) demonstration programme, is being carefully 
evaluated through a large-scale randomised control trial. ERA offered a unique 
combination of financial incentives and in-work support designed to help 
individuals sustain and advance in the labour market. The demonstration targeted 
three groups: unemployed lone parents, lone parents working part-time, and long-
term unemployed individuals receiving Government benefits. While a companion 
report1 presents effects for lone parents, this report focuses on the experiences of 
the long-term unemployed group, most of whom are men. 
An earlier evaluation report, published in 2007, showed that, despite significant 
positive effects for lone parents, ERA’s effects for the long-term unemployed 
group were mixed and uncertain after one year of follow-up. For this group, the 
programme had shown no effects overall on employment or earnings but there 
were suggestions of positive effects in some districts. The new evidence presented 
here, covering two years of follow-up, continues to show that ERA’s effects were 
limited. Although the programme increased overall employment rates and reduced 
benefits receipt in year 2, these effects were small. However, final assessment of 
ERA’s effectiveness for this group must await longer-term follow-up. 
The results presented here should be regarded as interim in nature for several 
reasons: Advancement in work is a gradual process that can take several years to 
unfold and this is likely to be particularly true for this target group of long-term 
unemployed people. More than half of this group did not work during the period 
observed and thus, could not benefit from ERA’s post-employment services, and 
many of those who did work did not do so until the second year of follow-up. 
Furthermore, ERA services were available for 33 months. By the end of the second 
1 Riccio et al., 2008.
2year of follow-up, many ERA customers had not yet had an opportunity to take 
full advantage of the programme’s in-work guidance and incentives and many 
had not yet completed their training activities. The evaluation will continue to 
track the work and benefits outcomes of the study’s participants for several more 
years.
The long-term unemployed group consists of long-term recipients of Jobseeker’s 
Allowance (JSA), a cash benefit available to unemployed individuals who are 
actively seeking work. These individuals, because of their reliance on JSA for 18 or 
more consecutive months, are also mandated to participate in the New Deal 25 
Plus (ND25+) programme, an employment assistance programme for the longer-
term unemployed aged 25 and older. 
This target group represents a small fraction of the working-age population. In 
2006/07, for example, around 105,000 people entered ND25+.2 In addition, 
the majority of those who commence a claim for Jobseeker‘s Allowance do not 
continue on for 18 or more months and are mandated to join ND25+. In 2004/05, 
for example, only about six per cent of JSA claims reached 18 consecutive months. 
Nonetheless, it is a quite distinct group from the lone parent target groups in the 
evaluation and one that faces severe labour market disadvantages.
For example, about 80 per cent of the ND25+ sample are male and 16 per cent 
belong to an ethnic minority. Many lack skills or have outdated skills, a short 
or patchy work history and transport difficulties. More than a third have no 
educational qualifications at all and almost half had not worked in the three years 
before they entered the demonstration. Nationally, about 30 per cent of ND25+ 
participants report that they are suffering from some long-term illness or disability, 
while others have criminal records, drug or alcohol dependence or mental or 
physical health problems.3
The ND25+ group in the ERA evaluation had lower employment and earnings than 
the lone parents over the same follow-up period and programme staff found it 
somewhat more challenging to engage them in services. Although the results from 
ERA to date have been less positive for this group, improving their employment 
retention and advancement remains an important policy challenge. Nationally, this 
group has been found to have relatively low employment retention rates, with 
only one in four ND25+ participants leaving benefits for sustained work.4
The ERA model and evaluation
ERA – started in 2003 and administered by Jobcentre Plus – was envisioned as a 
‘next step’ in British welfare-to-work policies. The programme built on Britain’s 
2 In contrast, the working-age population in the UK totals about 30 million 
people.
3 Adebowale, 2004.
4 Adebowale, 2004.
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3New Deal programme (also administered by Jobcentre Plus), which offers job 
placement help and other pre-employment assistance to out-of-work recipients 
of Government benefits. To the existing pre-employment New Deal services, 
ERA added a new set of financial incentives and job advisory services following 
customers’ entry into work. By offering this unique combination of services, the 
programme aimed to help low-income individuals who entered work sustain 
employment and advance in the labour market. 
The demonstration was aimed at three groups that have had difficulty getting and 
keeping full-time work or advancing to more secure and better-paid positions: 
1 lone parents (mostly women) who receive Income Support (IS) and volunteer 
for the New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) programme;
2 longer-term unemployed people over the age of 25 (largely men) who receive 
JSA and are mandated to enter the ND25+ programme; and
3 lone parents who are already working part time (between 16 and 29 hours a 
week) and are receiving Working Tax Credit (WTC). 
For the two New Deal customer groups, ERA began with job placement and 
other pre-employment assistance, largely following the same procedures as the 
regular New Deal programme. This assistance was expected to last for up to nine 
months. The programme then continued into a unique post-employment or ‘in-
work’ phase, expected to last for at least two years.5 During that phase, ERA’s job 
coaches, known as Advancement Support Advisers (ASAs), were expected to help 
customers avoid some of the early pitfalls that sometimes cause new jobs to be 
short-lived and to help them advance to positions of greater job security and better 
pay and conditions – at their current employer or a new one. ERA also offered 
special cash incentives and other resources to promote these goals, including: 
•	 an	employment	retention	bonus	of	£400	three	times	a	year	for	two	years	for	
staying in full-time work (at least 30 hours per week for 13 out of every 17 
weeks, which is about 75 per cent of the time); 
•	 training	tuition	assistance	(up	to	£1,000)	and	a	bonus	(also	up	to	£1,000)	for	
completing training while employed; and
•	 access	 to	emergency	payments	 to	overcome	short-term	barriers	 to	staying	 in	
work. 
ERA operated in six very diverse regions of the UK: East Midlands, London, North 
East England, North West England, Scotland and Wales. Within these districts, 
5 Although the original design of the programme envisioned that the post-
employment phase would last for a maximum of two years, those who 
entered work sooner could receive more than two years of post-employment 
adviser support. In fact, WTC customers who were already working when 
they entered ERA could receive post-employment adviser support for their 
full 33 months of participation in ERA. However, receipt of the financial 
incentives was limited to the two-year maximum.
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4qualifying members of the three target groups were invited to volunteer for the 
limited number of ERA openings. To provide everyone who expressed interest with 
a fair and equitable chance to participate in the programme, a lottery-like process 
was used to select those who were eligible. After completing an informed consent 
process, half the volunteers were assigned randomly to the ERA programme 
group and the remainder to a control group. Individuals assigned to the control 
group could continue to receive whatever provisions they were normally entitled 
to receive from Jobcentre Plus. Intake into the study took place from October 
2003 to April 2005. Over 16,000 people were randomly assigned during this 
period, making this study one of the largest randomised social policy trials ever 
undertaken in Britain. 
ERA’s success is determined by comparing the outcomes of the programme group 
(e.g. future average earnings) with the outcomes of the control group. Because the 
random assignment process created two groups with nearly identical background 
characteristics, on average, at the beginning of the study, the only difference 
between them was that one was offered the programme and the other was not. 
Thus, any statistically significant difference in future outcomes can confidently be 
assumed to have been caused by ERA. Such differences are referred to here as the 
programme’s effects or ‘impacts’.
The analysis relies on administrative data to estimate the programme’s effects. 
Employment and earnings data were obtained from the Work and Pensions 
Longitudinal Survey (WPLS) matched to data from Her Majesty’s Revenue and 
Customs (HMRC) agency. Benefits data were obtained from the Department 
for Work and Pensions (DWP). Data from two waves of a customer survey are 
used primarily to describe individuals’ experiences with, and participation in, the 
programme while employed.6 To provide a richer understanding of the Jobcentre 
Plus offices’ experience of implementing ERA, customers’ efforts to find work 
and advance and their responses to the in-work assistance that ERA offered, the 
analysis also uses qualitative research involving in-depth interviews with ERA staff 
and customers. 
DWP, working with Jobcentre Plus staff in each of the study districts, managed the 
overall implementation of ERA and is overseeing the evaluation. The study is being 
conducted by a research consortium that includes the Policy Studies Institute, 
the Institute for Fiscal Studies, the Office for National Statistics, and MDRC (a 
New York City-based research organisation experienced in conducting large-scale 
random assignment tests of new social policies). 
6 In contrast to the analysis for the lone parent customers groups, the survey 
data are not used to estimate the programme’s effects. Lower survey response 
rates for the ND25+ group, coupled with the fact that that the survey sample 
consists of a cohort of early entrants into the programme, resulted in a 
survey sample that is not sufficiently representative of the full sample. The 
survey data were deemed adequate, however, to provide a rough gauge of 
participation in the programme.
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5ERA’s implementation and delivery of in-work assistance
The main focus of this report is on in-work support, since that was the key feature 
that set ERA apart from typical Jobcentre Plus services. In addition, the first-year 
report documented that the extent and type of pre-employment support received 
differed little between the ND25+ programme and control groups. However, when 
considering ERA’s effects on in-work assistance, it is important to keep in mind 
that less than half of the ND25+ customer group worked during the two-year 
period and was able to take advantage of these supports and services.
Perhaps the biggest challenge for ERA staff (principally the ASA and their frontline 
managers) was learning how to help working customers meet employment and 
retention goals after they took jobs, when all of the staff’s previous training and 
experience, as well as the organisational and programmatic focus of the Jobcentre 
Plus system that housed the programme, was focused on helping customers 
find jobs. Indeed, job placement was the primary measure of staff and office 
performance. Thus, in the delivery of services to all three target groups, ERA posed 
a challenge to existing Jobcentre Plus delivery structures and staff skill sets. 
ERA’s implementation, which faced difficulties in the first year of 
operation, improved considerably over time, as staff grew more 
skilled and confident in delivering a post-employment intervention.
Not surprisingly, it took considerable time and effort for ERA district staff, whose 
previous experience had focused on helping the unemployed find jobs, to learn 
to incorporate strategies that involved building a partnership with customers that 
extended into work and was to last for at least two years after job placement. 
For advisory staff, retention and advancement support meant proactively 
engaging customers beyond traditional Jobcentre Plus routines, anticipating the 
needs of working individuals and promoting job progression. In the early days 
of the programme, staff were unfamiliar with what was entailed in providing 
post-employment support and had difficulty keeping working participants fully 
engaged in the programme. Moreover, there were tensions between the central 
job placement goals of Jobcentre Plus and the post-employment focus of ERA. 
Over time, the programme grew considerably stronger as technical assistance 
efforts were intensified, staff training was improved and DWP’s oversight and 
accountability mechanisms were strengthened to support ERA’s goals 
A new set of challenges arose in the third year of programme operations, as the 
operational phase of the demonstration began to wind down. As customers began 
to reach the end of their 33-month tenure and began to exit the programme (in 
July 2006) on a rolling basis, many staff were reassigned to other posts but not 
necessarily at an even pace. Some staff caseloads thus grew to levels much higher 
than intended and many customers were assigned a new ASA. Thus, for some 
customers, the continuity and intensity of in-work assistance began to suffer. 
Several indicators suggest that ERA reached its peak performance level in most 
districts towards the end of 2005 and into the first half of 2006 (near the end of 
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6the two-year follow-up period covered by the impact analysis presented in this 
report). 
Overall, the districts’ implementation of the ERA model demonstrates that it 
was feasible to operate ERA as a Jobcentre Plus initiative, although not easy. The 
challenges of keeping working customers engaged in the programme and providing 
them with high-quality career guidance were ongoing. These challenges underscore 
the importance of assigning the role of the ASA to staff who have the capacity to 
deliver a service that is more complicated than the normal job placement assistance 
of Jobcentre Plus. It is also critical to provide those staff with more extensive training 
and manager support and to motivate and recognise their accomplishments with 
performance assessments tailored to retention and advancement outcomes. 
Working ND25+ customers in ERA were much more likely than those 
in the control group to receive retention-related and advancement-
related help or advice from Jobcentre Plus staff.
Customers in the ERA group who worked at some point within the two-year follow-
up period received a substantial post-employment intervention from Jobcentre 
Plus. This intervention differed in both content and intensity from what they would 
have experienced had ERA not existed (as evidenced by comparisons with workers 
in the control group). For example, among ND25+ customers in ERA who got jobs, 
47 per cent reported on the customer survey that, while they were employed, 
they had received help or advice from Jobcentre Plus (meaning primarily the ERA 
programme) that was related to staying employed or advancing. The rate for the 
control group was much lower, at 12 per cent. Assistance for the control group 
was likely to have been obtained through customer-initiated, informal interactions 
with Jobcentre Plus staff, since it was not a funded element of the regular ND25+ 
programme. The most common types of support received from staff were help 
finding an education or training course, developing long-term career goals and 
finding a better job. Interviews with staff indicated that many working customers 
had temporary work contracts and sought assistance finding new work as these 
contracts ended. 
At the same time, qualitative data point to a number of challenges that Jobcentre 
Plus staff encountered in operating the ERA model in the real world. For example, 
although most working ERA customers had some in-work contact with their ASAs, 
the nature and quality of the support they received varied substantially, ranging 
from the simple processing of bonuses and perfunctory interactions to specialist 
advancement action planning. The advisers also differed in how proactive they 
were in reaching out to their customers, in keeping participants engaged in the 
programme, in their capacity to provide helpful guidance on advancement issues 
and even in their marketing of the financial incentives. Over time, though, advisers 
on the whole became more skilled in delivering in-work support and administering 
ERA’s incentives. 
There were particular challenges in serving ND25+ customers, 
relative to lone parents, owing to their lower employment rates 
and rates of re-engagement with the programme once they were in 
work. 
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As such, the majority of this target group was never eligible for ERA’s post-
employment supports, the part of the programme that distinguished it from the 
services typically available through Jobcentre Plus. In addition, relative to serving 
the two lone parent groups, staff reported that they had greater difficulty engaging 
ND25+ customers in services once they were in work. According to staff, there 
were a variety of reasons for this: ND25+ customers’ desire to be independent of 
Jobcentre Plus, which many associated only with claiming benefits; a greater ethos 
of self-reliance; lower awareness of available in-work supports; and, finally, less 
interest in advancement, as many ND25+ customers viewed obtaining a steady 
job as accomplishment enough. 
Although staff used the Emergency Discretion Fund more for lone 
parents than for the ND25+ group, they saw the value of this fund 
as a retention tool. 
ERA customers who entered work could receive assistance from an Emergency 
Discretion Fund (EDF) to take care of minor, short-term financial emergencies that 
might prevent them from continuing in work. Financial payment records indicate 
that 12 per cent of the ND25+ programme group members who worked received 
EDF assistance. Most customers who received these payments received just one. 
Total	payments	averaged	£230	per	recipient.	These	funds	were	most	commonly	
used for transport-related expenses, such as car repairs and petrol. Staff mentioned 
reliable transport as an important job retention issue for ND25+ customers.
Most ND25+ ERA customers were aware of ERA’s financial 
incentives, although many did not meet the conditions for receiving 
them. 
When interviewed 24 months after entering the study, most ND25+ customers 
in ERA (86 per cent) said that they knew about the programme’s employment 
retention bonus. Yet, about two-thirds did not receive any of these bonus payments 
– largely because they did not meet the necessary conditions for the reward (i.e. 
sustaining full-time work for at least 13 out of 17 weeks in a given payment 
period). However, among those who ever worked full-time during the follow-up 
period, about 70 per cent received at least one bonus payment and about 50 per 
cent received two or more payments.
Although awareness of the bonus for completing an ERA-approved training course 
while employed was also fairly high, rates of take-up were low. Sixty-two per cent 
of the ERA group knew of this bonus, while only four per cent received a payment. 
In addition, only six per cent received ERA payments to help with training fees or 
tuition during this period. These rates were not much higher for ERA customers 
who worked full-time during the follow-up period. 
ERA’s impacts on employment and earnings 
During the second year after beginning ERA, ND25+ customers 
were somewhat more likely to work than they would have been 
without the programme. However, ERA had no effect on their 
earnings. 
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ERA were employed, compared with 42.2 per cent of the control group (Table 
1).7 This effect of two percentage points over the full period is driven by effects 
that began to emerge in year 2. In that year, 33.9 per cent of the ERA group 
worked, compared with 31.3 per cent of the control group, for a difference of 2.6 
percentage points. This effect in year 2 is quite small in size and longer follow-up 
will be needed to assess whether it increases or fades over time.
ERA had no effect on earnings over the 2005/06 tax year. Administrative data 
on earnings are not available by calendar year and thus cannot provide evidence 
of effects on earnings in year 1 compared to year 2. The tax year covers year 1 
earnings for customers randomly assigned late in the intake period and year 2 for 
customers randomly assigned early in the intake period.
A district-level analysis was conducted to assess whether the general conclusions 
reached for the pooled sample held across all districts or whether ERA seemed 
to have had more positive effects in some districts. The results suggest some 
variation by district but this variation is due, in large part, to oddly negative effects 
in Wales. The negative effects on employment in this district appear to stem, in 
part, from staff shortages in delivering ERA’s pre-employment services, with the 
result that the control group was likely to receive more intensive pre-employment 
assistance and had higher rates of job entry. The results highlight the importance 
of not losing sight of pre-employment services, even within a programme that is 
largely directed towards post-employment services. This is particularly relevant for 
the ND25+ sample, for whom retention and advancement depend on receiving 
adequate support to find employment in the first place. 
ERA increased employment in year 2 by encouraging job entry 
during that period, rather than by increasing employment 
retention.
Among ND25+ customers who entered work during the first year of the follow-
up period, half worked for less than 12 consecutive months. ERA had no effect 
on this or on other measures of retention. Instead, ERA’s effect on employment 
rates was attained by increasing and speeding up entry into work and not by 
prolonging employment for people who obtained jobs earlier on. In other words, 
ERA encouraged more customers who would not have otherwise worked during 
the two-year period to enter work during the second year. 
ERA’s effects on benefits receipt
ERA produced small savings in payments for JSA in year 2. It also 
somewhat reduced the use of Incapacity Benefit (IB). 
All individuals who entered the study were receiving JSA from the start. By the 
end of the two-year follow-up period, the rate of benefits receipt had dropped by 
7 Administrative data do not cover some types of employment, e.g. self-
employment and low-hours jobs, and likely understate employment rates to 
some extent.
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factors not related to ERA. Nonetheless, ERA produced some additional savings 
in Government payments. At the end of year 2, for example, 42.2 per cent of 
the programme group were receiving JSA, which is a statistically significant 2.6 
percentage points lower than the control group rate (Table 1). The average total 
amount	of	JSA	payments	in	year	2	was	lower	for	the	ERA	group	by	£72	relative	
to the control group – a five per cent drop. In addition, ERA produced statistically 
significant, albeit small, reductions in the proportion of ND25+ customers receiving 
IB over the two-year period (not shown).
Table 1 Effects of ERA on employment, earnings and benefits  
  receipt for ND25+ customers within two years after   
 random assignment
Outcome
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Difference 
(impact) P-value
Employment and earnings
Ever employed during (%)
Year 1 35.8 35.0 0.7 0.526
Year 2 33.9 31.3 2.6** 0.020
Years 1-2 44.2 42.2 2.0* 0.082
Average earnings during 2005/06 tax 
year	(£)
 
2,848
 
2,679
 
169
 
0.235
Benefit receipt
Average number of months 
receiving JSA in
Year 1 7.9 7.9 0.0 0.879
Year 2 5.4 5.7 -0.4*** 0.003
Years 1-2 13.3 13.6 -0.3* 0.070
Receiving JSA in month 24 (%) 42.2 44.7 -2.6** 0.027
Average JSA payment received in
Year 1 2,267 2,274 -7.0 0.862
Year 2 1,433 1,505 -72* 0.062
Years 1-2 3,700 3,779 -79 0.254
Sample size = 6,782 3,424 3,358
Source: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment records.
Notes: Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for  
pre-random assignment characteristics of sample members. 
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the 
control group. Statistical significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; 
and *** = 1 per cent.
Includes all customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005.
JSA = Jobseeker‘s Allowance.      
Summary
10
ERA’s impacts by customer subgroups 
ERA’s effects in general did not vary across different types of 
customers, including more disadvantaged customers, those with 
fewer qualifications and ethnic minorities. 
Overall, ERA’s effects did not vary consistently with the background characteristics 
of ND25+ customers that are typically associated with the degree of success in the 
labour market. For example, there was no strong evidence suggesting that ERA had 
larger or smaller impacts for customers with more, rather than less, previous work 
experience or for those with more, rather than fewer, barriers to employment.
Conclusions
Although ERA had no effect on earnings, it did lead to a small increase in 
employment rates in year 2, an effect that appears to derive from encouraging 
job entry in year 2 among those who would not have otherwise worked. Still, the 
findings after two years for the ND25+ group are discouraging, especially when 
compared with those for lone parents. 
ND25+ customers differed from the two lone parent groups in that they faced 
more severe barriers to work, which contributed to their much lower employment 
rates. Less than half of this group worked at all during the two-year period. The 
fact that fewer of them were able to take advantage of ERA’s in-work supports 
may help to explain the programme’s limited effects for this group but it also 
highlights the importance of pre-employment supports. ERA was not designed to 
provide more pre-employment support than that typically offered, which may not 
be enough for many of these individuals. 
In addition, staff found it more difficult to engage working ND25+ customers 
in the programme than their lone parent counterparts. Some customers wanted 
limited involvement with Jobcentre Plus once they were employed, for example, 
while others did not feel that they needed assistance. ND25+ customers as a 
whole were also more difficult to engage in advancement services. According to 
staff, many of these customers, who had been out of work for long periods or 
had cycled in and out of temporary jobs, felt that obtaining steady work was good 
enough.
Longer-term follow-up is needed, first, to assess whether ERA’s effects for this 
group increase over time and, second, to understand how ERA might affect 
customers’ journeys towards advancement, as those journeys continue to unfold 
after customers exit ERA. Current plans call for the evaluation to continue tracking 
outcomes for the programme and control groups until five years have passed from 
the time that customers entered the study. The next set of evaluation results is due 
to be published in early 2009.
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1.1 Introduction 
This report evaluates a scheme designed to help long-term unemployed people 
enter, keep, and advance in, paid employment. It is the second of two reports 
presenting the latest findings from the UK Employment Retention and Advancement 
(ERA) demonstration. The ERA experiment is using a random assignment research 
design to test the effectiveness of an innovative method of improving the labour 
market prospects of low-paid workers and long-term unemployed people. ERA 
targeted three groups:
•	 long-term unemployed people (25 years of age and older) receiving Jobseeker’s 
Allowance (JSA) and required to participate in the New Deal;
•	unemployed lone parents receiving Income Support (IS) and volunteering for 
the New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) welfare-to-work programme; and
•	 low-paid employed lone parents working part-time and receiving Working 
Tax Credit (WTC), which supplements the income of working families. 
A companion report provides evidence of the programme’s effectiveness over a 
two-year period for the two lone parent groups.8 This report presents results for 
the long-term unemployed New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+) group.
The ERA programme operated within Jobcentre Plus offices and attempted 
to go beyond the services that Jobcentre Plus typically offers to the long-term 
8 Riccio et al., 2008.
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unemployed, which are mostly focused on job placement assistance. ERA was 
designed to help participants enter and remain in full-time employment and 
then to advance in work. It included two main features: (1) employment advice 
to support customers for two years after entering employment and (2) a set of 
financial incentives to encourage the take-up and retention of full-time work and 
the completion of training opportunities while employed. Participants who were 
not working when they entered the programme first received welfare-to-work 
assistance to help them find jobs. This process was expected to last nine months 
or less, after which participants who had entered work were entitled to two years 
of in-work support. In practice, nearly everyone was allowed to remain eligible for 
ERA’s support and financial incentives for 33 months. 
ERA was implemented as a research demonstration project in six areas across the 
UK between October 2003 and October 2007. Whereas labour market initiatives 
of this kind have tended, in the past, to be evaluated using comparative research 
designs, which compare areas where the programme was piloted with similar 
areas where it was not, this demonstration project relied on a random assignment 
research design. Over the course of a little more than a year, 16,000 eligible 
participants in the six areas were randomly assigned to a programme group, who 
were offered the new ERA services and incentives, or to a control group, who 
were not. 
Because they share the same average characteristics and live and work in the 
same places, the control group represents the counterfactual – what happens 
to eligible people who receive no ERA services but continue instead with their 
normal treatment under, in this case, ND25+. By comparing their subsequent 
outcomes, such as their employment rates, earnings and benefits receipt patterns, 
with those of the programme group, the evaluation will determine the extent to 
which ERA achieved its core goals. If the programme group does better, then their 
improvement is unlikely to be associated with anything other than their treatment 
in the ERA scheme. 
ERA was designed from the outset as a random assignment or demonstration 
project by a team commissioned by HM Treasury and located in the Cabinet Office. 
This design process, including all the background and theoretical considerations, 
was published in detail in a previous report.9
The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) managed the overall implementation 
of ERA and is overseeing the evaluation. A research consortium headed by MDRC 
(headquartered in New York City) and including the Policy Studies Institute, the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies and the Office for National Statistics carried out the 
study in the UK. 
This introductory chapter, much of which is drawn from earlier reports on ERA,10 
briefly recaps the earlier findings, explains the policy background of ERA, reviews 
9 Morris et al., 2003.
10 See Dorsett et al., 2007; Hall et al., 2004; Hoggart et al., 2006; and Walker, 
Hoggart and Hamilton, 2006.
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the literature previously published on retention and advancement, describes 
the ND25+ group targeted by ERA and the service delivery model and explains 
the random assignment design and the various methods used to evaluate the 
programme.
Building on the analyses begun in earlier reports, especially that on the first-
year impact findings,11 this report continues the story of ERA’s implementation 
through its third and fourth years of operation, which ended in autumn 2007. 
The report goes on to examine ND25+ participants’ use of ERA’s in-work services 
and financial incentives and shows the effects of the programme on their labour 
market behaviour and other outcomes, including their earnings and benefits 
receipt within the first two years following random assignment. 
1.2 Summary of first-year impacts
The following summary highlights the most important effects of ERA for all 
three target groups after participants had spent their first 12 months in the 
programme:
•	 The	staff	assigned	to	ERA,	called	Advancement	Support	Advisers	(ASAs),	found	
their new jobs quite challenging, because their work departed from the prevailing 
target-driven ‘work-first’ organisation of Jobcentre Plus. The staff training effort 
had to be increased and renewed to reorient ASAs to focus primarily on their 
customers’ retention and advancement. 
•	 The	majority	of	working	ERA	customers	received	advice	and	were	aware	of	the	
advantages ERA offered, particularly the financial incentives attached to their 
retention of full-time work. They knew less of the training incentives.
•	 Customers	starting	ERA	from	the	NDLP	group	earned	substantially	more	than	
their counterparts in the control group, largely because they were more likely to 
work full-time.12 
•	 The	WTC	customers	in	ERA	were	also	more	likely	to	work	full-time,	compared	
with their control group counterparts, though they did not earn substantially 
more.
•	 ERA	 increased	 the	 proportion	 of	 customers	 combining	 training	 or	 education	
with work, especially among the WTC group. 
•	 ERA’s	 impacts	 on	ND25+	 customers	were	 less	 certain	 and	more	mixed	 than	
those for the lone parents. 
•	 Both	New	Deal	ERA	groups	(NDLP	and	ND25+)	showed	slightly	lower	receipt	of	
benefits compared with their control groups.
11 Dorsett et al., 2007.
12 Throughout this report, references to earnings exclude ERA retention or 
training bonuses, tax credits and other in-work benefits.
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ERA’s implementation was improving during the second and third years of service 
delivery. Following early high turnover, ASA teams stabilised and, in some districts, 
formed specialised Post-Employment Teams. In general, the focus on retention 
and advancement goals intensified. This report will examine the impact of ERA on 
ND25+ customers as the project gained focus and gathered pace and then came 
to an end.
Box 1.1 summarises the findings in the second-year report for the lone parent 
target groups.
 
Box 1.1 Second-year findings for lone parent participants: New Deal 
for Lone Parents and Working Tax Credit recipients13
Implementation
•	 ERA’s	implementation,	which	was	problematic	in	the	first	year	of	operation,	
improved over time, as staff grew more skilled and confident in delivering 
a post-employment intervention.
•	 Working	 lone	 parents	 in	 ERA	were	much	more	 likely	 than	 those	 in	 the	
control group to receive retention-related and advancement-related help 
or advice from Jobcentre Plus staff.
•	 Advisers	made	significant	use	of	the	Emergency	Discretion	Fund	(EDF)	to	
help secure participants’ attachment to work. 
•	 Most	ERA	customers	were	aware	of	ERA’s	financial	 incentives,	although	
many did not meet the conditions for receiving them.
•	 ERA	had	 small	 positive	 effects	on	 lone	parents’	 efforts	 to	 improve	 their	
work situation or earnings at their current job or to look for a new job.
Employment and earnings 
•	 Within	 the	 first	 two	 years,	 ERA	 lone	 parents	 earned	 substantially	more	
than they would have without the programme.
•	 ERA’s	 positive	 earnings	 impacts	 resulted	 largely	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
programme increased the proportion of lone parents working full-time. 
•	 ERA	increased	the	amount	of	time	that	lone	parents	worked	full-time	but	
more by accelerating entry into such jobs than by improving retention. 
•	 Other	than	its	effects	on	full-time	employment,	there	is	little	evidence	so	
far that ERA helped lone parents advance to ‘better’ jobs. 
Training
•	 ERA	lone	parents	–	especially	WTC	customers	–	were	more	likely	than	the	
control group to combine training or education and employment. 
13 See Riccio et al., 2008.
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Box 1.1 (continued)
Benefits receipt
•	 ERA	produced	small	savings	in	out-of-work	payments	of	Income	Support	
for NDLP customers. It also reduced the use of Housing Benefit among 
both lone parent customer groups. 
1.3 Policy background
ERA was envisioned as a potential next step in Britain’s ‘welfare-to-work’ policy, 
which has been evolving since the early 1970s, when the Government began 
supplementing the wages of working families to help them overcome the cycle 
of unemployment and in-work poverty. Larger out-of-work benefits and falling 
tax thresholds had left many families with children with only a small difference 
between their incomes in or out of work.14 Family Income Supplement (FIS), an 
in-work benefit available to families with children, was introduced in 1971 to 
increase the cash value of working. This benefit remained in place for 17 years, 
marking the start of a strong British commitment to wage supplementation, 
which, although initially targeting parents, is now important for low-paid people 
without children. Subsequently, the Government set an overall target to raise the 
proportion of the working-age population who are in paid work at any one time 
from a typical annual average of between 74 and 76 per cent, to 80 per cent.
Beginning in 1999, the Labour administration shifted in-work financial support 
from the benefits system to the tax system. Tax credits are designed to ‘make 
work pay’ by providing enough incentive to work while meeting the increasing 
challenge of keeping low-paid workers’ standards of living comparable with those 
of the working majority who have higher earnings. They also compensate low 
earners for the increasingly regressive effects of a greater use of indirect rather 
than direct taxation. In 1999, the Government introduced Working Families’ Tax 
Credit (WFTC), which offered larger wage supplements, as well as a credit to 
help cover most of the cost of childcare. It was also underpinned by the National 
Minimum Wage, which took effect in the same year. In 2003, WFTC was divided 
into its adult and child components as two separate payments:
•	WTC, which became the first major tax credit also available to low-paid workers 
without dependent children; and 
•	Child Tax Credit (CTC), which simplified support so that families with children 
would have a clearer idea of how much they could expect to receive in and out 
of work. 
14 In the 1960s an administrative device called the ‘wage stop’ prevented 
families from receiving more in benefits than they had had in wages but did 
not count in-work expenses such as travel costs.
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Tax credits remain the Government’s key policy to combat child poverty by 
increasing parents’ incentives to become and remain employed and by maintaining 
work incentives for all low earners. In addition, relevant to long-term unemployed 
people, a programme of active case management was delivered through the New 
Deal, or welfare-to-work, programmes.15 These programmes include mandatory 
requirements for unemployed people receiving JSA to actively seek work, as well 
as increased access for lone parents to work-focused advice and encouragement. 
These services are delivered mostly through Jobcentre Plus, Britain’s public benefits 
and workforce development system. 
Evaluative research on these aspects of the welfare-to-work strategy has reported 
broadly favourable outcomes. Nonetheless, there was growing concern about the 
sustainability of the low-wage jobs that long-term unemployed people typically 
took and their potential for income growth. The current New Deal programmes 
focus on job placement rather than in-work support. The New Deal for Disabled 
People (NDDP) offers the most post-employment support and the NDLP offers 
some. But ND25+ offers limited and short-term in-work support to help customers 
retain work and none to support advancement. 
Initially, only the Gateway provisions of ND25+ (a four-month period of job 
search, advice, training or other specialist help) were mandatory. It was soon clear 
that, despite the assistance offered by the New Deal, a substantial proportion of 
long-term unemployed people still did not get and keep paid work. This led to 
successive policy reviews and consequent attempts to increase the scheme’s ‘pace 
and purpose’ and to refocus its strategy to help more of its most disadvantaged 
customers.16 There were also pilot projects for more specialised interventions. For 
example, the StepUP pilot scheme placed very long-term unemployed people who 
had emerged from ND25+ without paid work into a subsidised job for a year. The 
results of StepUP were qualified by high rates of non-participation, but one study 
suggested that, for those who did participate, the programme might have helped 
improve their persistence in work and discouraged a return to benefits:
15 JSA is a conditional cash benefit available in Great Britain to unemployed 
individuals who are actively seeking work. Recent workers who built up 
entitlements while employed can receive contribution-based JSA for six 
months, unaffected by other household income, but other JSA recipients 
have their household income assessed. JSA rules do not allow someone to 
leave work voluntarily without losing benefits. IS is an (almost) unconditional 
out-of-work benefit typically received by lone parents who are unemployed 
or working less than 16 hours a week. Entitlement to IS is assessed against 
other income and its value varies with family size and composition.
16 See, for example, Adebowale, 2004.
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‘Once in employment, participants were more motivated and confident 
about their ability to find and maintain another job. Most were keen not to 
return to the routine of signing on.’17
The ERA programme shifted the focus of service delivery towards sustaining and 
progressing in employment, in addition to job placement. ERA offered both pre-
employment and in-work support to assist low-waged and unemployed individuals 
to maintain full-time, steady jobs with better working conditions and at the same 
time to help them leave the cycle of moving between work and spells receiving 
Government benefits.
ERA’s policy relevance for the ND25+ group has grown since its design was 
conceived in 2002. A DWP paper published in October 2005, acknowledged the 
importance of retention and progression in work, in addition to job placement, as 
the next stage in welfare reform.18 More recently, in October 2006, a paper was 
published discussing the importance of both pre-employment and in-work support 
in combating child poverty and reinforcing Government policy to reach the 2010 
target of a 50 per cent reduction from 1999 poverty levels. This paper explicitly 
recommended rolling out ERA as a national programme, should the evaluation find 
it to be successful.19 In December 2006, the final report of the Leitch Review of 
Skills, which considered the UK’s long-term skills needs, signalled the importance 
of focusing on sustainability and progression in work and called attention to 
the ERA project.20 As part of the response to the Leitch recommendations, two 
new Public Service Agreement (PSA) indicators, one for retention and one for 
progression, have been put in place.21
The Government’s recent command paper, Ready for work: full employment in 
our generation, published in December 2007,22 introduced a set of reforms that 
will reunite Jobcentre Plus services for their unemployed customers, essentially 
combining the various New Deal provisions into a single programme or a Flexible 
New Deal (FND). All the mandatory New Deal schemes (essentially all the New 
Deals, except those for lone parents, disabled people, and partners) will provide 
greater flexibility and more personalised support for people of all ages seeking 
work, including self-employment. Action is promised ‘….to help people break 
the cycle of short-term work and end repeated long-term unemployment and 
benefit claims’ together with ‘…a skills screen…’ to identify any potential basic 
literacy, language and numeracy skills needs at the start of every claim for JSA. 
People with the longest duration on benefits will be targeted for earlier support 
17 Bivand et al., 2006.
18 Department for Work and Pensions, 2005.
19 Harker, 2006.
20 HM Treasury, 2006.
21 See http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/A/5/pbr_csr07_psa2.pdf, and 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/5/9/pbr_csr07_psa8.pdf
22 Department for Work and Pensions, 2007.
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and there will be pre-employment training and basic skills provision that support 
further development and progression in work. The system will become more 
flexible and customer-centred. For all customer groups, it will move more swiftly to 
intervention in training and preparation, as well as mixing public and private sector 
provision and following through after job placement. There is now a widespread 
recognition, based upon growing research evidence, that individuals’ barriers to 
work do not all vanish once they get a job and that continued post-employment 
support is an attractive policy option. 
1.4 Research on retention and advancement in work
A literature review conducted before the ERA demonstration began found that, 
although some research existed on low-wage workers’ difficulties with retention 
and advancement in work, as described in this section, there was relatively little 
hard evidence on what policies improve outcomes, especially for people recently on 
benefits. Job retention and advancement are important concerns for a significant 
portion of the labour force. While about nine out of ten workers remain in work 
steadily, recurring unemployment and lack of advancement are common among 
disadvantaged and low-paid workers.23 Many become entrenched in a ‘low-
pay, no pay cycle’, in which they shift repeatedly between low-wage work and 
unemployment. Often these individuals seek Government benefits to supplement 
their income. Paid work, therefore, is often a temporary solution to poverty, as jobs 
are frequently not sustained, thus resulting in recurrent poverty.24 Hence, what 
has been termed ‘the low pay, no pay cycle’ is an important driver of recurrent 
poverty.
In the face of the restructuring of labour markets over the past 30 years, certain 
forms of work and income insecurity have grown, particularly at the lower end.25 
For example, although overall employment has fallen dramatically– and along 
with it, ND25+ caseloads – many households are finding it difficult to maintain an 
adequate standard of living with just one earner. Lone parents re-entering work 
are particularly vulnerable to problems with job retention26 and low-skilled men 
fare little better. Those with low-level skills and poor educational qualifications 
have been particularly badly hit by the labour market shift from manual to service 
industries.27 The predominance of casualised employment at the bottom end of 
the labour market has contributed to repeated movements between work and 
benefits.28 Reflecting this, around two-thirds of JSA claims each year are repeat 
claims.29 
23 Morris et al., 2003.
24 Kemp et al., 2004; Smith and Middleton, 2007.
25 Dean and Shah, 2002; McDowell, 2003.
26 Hales et al., 2000; Evans et al., 2004.
27 Gregg and Wadsworth, 1999; Nixon, 2006.
28 Furlong and Cartmel, 2004; Carpenter, 2006.
29 Evans, 2007.
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People who struggle to retain employment and to advance in work can face a 
multitude of barriers to finding and keeping well-paid jobs. Many in the ND25+ 
group face severe labour market disadvantages, such as lack of suitable jobs, lack 
of skills and/or outdated skills, lack of suitable training, a short or patchy work 
history, transport difficulties, lack of confidence, lack of motivation to work and 
employer prejudices regarding age and work history. About 30 per cent say they 
are suffering from some long-term illness or disability. Forty per cent have low 
education levels, with only a basic qualification (meaning they have completed 
examinations taken around age 15 or 16 but have not completed further education) 
or no educational qualifications at all. Some of the long-term unemployed also 
have criminal records, drug or alcohol dependence, learning difficulties, mental or 
physical health problems or are simply resistant to re-engagement in paid work.30 
Moving frequently between work and benefits may have a ‘scarring’ effect, 
because individuals who spend more than a few weeks unemployed have been 
shown to experience chronic difficulty in re-establishing themselves in the labour 
market.31
The literature on job retention indicates that low-wage workers leave employment 
for a variety of reasons. Some have short-term contracts, which workers often 
accept because the labour market seems to offer few other opportunities. There 
is also evidence that many leave work voluntarily. Some low-wage workers see an 
unfavourable contrast between the kinds of work they feel able to do and the jobs 
they get. Importantly for ERA, the literature suggests that individuals’ barriers to 
employment often persist after they enter work. There is also a growing concern 
regarding low-wage workers’ prospects for advancement. Wage inequality in the 
UK has risen since the 1980s,32 while wage mobility has declined.33 These trends 
indicate that few low-wage workers move into better jobs. They remain, instead, 
at junior levels in jobs requiring few higher-level skills, which are often part-time 
or temporary and which tend to offer few opportunities for training.34 Conditions 
that threaten job retention also often present barriers to advancement in work. 
Research shows that employees earning the lowest wages and whose working 
conditions are poor, are generally less able to negotiate better working conditions 
for themselves35 and are actually more likely to return to benefits than to improve 
their earnings.36 Poor prospects for advancement are also associated with decisions 
to leave work, which worsen the ‘scarring’ effect and have implications for such 
workers’ future labour market participation.
30 Adebowale, 2004.
31 Arulampalam, 2001.
32 Machin, 1999.
33 Dickens, 2000b; Stewart and Swaffield, 1999.
34 Dickens, 2000a.
35 Dex and Smith, 2001.
36 Dickens, 2000b.
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ND25+ participants who do find work are widely believed to have some of the 
poorest retention records. Official statistics showed a persistently low proportion 
of ND25+ participants leaving benefits for a paid job; with estimates ranging from 
one-third to 40 per cent. But among those who did enter work, over 40 per cent 
of this group were unemployed again a year later.37 The National Employment 
Panel (NEP) worried about the lack of sustained employment:
‘Only 25 per cent of participants [in ND25+] move from benefit into 
sustained, unsubsidised jobs.38 Almost half (46 per cent) of those who leave 
the programme end up back on welfare.’39 
(italics in original)
More recent reviews40 have concluded that among certain low-paid and insecure 
workers, the ‘low-pay, no pay’ cycle persists, even during this most recent period 
of high UK employment levels: ‘[T]here now appears to be a widespread consensus 
that progression in the labour market is as important in terms of economic 
competitiveness and social justice as is ending worklessness,’ stated a recent 
research review. The review went on to cite ERA’s first findings and concluded: 
‘While there has been success in recent years in raising the employment rate, 
there is an increasing concentration of unemployment and low-paid temporary 
work as a result of a combination of the type of work that [long-term unemployed 
people] are able to access and the barriers that they face in progression to more 
stable employment.’41 Establishing long-term unemployed people as permanent 
full-time workers with proper terms and conditions of service was the considerable 
task given to the Jobcentre Plus staff that worked on the ERA project.
1.5 Design of the ERA programme
The ERA programme was designed to test a method to improve job retention 
and advancement among low-income individuals. The primary policy aims of ERA 
were to:
•	promote a work-based welfare policy, building on the progress made by 
increased wage supplementation and the active case management of the New 
Deal;
•	 interrupt the ‘low-pay, no pay cycle’ and so lessen the ‘scarring effect’ of 
unemployment;
37 Hall et al., 2004.
38 The NEP went on to cite a range of such outcomes between 14 per cent and 
33 per cent for the worst- and best-performing districts.
39 Adebowale, 2004.
40 See, for example, Nunn et al., 2007.
41 Carpenter, 2006, cited by Nunn et al., 2007.
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•	 improve ‘job matching’ by placing customers in work that is likely to suit them 
in the longer term, which may include changing employers after beginning 
work;
•	provide longer-term ‘treatment’ for barriers to work by continuing to 
provide support after customers begin working and encounter barriers, such as 
transport, childcare or reversals in health; and
•	 reduce in-work poverty by promoting work advancement and training 
opportunities.
The Cabinet Office team devised the ERA demonstration project to offer services 
beyond those already offered by the New Deal.42 Table 1.1 summarises the staff 
and services available through ERA, compared with the services available to ND25+ 
customers who are not in ERA. The following section outlines the ERA model as 
designed. Chapters 2 and 3 discuss how the design was implemented.
Table 1.1 Staff and services available to ERA (programme group) 
 and non-ERA (control group) customers
ND25+
Feature
ERA 
(Programme)
Non-ERA 
(Control)
Job coaching staff
•	 PA:	Personal	Adviser
•	 ASA:	Advancement	Support	Adviser ASA
PA
Eligible for New Deal pre-employment services
•	 Job	placement	assistance	
•	 Advice	on	training	and	increasing	skills
 
Mandatory participation in New Deal pre-employment services  
Eligible for in-work support
•	 Coaching	on	advancement	in	current	position	and/or	finding	a 
 better job
•	 Rapid	re-employment	services	when	necessary

Eligible for in-work bonuses
•	 Retention bonus:	Up	to	six	payments	of	£400	for	each	period	 
 when customers work 30 or more hours per week for 13 out  
 of 17 weeks 
•	 Training Bonus:	Tuition	payment	of	up	to	£1,000	if	training	 
 undertaken while working; if training is successfully  
	 completed,	£8	for	every	hour	of	training,	up	to	£1,000

Eligible to receive Adviser Discretion Fund (ADF) money
•	 Pre-employment	funds	available	to	help	customers	obtain	work
 
Eligible to receive Emergency Discretion Fund (EDF) money
•	 In-work	funds	available	to	help	customers	stay	employed

42 For a detailed discussion of the design process, including all the background 
and theoretical considerations behind the ERA design, see Morris et al., 
2003.
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1.5.1 Work-related services
Customers who were assigned to the ERA programme were to work with an ASA 
for a maximum of 33 months over both pre-employment and in-work periods. 
The ASAs were drawn largely from the pool of PAs already working at Jobcentre 
Plus in the selected districts, who were provided with training on how to deliver 
ERA services. Research with these ASAs and remaining PAs showed that they did 
not differ significantly in their composition or in their broad approach to their 
work.43
ERA was designed so that in the pre-employment stage, ASAs coached their ERA 
customers to consider the advancement opportunities of a job before taking it 
and to try to identify work that would be a good fit with their skills and interests. 
Once in work, support should continue in order to help customers address any 
continuing or new barriers and to help them advance in their work, for example, 
through higher pay, more hours, a promotion, better pension provision or by 
finding a better job. ASAs were to listen carefully for any signs of difficulty in 
work but also to help customers envision advancement even when they were not 
experiencing difficulties.
To guide their work with customers, ASAs were to develop an Advancement 
Action Plan which set out job search, retention and advancement steps for each 
ERA customer. The plan, reviewed at each face-to-face meeting, was individually 
tailored for the customer to: 
•	 balance	short-term	requirements	with	longer-term	ambitions	and	goals;	
•	 incorporate	local	labour	market	opportunities;	
•	 lay	down	steps	to	achieve	goals;	and	
•	 connect	to	other	services	to	address	special	barriers.	
ASAs	also	had	an	EDF,	which	was	a	pool	of	up	to	£300	per	customer	to	divert	minor	
financial emergencies that threatened to prevent a customer from continuing in 
work, such as the need for special clothing, new tools, car repairs or help with 
short-term childcare problems. It became available only when a customer was in 
employment of 16 hours or more per week. The EDF was separate from the pre-
employment ADF, which was available to PAs as well as to ASAs (in other words, 
to both non-ERA and ERA advisers) to make purchases that would help out-of-
work customers obtain a job or accept a job offer. 
1.5.2 Financial incentives 
In addition, the ERA programme included financial incentives – separate from the 
EDF – designed to promote retention and advancement. These financial incentives, 
as well as the EDF funds, were tax-free and did not count as income against 
entitlement to tax credits or Housing Benefit. 
43 See Chapter 3 of Dorsett et al., 2007.
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Retention bonus
To motivate customers to enter full-time work or to make the transition from part-
time to full-time work and to encourage them to do so earlier than they might 
have	 otherwise	 considered,	 ERA	 offered	 up	 to	 six	 payments	 of	 £400	 for	 each	
period when customers worked 30 or more hours per week44 for 13 out of 17 
weeks.45	This	amounted	to	£2,400	for	a	customer	who	received	all	six	payments.46 
Customers were required to provide evidence of their employment and hours by 
showing wage slips and to come into the office to claim their retention bonus. 
This provided another opportunity for face-to-face contact with their ASA. 
Training bonus
ERA customers were also eligible for financial incentives to combine work and 
training. This was intended to encourage them to invest time and effort in 
developing skills that might promote their long-term career progression. While in 
work for at least 16 hours per week, customers qualified for tuition payments of 
up	to	£1,000	for	approved	courses	that	reflected	the	agreed	goals	in	their	own	
Advancement Action Plans and corresponded with local labour market needs. 
These payments were made directly to the training providers. 
In addition, customers who successfully completed an approved course received 
an	additional	bonus	of	£8	for	every	hour	of	training	completed,	up	to	a	maximum	
of	£1,000	(or	125	hours).	It	was	paid	only	for	training	within	the	33-month	ERA	
service period, so the courses must have been completed within this time for 
customers to receive the bonus.47
The primary hypothesis of ERA’s design is that a mix of job coaching and financial 
incentives, including adviser support while customers are employed as well 
as beforehand, can have a positive impact on individuals’ job retention and 
advancement. Before entering employment, customers would be advised to find 
good jobs with prospects for advancement; once they were in work, they would 
be offered continuous close support as well as financial incentives to encourage 
them to stay in work and take up training opportunities. The in-work support 
44 In 1997, the OECD set 30 hours as the cut-off to delineate part-time and 
full-time work (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
1997). In ERA, part-time work is tied to WTC eligibility rules, which set the 
threshold at a minimum of 16 hours per week and specify that an extra 
amount be paid for work of 30 hours or more per week.
45 This provision accommodates the likelihood that many workers may lose 
jobs and offers an incentive for quick re-employment.
46 At the currency exchange rate in effect on 11 February 2008, these retention 
bonus payments were equivalent to US$780 and US$4,680, respectively.
47 Customers could claim the payment after the 33-month period as long as 
the training was completed within the 33 months; this was to allow for the 
delay in the production of certificates.
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would also help them to continue to resolve any barriers to work they might have. 
The design envisioned that these strategies would result in higher retention and 
would make advancement more likely.
The development of the programme was inspired by a similar demonstration, 
the US ERA programme, which was already being implemented in several US 
states. Launched in 1999, the US ERA demonstration tests a variety of retention 
and advancement programmes and has many features that are similar to the UK 
demonstration (see Box 1.2). The US ERA demonstration is directed by MDRC. 
Many of the early findings from the US project informed the implementation of 
the UK ERA programme.
 
Box 1.2 Description of the US ERA project and the Work Advancement 
and Support Center demonstration (WASC)
US ERA: 
Launched in 1999, the US ERA project is evaluating the effectiveness of 16 very 
different programme approaches located in eight US states. The programmes’ 
aims and target populations vary, as do the services they provide. Some of 
them focus on advancement, i.e. helping low-income workers move into better 
jobs by offering services such as career counselling, education, training and 
financial incentives. Others focus on both placement and retention, and aim to 
help participants, mostly ‘hard-to-employ’ people (such as welfare recipients 
with disabilities or substance abuse problems), find and hold jobs. Finally, 
other programmes have mixed goals and serve a variety of populations.
WASC: 
In an effort to help US workforce development and welfare systems meet the 
needs of low-wage workers and their families, MDRC developed the WASC 
demonstration. This project aims to test the feasibility and effectiveness of 
establishing WASC units – locations where staff would target low-wage 
workers for employment retention and advancement services in combination 
with education about and easier access to financial work supports – in ‘one-
stop’ employment centres in four communities around the country. The 
establishment of WASC units began in 2005.
A related demonstration project, the WASC demonstration, was launched in the 
US in 2005, two years after the UK ERA programme began (see Box 1.2). MDRC 
designed and is evaluating WASC, and findings from both the US and UK ERA 
programmes have informed its implementation. Like the UK ERA programme, 
both US projects are being assessed through randomised control trials.
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1.6 The ERA evaluation
1.6.1 Site selection
Six Jobcentre Plus districts from the national total of 50 were chosen to be a part 
of the demonstration, each selected strategically so that the programme would be 
tested in several different types of areas. 
At the time when districts were selected for the ERA programme, a new integrated 
service model had been introduced but had not been fully implemented. This 
was a very large operation to integrate the work of the Benefits Agency and the 
Employment Service into a single service. It was decided that the ERA districts 
would be drawn only from those, half the total, where the new model had been 
operating for a minimum of six months prior to the start of ERA, so that they 
would be relatively stable administratively by the time ERA began. From 25 eligible 
districts, six were chosen to meet the following criteria:
•	 all	were	 to	be	districts	with	 a	 large	number	of	 customers	 expected	 to	 enter	
ND25+ and NDLP;
•	 some	were	 to	be	districts	with	a	 substantial	proportion	of	ND25+	and	NDLP	
entrants from an ethnic minority background;48 
•	 the	districts	were	to	be	spread	across	varied	regions	encompassing	some	urban,	
some semi-urban, and some rural regions. 
Based on these criteria, one district was chosen in each of the following regions:
•	 East	Midlands;
•	 London;
•	 North	East	England;
•	 North	West	England;
•	 Scotland;
•	Wales.
Figure 1.1 shows the approximate locations of these six districts. 
48 Information on the number of ethnic minority customers by Jobcentre Plus 
district was obtained from the New Deal Evaluation Database.
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Figure 1.1 Map of the six ERA districts
The districts vary considerably in terms of size, population characteristics and the 
local economy. For example, the population ranges from under 320,000 in the 
Welsh district to nearly a million in the East Midlands district.49 The more urban 
49 Office for National Statistics. 
SOURCE: Reproduced from Ordnance Survey map data by permission of the 
Ordnance Survey © Crown copyright 2001. 
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districts – those in London and North West England – also have relatively high ethnic 
minority populations. Unemployment rates in recent years varied substantially 
across the six districts. They were lowest in the East Midlands, Scotland and Wales 
(roughly four to five per cent in 2003/06) and highest in North West England 
(peaking at about nine per cent in 2005).50 Three of the six districts (London, 
East Midlands and North East England) saw unemployment rates begin to climb 
in 2006, following national trends. See Chapter 2 of the companion report for 
more information on the demographic and economic characteristics of the six 
districts.51
1.6.2 The ND25+ target group
ND25+ is a mandatory programme introduced in 1998 to assist long-term 
unemployed people back into work. In total, about 750,000 people have entered 
ND25+ and about 300,000 of these were recorded as leaving the scheme for paid 
work. The typical caseload is about 60,000 participants at any one point in time.
As discussed above, the first two years of ND25+ were disappointing, with low 
rates of re-engagement. Following a series of improvement trials and pilots in 
2000, a ‘re-engineered’ ND25+ was introduced in April 2001. The programme 
now targets individuals over the age of 24 who have been on JSA for 18 out of 
21 months or more (although about a quarter are given ‘Early Entry’ on special 
grounds, such as recent release from prison or exceptional leave to stay in the UK). 
ND25+ customers work with a Jobcentre Plus PA until they begin employment. 
Whereas the earlier form of ND25+ mandated entrants only to the ‘Gateway’, 
they are now required to participate in all four stages of job preparation:
•	 an	initial	interview	and	assessment;
•	 a	 four-month	 ‘Gateway’	period	 that	combines	 job	search,	advice,	 training	or	
other specialist help;
•	 a	13-week	‘Intensive	Activity	Period’	(IAP)	of	training,	work	placement	and	job	
search; and
•	 a	six-week	‘Follow-Through’	of	continuing	advice	and	support.
This re-engineered ND25+ was evaluated in 2001 and 2002 by IFS Research, 
which carried out several hundred semi-structured interviews, meetings and group 
discussions with staff, providers, clients and employers.52 Those in a position to 
judge agreed that, despite ‘...a difficult start...’, there had been improvements. 
But it was not until 2002 that the programme started to work ‘...along the lines 
initially intended’. Staff in particular were said to be unanimous in this view: The 
programme offered more and was now more client-centred and tailor-made than 
before. The newly mandatory IAP had given the programme more ‘bite’, they said. 
50 Office for National Statistics.
51 Riccio et al., 2008.
52 See Winterbotham, Adams and Kuechel, 2002.
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For ERA, the important aspect of this evaluation was that ND25+, as a programme, 
was not judged fully operative or effective until a point little more than a year 
before the first customers were randomly assigned into ERA. 
Nationally, about 80 per cent of ND25+ customers are men, though the number 
of women entering the scheme has been increasing; 13 per cent belong to an 
ethnic minority.53 It is also important to bear in mind that an increasing minority 
have children living with them. In this ERA sample, 16 per cent had dependent 
children; their work incentives will be similar to those of lone parents, as they rely 
on larger amounts of tax credits. 
Clients with multiple disadvantages may represent at least a quarter of the current 
caseload, totalling about 100,000 entries a year. At least a third of these are on 
their second, or even their third, time around the system.
For those who become employed through ND25+ but who subsequently lose their 
job, the rules for rejoining the New Deal vary according to the length of the work 
spell. If they were employed for 13 or fewer weeks, then they would automatically 
return to JSA and the ND25+ regime. However, if they were employed for more 
than 13 weeks, they would be eligible only for JSA and would have to fulfill the 
usual requirement for fortnightly visits to Jobcentre Plus to ‘sign on’. They would 
not be eligible for ND25+ advisory support.
Although the ND25+ group was targeted for the evaluation because of its poor 
retention records, it is important to place the size of this group in context. In 
2006/07, for example, about 105,000 persons entered ND25+, out of a total 
working-age population of about 30 million. In addition, only a minority of those 
who commence a claim for JSA continue on for 18 or more months and are 
mandated to join ND25+. In 2004/05, for example, only about six per cent of JSA 
claims reached 18 consecutive months. Nonetheless, it is a group that faces severe 
labour market disadvantages and one that might benefit from ERA. 
1.6.3 The random assignment design and the intake process 
Figure 1.2 illustrates the random assignment process. When customers came into 
Jobcentre Plus offices, basic demographic information was recorded and they 
were told of the possible advantages of participating in the ERA programme. They 
were then invited to enter the demonstration and were told that they had a 50 
per cent chance of being selected for ERA services. 
53 Hall et al., 2004. 
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Figure 1.2 Random assignment process for ND25+ customers
Some customers, initially up to a quarter of ND25+ entrants to whom the offer 
was made, declined it, though later this proportion fell sharply when greater 
mention was made of the financial incentives. Those refusing were often those 
most keen to sever their links with the benefits system as soon as they got a 
job. Those who went through a process of informed consent and accepted were 
assigned by a computerised algorithm to the programme group or to the control 
group.54 Of the, approximately,16,000 customers randomly assigned, 41 per cent 
were ND25+ customers.
54 A special study conducted by the Institute for Fiscal Studies as part of the 
ERA evaluation, carefully examined the issue of non-participation and its 
implications for interpreting the results of the main impact study. That 
analysis assessed how representative ERA study participants are of the full 
eligible population by first documenting the incidence of non-participation 
and then testing for the presence of any systematic differences between 
non-participants and participants in terms of observed characteristics and 
subsequent outcomes. The analysis found some differences of these kinds, 
especially among the ND25+ group, which had the larger proportion of 
non-participants overall. However, the report concluded that those who 
participated in ERA were not so different from the non-participants such 
that the study’s impact analysis would have produced different conclusions 
had the non-participants been included in the random assignment sample 
(See Goodman and Sianesi, 2007).
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The random assignment process was carried out successfully. As a result, programme 
and control group members shared similar characteristics, on average. This helps 
ensure that the control group will provide unbiased estimates of how programme 
group participants would have progressed over time had they never encountered 
ERA. The ERA demonstration represents the first time in the UK that a random 
assignment social policy evaluation has been carried out on such a large scale. 
Given the pioneering nature of this initiative, a special study, published in 2006, 
was undertaken to describe and capture lessons from the implementation of the 
random assignment process itself, including staff and customers’ reactions.55 
The study found that, although the process was not without its challenges, and 
although it appears, with hindsight, that some procedures could have been 
implemented better, the random assignment process generally proceeded well, 
especially considering the scale of the ERA programme. Most customers and staff 
viewed the process as fair. This experience showing that random assignment is 
practical in a UK context has encouraging implications, even beyond the ERA 
demonstration.
1.6.4 Key research areas 
The evaluation of ERA is divided into three research strands:
•	A process study: The purpose of the process study is to understand how ERA 
was implemented ‘on the ground’ – whether it was implemented as envisioned 
in its design, particular implementation challenges and any differences in service 
delivery across the six sites. It is intended to provide insight into possible reasons 
for the programme’s impacts, or in some aspects, its lack of impacts. 
•	An impact study: The impact study uses customer surveys as well as 
administrative data to compare the service receipt, employment, earnings, 
benefits receipt and other outcomes for ERA customers with those of the 
control group customers. For example, it examines whether programme group 
customers worked more than control group customers during the ERA service 
period, and whether the earnings of the programme group were higher than 
those of the control group. 
•	A cost and cost-benefit study: The cost study examines the total cost of 
implementing ERA, by adding up the total expenditures associated with operating 
it. It also provides a foundation for a cost-benefit study, which will seek to 
understand the net economic gains or losses generated by ERA by comparing 
the costs of the programme with the financial benefits it induces. This strand of 
the evaluation is not reported in this volume. 
This report focuses on the first two strands: It updates the assessment of ERA’s 
implementation provided in earlier reports and it examines, in detail, ERA’s impacts 
over the 24 months following random assignment for the ND25+ group. Longer-
term impact findings and a full cost-benefit analysis will be presented in future 
reports. 
55 Walker, Hoggart and Hamilton, 2006.
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1.6.5 Data sources
The ERA evaluation uses a rich and varied set of quantitative and qualitative data 
to assess ERA’s implementation and effectiveness. Table A.1 provides summary 
descriptions of each of these data sources. 
Researchers conducted multiple rounds of qualitative interviews with both staff 
and customers from 2004 to spring 2007. These data form the bulk of the 
implementation and process analysis of ERA but this analysis also relies on weekly 
diaries that Technical Advisers (TAs) kept from the beginning of random assignment 
to June 2005, as well as on data collected on site visits and observations made at 
various points throughout the course of ERA. It also draws upon findings from the 
two staff surveys presented with the year 1 results.56 
A survey was administered to customers 12 months after their date of random 
assignment (between December 2004 and February 2006) and again at their 
24-month anniversary (between November 2005 and March 2007). However, in 
contrast to the year 1 impact report and the year 2 analyses of outcomes for 
the two lone parent groups, survey data are used in this report only to provide a 
rough gauge of programme participation and service use. All other quantitative 
analyses, including the estimation of programme impacts on employment, 
earnings and benefits receipt, rely on administrative data. Employment and 
earnings administrative records data were obtained from the Work and Pensions 
Longitudinal Survey (WPLS) matched to data from HM Revenue and Customs. It 
should also be noted that the WPLS earnings data pertain only to the 2005/06 
tax year (which began in April 2005 and ended in March 2006). For many sample 
members, this roughly corresponds to the second relative year after random 
assignment but for some it largely covers their first relative follow-up year. Benefits 
receipt data were obtained from DWP.
The survey data are not used to estimate programme impacts for several reasons 
(see Appendix B for more details). The response rates to the first-year survey were 
significantly lower than those obtained from the lone parents and low contact 
rates looked set to continue for the second year, compounding the non-response 
problem. A decision was made to reallocate survey resources and field a larger 
sample of the WTC group, a group with a smaller first-year fielded sample but 
with a much higher response rate than the ND25+ group. As a result, the ND25+ 
fielded sample represents a smaller early cohort of customers randomly assigned 
between December 2003 and March 2004. Thus, effects estimated using the 
survey sample may not generalise to the full sample of ND25+ customers. In 
fact, an analysis of survey response finds some evidence of this type of ‘cohort 
bias’. Most importantly, however, the response analysis also found evidence to 
suggest response bias more generally, meaning that effects estimated for survey 
respondents cannot be generalised even to the narrow cohort from which the 
survey was fielded. For these reasons, the survey data are not used to provide 
56 Dorsett et al., 2007. 
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experimental estimates of the programme’s effects. However, these data are used 
in Chapter 3 to provide a look into patterns of programme participation while in 
work, since this analysis is non-experimental and is meant to provide a general 
assessment of customers’ interaction with the programme. 
Finally, the process study uses DWP administrative data on the financial incentives 
to measure the proportion of ERA programme group customers who received the 
employment retention and training bonuses, the EDF and training fees. 
1.7 Characteristics of the ND25+ research sample
As shown in Table 1.2, the ND25+ customers in ERA had characteristics similar to 
the national pattern: ND25+ customers in the research sample are largely older 
men – 82 per cent are male, nearly half are age 40 or older and 84 per cent are 
age 30 or older. Sixteen per cent have dependent children at home, while more 
have children who live elsewhere. Sixteen per cent are ethnic minorities – a higher 
proportion of ethnic minorities than either of the two lone parent groups in ERA. 
More than a third have no educational qualifications at all. The largest proportion 
(46 per cent) lives in social housing; 30 per cent live in private housing. Less than 
a quarter of the ND25+ customers have a driving licence and access to a vehicle. 
Two-thirds cite barriers to work, 44 per cent had no work experience in the three 
years before random assignment and only 20 per cent say they worked more than 
a year during that time. Among a group unemployed for 18 months or more, the 
duration of unemployment itself also constitutes a considerable barrier to work, 
in many cases accumulating years out of work.
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Table 1.2 Demographic profile of ND25+ customers 
 randomly assigned between October 2003 and  
 April 2005
Characteristic Percentage
Gender
Male 81.6
Female 18.4
Age
Under 30 16.2
30-39 36.3
40 or older 47.6
Age of youngest childa
No children 84.6
Under 7 8.4
7-11 2.9
12-16 2.4
17 or older 1.7
Race/ethnicity
Ethnic minority 16.4
White 83.6
Education (highest qualification obtained)b
None 35.8
GCSE 27.7
A-level 23.0
Other 13.5
Housing statusc
Family 23.9
Social 45.7
Private 30.4
Number of months worked in three years prior to random assignment
None 44.2
1-12 33.7
13+ 22.1
Cohort
Early (October 2003 - May 2004) 47.8
Late (June 2004 - April 2005) 52.2
No driving licence or lack of access to vehicle 76.8
Has barriers to workd 63.2
Severely disadvantagede 20.0
Sample size 6,782
Continued
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Table 1.2 Continued
Source: MDRC calculations from baseline information forms completed by DWP staff.
Notes: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
Sample includes all ND25+ customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005.
a Child’s age is asked only for children who are living with the customer.
b Participants who have General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) qualifications refers 
to those who have passed a series of examinations in a variety of subjects, usually taken at 
age 15 or 16. Participants with A-level qualifications have passed a series of more advanced 
examinations usually taken around age 18 or older. Those with no qualifications have 
completed neither series of examinations. 
c Family housing refers to situations where the customer is living with their parents or other 
friends or relatives. Social housing refers to housing in which the local authority (local 
government) or a private housing association is the landlord. Private housing refers to owner-
occupied housing or housing that the customer rents privately. 
d Barriers to work include housing, transport, childcare, health, basic skills or other problems.
e Severely disadvantaged refers to those participants with GCSE qualifications or lower, no work 
in the three years prior to random assignment and at least one barrier to employment.
ND25+ customers vary little across the districts in their educational background 
but vary more in their housing status and prior work experience (see Table 1.3). 
Again, none of the districts has clearly more or fewer disadvantaged customers. 
However, customers in North West England may be slightly more disadvantaged; 
relatively high percentages live in social housing and lack significant previous 
work experience. Both North West England and North East England have a higher 
proportion of ND25+ customers living in social housing (around half), while London 
is on the low end at around a third. North West England and London have high 
proportions of customers who did not work any months in the three years prior 
to random assignment. They also have the smallest proportion of customers who 
worked only 13 months or less. These two districts – the more urban districts – 
also have higher concentrations of ethnic minority ND25+ customers. Customers 
in Scotland, on the other hand, show relatively high levels of work experience; 
over a quarter reported that they worked 13 months or more in the three years 
before random assignment.
1.8 Timeline of ERA implementation 
DWP was responsible for managing the implementation of the ERA demonstration. 
It was in charge of overseeing site selection, establishing guidance on service 
delivery, overseeing a training strategy, selecting and overseeing the evaluators, 
and monitoring service delivery in the sites. It developed a special project team 
to carry out programme implementation functions and to work closely with the 
sites. It also assigned an evaluation team to work with the research contractors 
and monitor the evaluation. 
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Random assignment began in October 2003 in five of the six ERA sites and in 
January 2004 in the sixth site (see Figure 1.3). Intake for the New Deal groups 
was extended to last a year, though the last few customers were enrolled in April 
2005. Following their 33-month service period, the first customers moved off the 
programme beginning in July 2006, and the last customers phased out in October 
2007. 
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Several other policies affecting Jobcentre Plus coincided with the implementation 
of ERA. Figure 1.3 highlights a few of these policies. In 2003 and 2004, the 
Pathways to Work pilot, an employment programme for recipients of IB and 
disabled recipients of IS, began in three of the six ERA districts. Although this 
intervention does not directly affect ERA customers, it was a priority programme for 
districts and district resources and so may have affected the attention and funding 
dedicated to ERA during that first year before funding for ERA was ring-fenced.57 
In addition, DWP implemented important changes in staffing and performance 
goals. In January 2006, Jobcentre Plus underwent an organisational review, which 
resulted in staff reductions and reorganisation. 
1.9 The remainder of this report
The remainder of this report is organised as follows:
•	Chapter 2 discusses programme operations, updating the findings from 
previous reports. It highlights the continued evolution of ERA over time and 
also the challenges encountered as operations finally came to an end in autumn 
2007. 
•	Chapter 3 reports on the patterns of programme participation, service receipt 
and take-up of the financial incentives over the first two years after random 
assignment. Drawing on qualitative as well as quantitative data, it focuses on 
customers’ experiences once employed and compares the patterns of in-work 
service receipt among the working customers in ERA with the experiences of 
workers in the control group.
•	Chapter 4 describes the impacts of ERA on employment, earnings, and benefits 
receipt over the two years after random assignment. It focuses first on effects 
for the full sample, pooled across the six districts, and then on the districts 
separately. 
•	Chapter 5 analyses the variation in ERA’s effects across key customer subgroups. 
It considers whether the programme’s effects are broadly based or concentrated 
among particular types of customers.
•	Chapter 6 offers conclusions about the report’s findings for the ND25+ group.
57 Ring-fencing, as the name implies, meant setting aside staff and/or resources 
specifically for ERA.
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2 Implementation of ERA
2.1  Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of the Employment Retention and Advancement 
programme’s (ERA’s) implementation, building on a detailed exploration presented 
in an earlier evaluation report.58 It describes the challenges of introducing a post-
employment service into the six Jobcentre Plus districts and highlights critical 
changes and developments that helped to shape ERA’s programme delivery to 
New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+) customers. Since the implementation story is largely 
a generic one for the three customer groups, the information presented here 
is similar to the material presented in the companion report on the New Deal 
for Lone Parents (NDLP) and Working Tax Credit (WTC) groups.59 However, any 
procedures or events that differed for the ND25+ group are highlighted. 
The main data sources for this analysis are qualitative interviews and focus groups 
with Advancement Support Advisers (ASAs) and interviews with ERA management 
staff. It is important to note that these data extend beyond the time period covered 
by the two-year impact data presented in Chapter 4. Whereas those impact data 
cover the experiences of participants through November 2006, the qualitative 
data cover programme operations through June 2007, by which time a substantial 
number of participants were reaching the end of their 33-month tenure in the 
programme. Programme operations ended a few months later, in October 2007 
(see Box 2.1). Therefore, the available impact findings do not yet capture the full 
effects of ERA’s operational phase or the last months of customers’ involvement 
in the programme. 
 
58 See Dorsett, et al., 2007, which provides an in-depth assessment of the first 
two years of operating ERA. 
59 Riccio et al., 2008.
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Box 2.1 Periods of ERA programme operations and data collection
 
Overall, the analysis suggests that ERA was largely implemented as designed, 
though with some qualifications. There were inconsistencies across districts, 
between offices and across staff within districts. The quality of implementation 
also varied over time. Implementation improved considerably between the first 
and second years of operation but the districts faced new challenges in the third 
year as the operational phase of the demonstration began to wind down. 
2.2 Programme implementation and delivery
A fundamental issue for ERA was the Jobcentre Plus context in which the 
programme was delivered. The delivery of ERA post-employment services occurred 
within the parameters of an organisation that was primed to support job seekers 
up to the point of job entry but not beyond. ERA introduced a new dimension 
of working with Jobcentre Plus customers that required changes to delivery 
structures, resources, skill sets and monitoring and rewards systems. While ERA’s 
staff were generally up for the challenge and championed the programme’s aims, 
it is important to note these challenges. The ethos behind ERA essentially entailed 
a cultural shift within the organisation. (For a district-by-district summary of key 
implementation features, problems and accomplishments and significant events, 
see Table C.1.) 
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(Two-year follow-up period for most survey respondents fell within these dates)
October 2003 Programme operations October 2007
Sample intake begins July 2006: First 
customers begin 
exiting ERA
ERA programme 
operations end
Qualitative field researchSeptember 2003 June 2007
Customer survey
December 2003 March 2006
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2.2.1 The structure and management of ERA
Because districts were given autonomy over how ERA was managed, somewhat 
different models for programme delivery emerged. The extent to which ERA 
delivery was affected by the Jobcentre Plus context was partly determined by 
whether a district established a centralised or decentralised management structure 
for operating ERA. The centralised system involved assigning overall responsibility 
for ERA across the whole district (which included multiple Jobcentre Plus offices) 
to a dedicated ERA manager, with local ASA managers overseeing frontline ERA 
staff. This made it easier to guide staff and hold them accountable for delivering 
ERA’s retention and advancement agenda. In contrast, under the decentralised 
system, districts assigned responsibility for managing ERA frontline staff at the 
office level to non-ERA Jobcentre Plus managers. As a consequence, frontline staff 
were more likely to feel the pressure of conflicting demands – meeting Jobcentre 
Plus’ job entry goals versus delivering ERA’s post-employment services to employed 
customers. In this environment, there was a tendency to sideline ERA’s assistance 
to working customers.
Centralised management was applied in two districts: East Midlands and Wales. A 
variant on the centralised structure involved adopting a Post-Employment Team. 
This was designed to ring-fence60 staff to enable them to focus on delivering 
in-work support to working customers. This structure was implemented in two 
districts: London and North West England. As a consequence of this model, ND25+ 
working customers who subsequently lost their jobs, were assigned another 
adviser outside the Post-Employment Team. This practice disrupted the continuity 
of advisory support for these individuals. 
Other changes in Jobcentre Plus management policies that were not directly 
related to ERA had significance for ERA delivery. For example, North East England 
and Scotland both experienced district reorganisation during the course of ERA, 
meaning that some local offices were reassigned from one Jobcentre Plus district 
to another. Indeed, some ASAs spoke of having multiple line managers over a 
three-year period. Changes in management structures and in staffing often 
disrupted ERA delivery, particularly when new managers did not embrace the 
post-employment ethos of ERA, when inexperienced ASAs were introduced or 
when ASAs took over the caseloads of advisers who moved off ERA. 
ASA staffing levels were an issue throughout ERA delivery. In the interviews, ASAs 
who had high caseloads, some of whom were often the only ERA staff member in 
the office, said that they were unable to deliver ERA according to guidelines. Some 
60 From the start of ERA, the districts were given extra resources so that the 
project would not undermine the work of Jobcentre Plus. However, these 
resources were not ring-fenced in the first year and were often used to 
fund non-ERA work. After ERA funds were ring-fenced, the district manager 
could not use them for any other Jobcentre Plus work. Likewise, an ERA 
ring-fenced ASA should not be allowed to undertake any other Jobcentre 
Plus activities.
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districts (East Midlands and Wales) deployed peripatetic ASAs to cover a large rural 
area and these advisers experienced downtime while travelling to multiple offices, 
which detracted from time with ERA customers. Staff shortages were particularly 
acute in Wales, where, during the first year of implementation, there were only 
two peripatetic advisers available for members of the ND25+ programme group. 
Consequently, job placement and other pre-employment support were weaker 
for the programme group relative to that provided to the control group under the 
regular New Deal programme. This problem may have affected the volume of ERA 
ND25+ customers in Wales who entered work, as discussed in Chapter 4. Overall, 
districts took time to build up ASA staff and some districts suffered relatively more 
from this lack of resources. 
2.2.2 Staff training and support
Continuing support was critical to advisory and management staff, because ERA 
demanded new skills and re-allocation of resources. Yet training was not timely, 
nor was it delivered consistently to all advisers, particularly among staff who 
arrived later in the programme. Staff reported that no systematic training on best 
practices for delivering in-work support was provided within districts until post-
employment workshops were organised in January 2005, when most advisers had 
been functioning in their ERA posts for approximately one year. ERA management 
and advisory staff alike identified this training as a significant turning point in 
programme delivery. 
Other support was concentrated in the first two years of ERA delivery when 
Technical Advisers (TAs) and the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) Project 
Team were in place. This was a function of ERA being a time-limited demonstration 
project. The deployment of a team of six TAs who worked closely with the evaluation 
contractors was an important and distinctive feature of the ERA demonstration. 
One TA was assigned to each district. It was their responsibility to ensure not only 
that the evaluation’s random assignment procedures were properly implemented 
but also, alongside the DWP Project Team, to help train ASAs and to contribute 
ideas about good practice for delivering post-employment assistance to customers. 
In addition to their hands-on assistance, some TAs also supported ASAs by writing 
electronic newsletters and organising peer support through e-mail exchanges. 
The TAs worked with the districts until June 2005 and some staff identified their 
departure as a significant juncture for ERA. As detailed in previous reports,61 ASAs 
and local managers valued TAs not only as a key resource on programme rules 
and post-employment practices but also for the support they provided to staff, 
particularly to ASAs in districts that followed a decentralised delivery model. In 
these cases, the TAs helped to compensate for the lack of standardised focus 
and direction that might otherwise have been provided by a centralised ERA 
management structure. The frequency of district-wide ASA meetings, which were 
often organised by the TAs, also declined in some districts after they left the 
demonstration. 
61 Hall et al., 2005; Dorset et al., 2007. 
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2.2.3 Delivering out-of-work support
As will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, a substantial number (just over half) 
of ND25+ programme group customers did not enter work within the two-year 
follow-up period and among those who found work, a notable number did not 
sustain employment while on ERA. In contrast, about 70 per cent of the NDLP 
group entered work and the majority of these lone parents remained in work 
during the same period. One implication of this is that ERA pre-employment 
services included disproportionately more ND25+ customers throughout the 
duration of the demonstration. 
As stated previously, the types of pre-employment services offered did not 
qualitatively differ for ND25+ programme and control groups during the first year 
of the ERA programme.62 ND25+ is a mandatory programme with a prescribed 
timetable of structured activities (as described in Chapter 1). In the first year of ERA 
delivery, ASAs had less confidence in the skills required of them by the programme 
and less time to promote retention and advancement within the New Deal regime. 
By the second year of operations, following the advancement training and positive 
changes to programme structures, advisers in some of the districts reported that 
they were discussing long-term goals and advancement strategies with their non-
working customers. 
However, there continued to be non-working ND25+ customers who were not 
involved in the programme, despite ASAs’ efforts to engage them. In 2005, ASAs 
in some districts reported that, to prioritise in-work support, inactive ND25+ 
customers on ERA caseloads were shifted to the mainstream Jobseeker’s Allowance 
(JSA) system. This suggests that those non-working ERA customers would have 
received the same treatment as their control group counterparts. On balance, 
therefore, the research evidence suggests that throughout the ERA demonstration, 
ND25+ customers who did not enter work received a pre-employment service that 
was similar to the mainstream New Deal.63 
Also important for the ND25+ group was the support ASAs provided to those 
who lost a job. According to discussions with customers and advisers, this ’re-
employment’ support generally focused on job search and customers tended to 
make an appointment with their adviser when they went into the office to claim 
their benefit payments. But practices did vary across districts and individuals. There 
were also different arrangements in districts where pre- and post-employment 
caseloads were divided between different advisory teams and there was some 
variation in how quickly advisers were alerted to the change in employment status. 
It tended to be the case that working customers who maintained contact with an 
adviser continued to stay in touch if they left work. Some customers who became 
unemployed confirmed that they had taken the initiative to alert their ASA to 
the change in their employment status. Yet it was also reported that ASAs were 
sometimes not aware that a customer had returned to JSA. This indicates that 
62 See Chapter 3 in Dorsett et al., 2007.
63 The experience in Wales, mentioned previously, is a notable exception.
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effective communication systems were not always in place, and that direct contact 
between customers and their advisers was sometimes necessary for customers to 
benefit from the range of ERA supports. Where contact was not maintained with 
working customers, re-employment support was sometimes delayed or absent.
2.2.4 Delivering advancement support
It was evident that ASAs’ confidence in their ability to deliver post-employment 
support grew with experience. At first, ASAs were unfamiliar with what was 
entailed in providing post-employment support. As the programme progressed 
and they received specialised training, ASAs strengthened their skills and 
confidence in this area. A number of special guides, developed either by the 
TAs, the Project Team or independently within districts, helped to improve staff 
delivery of advancement-focused customer support. These included a ‘motivation 
sheet’, which aimed to identify an individual customer’s motivation and could be 
used as a ‘hook’ for maintaining engagement and Advancement Action Plans, 
which were used to record customers’ goals and strategies. Two districts, East 
Midlands and Wales, were relatively more proactive in promoting work retention 
and advancement concepts early in the implementation. Wales also introduced 
innovative advancement materials for use with non-working customers during the 
first year of implementation, although staffing shortages curtailed delivery to all 
ERA ND25+ customers.
The use of Advancement Action Plans is a good example of how the delivery of 
ERA improved over time. Although these plans were to be used from the outset, 
advisers largely ignored them during the first year of operations. They viewed them 
as an unnecessary administrative burden, as they duplicated the New Deal action 
plans already required for pre-employment customers. Generally, at that time, 
Advancement Action Plans were completed for customers only as they entered 
work. During the programme’s second year of operation, most districts launched 
a big push to complete the plans for all customers, including those who were out 
of work and to house them on a shared computer drive that was accessible to all 
ASAs and managers. 
Towards the end of ERA, Advancement Action Plans had served three main 
functions: 
•	Monitoring ASAs’ work: Initially TAs and, latterly, managers, were able to use 
the action plans as a way of monitoring the post-employment services delivered 
by ASAs. The extent to which the managers utilised this opportunity varied 
across the districts, according to management structures and resources. It was 
generally more effective in centralised structures where time and expertise were 
available. In some districts, action plans were also reviewed to identify training 
support needs for staff development in conjunction with case conferencing and 
peer mentoring. 
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•	Managing caseloads: ASAs used action plans to remind themselves of 
customers’ details and to check whether agreed activities were being 
undertaken (by customers and staff). They allowed customers to be transferred 
more effectively between staff, when necessary, and also provided a means of 
tailoring contacts with customers to their individual circumstances. 
•	Working with customers on advancement: Some advisers also used action 
plans in their meetings with customers to develop advancement goals and 
collaboratively agree upon the steps needed to reach them. Goals and plans 
were then revisited, monitored and revised, if necessary, at each contact. Staff 
felt that this built commitment and motivation among customers and some 
ASAs, therefore, gave the customer a copy of the plan. ASAs also used the plans 
to develop creative thinking around advancement with customers and to ‘think 
outside the box’. 
2.2.5 Monitoring in-work support
ERA’s implementation was further complicated and challenged by a performance 
system focused on Job Entry Targets that applied to all Jobcentre Plus advisers, 
including ASAs. This particular target-driven system, which assessed staff 
performance according to job placements, detracted from the post-employment 
focus of ERA and undoubtedly encouraged district managers to give limited 
attention to ERA. The system meant that ERA staff were under pressure to 
contribute towards job entries by concentrating on non-working customers. These 
included both ERA and non-ERA customers.64
Over time, there was rising acceptance in the districts that, as more customers 
entered the post-employment phase of ERA, the ASAs would be less effective at 
contributing to Jobcentre Plus business goals. But there were no targets developed 
that specified outcomes on retention and advancement. There was a general 
consensus among management that it was difficult to quantify advancement, given 
the broad meaning of the term. Rather, management focused on post-employment 
64 The approach to rewarding job entries was modified in April 2006 with the 
national introduction of Job Outcome Targets (JOTs) in Jobcentre Plus. Under 
this system, credit is earned for benefit recipients who moved off benefits 
on their own, even without assistance from Jobcentre Plus, and for non-
benefit recipients who obtained work through Jobcentre Plus self-help job 
search assistance. Evidence of job entry is obtained from Work and Pensions 
Longitudinal Study (WPLS) administrative records (see Chapter 1). Points are 
awarded when someone enters a new job, with more points attached to job 
entries for higher-priority customers. For example, helping an unemployed 
lone parent into work would earn 12 points, while helping an employed 
person change jobs would earn one point. Early evaluation findings indicate 
that the introduction of JOT has contributed to changes in the culture 
of delivery in Jobcentre Plus, including more team working and fewer 
competitive practices (Nunn et al., 2007). By the time these modifications 
took place, other changes in the delivery of ERA had served to strengthen 
the delivery of the post-employment programme.
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procedures and quantifiable records on customer contact frequency, referrals and 
bonus payments, as well as on observing customer interviews and monitoring the 
content of Advancement Action Plans. The monitoring of procedures to deliver 
in-work support developed over time and was not standardised across districts. 
In spring 2005, some districts reported that they had established benchmarks for 
contacting working customers with guidelines on the content of interviews. These 
were described as ‘objectives’, as opposed to ‘targets’. By 2006, according to staff 
survey data,65 about half of responding ASAs reported that they had benchmarks 
or targets for contacting their working customers. Still, a majority (74 per cent) 
reported that they were generally in contact with their working customers at least 
three times over any six-month period. One manager also spoke of monitoring 
ASAs’ post-employment work for health and safety reasons, so that she would be 
aware of when her staff were visiting customers outside the office and beyond 
Jobcentre Plus operational hours. Districts that were managed centrally were in a 
better position to consistently measure post-employment activity on a consistent basis. 
2.2.6 The promotion of ERA in the districts
The organisational context of Jobcentre Plus also posed problems for the way in 
which ERA was promoted within districts and supported by staff external to the 
programme. Across all districts, staff felt that ERA did not have a high enough 
priority within the remit of Jobcentre Plus. ERA staff attributed this to low senior 
management buy-in and to the mismatch between the job entry culture of 
Jobcentre Plus and ERA’s emphasis upon in-work support.
Over time, the situation improved, as awareness of ERA spread and in response 
to efforts by the DWP Project and Evaluation teams to lift the programme’s 
profile.66 In general, however, local Jobcentre Plus staff perceived ERA as having 
low governmental priority throughout its implementation, particularly in those 
districts that followed a decentralised management structure and in comparison 
with the Incapacity Benefit (IB) pilots that were operating at the same time in the 
East Midlands, North East England and Scotland.
2.3 The strength of the ERA programme over time 
Over time, several steps were taken to improve ERA staff’s capacity to assist their 
customers to meet their retention and advancement goals. In November 2004, the 
DWP Project Team ring-fenced the districts’ ERA budgets and, in April 2005, the 
Project Team set up a new financial accounting system and an ERA performance-
monitoring system within each ERA district. These changes helped to ensure that 
65 Dorsett et al., 2007.
66 As outlined in Chapter 1, DWP established a special project team to guide 
ERA’s implementation across the participating Jobcentre Plus districts, and 
it assigned an evaluation team to work with the research contractors and 
monitor the evaluation.
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ERA resources were channelled onto the programme. During this time, Post-
Employment Teams were also established in the London and North West England 
districts; some of the ASAs in the North East England, Scotland, and Wales districts 
were protected from mainstream Jobcentre Plus tasks through ring-fencing; and 
in the East Midlands, a second tier of ASA managers was introduced to provide 
more effective management support for ASAs. As mentioned previously, another 
important step was the specialised post-employment training for ASAs that the 
DWP Project Team, MDRC and an outside training expert organised in January 
2005 to strengthen ASAs’ capacity to engage and assist working customers. 
These and other efforts seemed to pay off. In staff interviews, ASAs and ERA 
managers expressed the view that their delivery of ERA greatly improved over time, 
as they continually built on their experiences and developed a better understanding 
of how to help their customers, especially in relation to their advancement in work. 
ERA’s implementation also benefited when an increased number of ASAs were 
assigned to the programme. For example, higher staff levels enabled some districts 
to re-engage customers who had drifted away from the programme and were 
not taking advantage of any of the ERA services or incentives. However, some 
districts, notably Wales, faced continual problems with low staffing levels. This 
posed an obstacle to re-engagement as ASAs focused on customers who were 
already participating in ERA. 
In many districts, changes in management structures influenced the strength of 
delivery over time. For example, ASAs in North West England felt that they had 
reached a peak with their delivery in January 2006, helped by ring-fencing, a Post-
Employment Team and the basing of staff in one office. And in June 2007, the 
London Post-Employment Team said that the delivery of ERA in their district had 
constantly improved.
Overall, a number of operations, management and advisory staff identified a 
period of approximately one year’s duration, spanning 2005 and 2006, as a period 
when ERA delivery was probably at its peak in most districts. However, in districts 
where the loss of the TAs in June 2005 was not compensated by additional ERA 
management, ASAs struggled to maintain momentum into 2006. 
Across all the districts, while the level of staff enthusiasm and understanding of ERA 
grew significantly over time, the delivery of ERA could still have been improved. 
Although by early 2006 staff largely understood the nature of the treatment they 
should be providing in ERA, they were still constrained by time. Resources being 
allocated to ERA had improved but these changes were fragile and varied across 
districts. 
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2.4 Programme delivery as ERA came to an end
The improvements observed in ERA operations generally extended to the months 
when the first customers started to flow off the programme in July 2006.67 Districts 
then found that the structures that had been put in place for the successful 
delivery of ERA, such as Post-Employment Teams and ring-fenced staff, were 
slowly dissolved as ERA approached an end. Many ASAs felt that the delivery of 
ERA weakened at that time.
One notable change in the delivery of ERA was the downsizing of the DWP ERA 
Project Team at the beginning of 2006. This made it more difficult to maintain 
central communication channels and contact among the districts began to decline. 
ASAs’ morale also suffered as ERA approached its end. In the 2006 and 2007 
discussions, ASAs expressed concern about their future positions within Jobcentre 
Plus, with some wishing to preserve the ‘specialness’ of the programme. 
2.4.1 Weaning customers off ERA
All districts followed similar procedures for communicating to customers that their 
time on ERA was coming to an end. This was variously referred to as a ‘weaning 
off’ or ‘disengagement’ period. A letter typically relayed this at six months before 
the end date, again at six weeks before the end, and again once ERA had ended. 
ASAs prepared personalised letters for active customers and standardised letters 
for inactive customers. This was a labour-intensive task and some ASAs felt that 
their time preparing correspondence for customers who were not engaged in 
the programme could have been better spent with those who were actively 
participating.
Across districts, ASAs gave varying levels of information and advice to parting 
customers. In North West England, they distributed a ‘disengagement folder’ 
that contained frequently-asked questions about job preparation, job hunting, 
budgeting or direct debits for utilities. The plan was to integrate this pack into 
mainstream Jobcentre Plus services. Some districts invited customers in for an 
interview at the six-month stage and it was often the case that ASAs personally 
communicated with customers with whom they were in more regular contact. In 
North West England, ASAs also called in pre-employment customers to meet at 
the time of their six-month letter. During the interview, ASAs informed customers 
of the in-work support available through ERA to act as a work incentive.
ASAs reported that customers who responded to the letters most frequently 
requested support for training. Some ASAs actively marketed the unused training 
allowance to their customers. Some districts also made an active decision to push 
the training incentives towards the end of ERA. 
67 October 2006 in the North West England district.
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2.4.2 Post-ERA customer contact
It was rare for ASAs to report continued contact with their ND25+ working 
customers who had completed their time on ERA. The districts neither encouraged 
nor discouraged post-ERA contact with customers. All advisers who participated in 
the spring 2007 focus groups confirmed that it was mainly their NDLP customers 
who sought advice post-ERA. All contact had been initiated by the customers. 
This outcome aligns with earlier reports on ND25+ customers generally being 
less open to in-work advisory support. (This is explored further in Chapter 3.) 
Some advisers felt that their ND25+ customers were reluctant to retain contact, 
either because they had negative attitudes towards Jobcentre Plus or because they 
desired ‘independence’ from the State. 
Therefore, demand on staff resources for continued support post-ERA was not 
found to be a significant issue for any of the ERA customer groups.
2.4.3 ERA staff reductions
Some of the key staff that were put in place to oversee ERA’s random assignment 
process and early implementation were removed as the programme entered 
its next phase. As noted earlier, the district TAs left in June 2005 and this was 
followed by the dissolution of the DWP ERA Project Team starting in early 2006. 
At the programme delivery level, all districts reduced staff resources on ERA as 
customer caseloads dropped, starting from summer 2006. This primarily affected 
advisory staff but in some districts, particularly those following a decentralised 
structure, ERA staff, including managers, were increasingly pulled off working on 
ERA to resume other duties in Jobcentre Plus offices. Senior management made 
decisions to reduce staff numbers and/or the percentage of time spent on ERA 
in order to balance their staff resources. The message was clear that ERA was 
‘running down’. For their own job security, ASAs also voluntarily moved to other 
posts (inside and outside Jobcentre Plus) as they became available.
Because staffing was reduced, advisers had to take on the caseloads of departing 
ASAs. As a result, some reported that their caseloads became unmanageable. 
This was particularly evident in Wales, where, in March 2007, there was only 
one adviser peripatetically serving all 132 working ERA customers (all groups) in 
the district. In addition, as customer caseloads dwindled, ASAs increasingly took 
on mainstream Jobcentre Plus tasks, which focused their attention away from 
programme delivery. This was more of a problem in the districts that followed a 
decentralised management model.
ASAs commented on how difficult it was for them to establish working relationships 
with their newly transferred customers and how this affected the quality of service 
they could provide. Some felt that the remaining time was too short for them to 
put a face to a name:
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‘I suppose I’ve got 90 odd, 70 of them are new to me…I spent three years 
looking at my caseload and knowing everything about everybody and now 
I’m looking at 70 names and they’re names. I don’t really know them at 
all…If you take over somebody else’s customers, it’s much more of an 
administrative process rather than a relationship.’
ASAs who specialised by ERA customer group commented that, with reductions in 
advisory staff, it was not always possible to assign customers to like advisers. This 
meant that some ND25+ customers would be served by lone parent advisers. Some 
of these ASAs were uncomfortable with this arrangement and found it difficult to 
adapt support to customers who had been through the more structured JSA and 
New Deal regimes.
2.5 Conclusions
The ERA programme of retention and advancement support required a longer-
term view and a proactive approach to ND25+ customers. The most significant 
challenge in ERA’s implementation was establishing a focus on post-employment 
support within the New Deal and JSA regimes. ERA staff – the ASAs and team 
managers – had to learn new skills to deliver the service and had to do so in a 
context in which they often felt that their efforts were not generally appreciated 
and rewarded. In an important sense, therefore, the ERA programme suffered 
because it was a time-limited demonstration project. 
Efforts were made, however, to improve implementation. The most important of 
these were to deliver specialised training to staff and to maximise the resources 
being allocated to ERA. By mid-2005 to early 2006, to varying degrees, ERA was 
being delivered as planned, though still not to its full potential. The final year of ERA 
delivery was characterised by some problems caused by the demonstration coming 
to an end but also by some customers making renewed efforts to take advantage 
of the programme – particularly the support for training – before their time on 
ERA ended. Perceptions of ERA from the viewpoint of ND25+ survey respondents 
are discussed in the next chapter, which highlights patterns of engagement in the 
programme and receipt of ERA services and financial incentives. 
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3 Use of ERA post-    
 employment services and 
 financial incentives
3.1 Introduction
This chapter explores New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+) programme group customers’ 
involvement with Jobcentre Plus and, in particular, their receipt of the Employment 
Retention and Advancement programme’s (ERA’s) post-employment adviser services 
and financial incentives. In addition, through comparisons with the control group, 
the chapter illustrates how ERA changed the experiences that customers normally 
had with Jobcentre Plus once they were in work. Thus, along with Chapter 2, it 
provides evidence on the extent to which the ERA treatment model was delivered 
as envisioned.
The chapter focuses primarily on the post-employment phase of ERA, because the 
programme’s distinctiveness is to be found largely in the services and incentives 
it offers to customers when they are in work. However, given that just over half 
of the ND25+ customer group did not enter work during the two-year follow-up 
period and a number of those who did enter work subsequently left, this chapter 
also briefly examines the out-of-work support offered to ERA programme group 
customers and how it differed from that offered to the control group.
The chapter shows that, as expected, rates of in-work contact and support from 
Jobcentre Plus were much lower for the control group than for the programme 
group. Still, as shown below, contacts between Jobcentre Plus staff and former 
customers in the control group did occur after customers took a job, though often 
informally and at customers’ initiative. This chapter shows the nature and degree 
of such contacts that would normally occur in the absence of ERA, as reflected in 
the experiences of the ERA control group.
For a variety of reasons, some customers might have chosen not to respond to 
ERA’s offer of in-work support or might not have been able to meet the conditions 
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necessary to receive the incentive payments. Implementation problems, such as 
those described in Chapter 2, might have also hindered take-up. A critical evaluation 
question, therefore, is: How much did working members of the programme group 
actually use ERA’s post-employment support? This chapter addresses that question, 
showing the extent to which the programme group received in-work employment 
advice and other adviser support from Jobcentre Plus, as well as discussing the 
nature of that support. As will be seen, engagement with employed customers 
was quite substantial, particularly in comparison to that of the control group, 
although far from universal.
The chapter begins with a brief discussion of pre-employment support. Following 
this, it examines the extent and quality of contact and engagement of working 
ND25+ customers with Jobcentre Plus staff, comparing the programme and control 
groups to reveal the extent to which ERA generated patterns that differed from 
‘business as usual’ for Jobcentre Plus. It then examines, more closely, the services 
working programme group members received, describing the types of help and 
support ERA advisers provided, as well as the delivery, take-up and uses of the 
programme’s various financial incentives. Finally, the chapter compares rates of 
support received by ND25+ programme group customers with rates for the New 
Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) group, discussed in the companion report.
Data used for this chapter come from both qualitative interviews with customers 
and staff, as well as quantitative data from the customer surveys. The customer 
surveys were administered at both the 12- and 24-month follow-up dates. 
However, as discussed in Chapter 1, the second-year survey includes only ND25+ 
customers who were randomly assigned between December 2003 and March 
2004. Therefore, quantitative survey data used in this chapter reflect only an early 
cohort of participants.68 These data include information on contact with, and help 
or advice received from, Jobcentre Plus staff, awareness of financial incentives and 
customers’ assessments of the influence of the retention bonus. In addition, this 
chapter uses financial payment records to determine the take-up of the various 
financial incentives. These data are available for all programme group members.
3.2 Pre-employment support
While ERA’s primary focus was on post-employment services and activities, ND25+ 
customers enrolled in the programme when they were out of work received pre-
employment services that were also offered to the control group. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, qualitative data from staff and customers show that pre-employment 
services differed little for ND25+ programme and control groups during the first 
68 As a test of the representativeness of this smaller survey sample, year 1 ERA 
service receipt rates were compared for the two-year respondent sample 
and the one-year respondent sample, which covers a broader cohort and 
was used in the first-year ERA report. The ERA service receipt rates were 
similar. 
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year of the ERA programme,69 as Advancement Support Advisers (ASAs) struggled 
to prioritise retention and advancement within the New Deal regime. This 
changed slightly in the programme’s second year, when there was a little more 
focus on discussing advancement in the pre-employment period. Data covering 
the full two years of follow-up (shown in Table D.1) show that the programme 
and control groups received similar levels of support for most types of help and 
advice when out of work. The exceptions to this were help to stay in or advance 
in future jobs, help setting up their own business and ‘other’ types of help or 
advice, for which greater numbers of programme group customers received 
support. This suggests that ERA programme group customers did receive slightly 
more retention- and advancement-focused help when they were out of work than 
control group customers70 but overall, the extent and patterns of support received 
when customers were out of work were similar.
The main difference in the pre-employment period for programme and control 
group customers, then, was that programme group customers should have been 
aware of their eligibility for the employment retention bonus. As shown in the 
first-year follow-up report, ASAs were relatively successful in building awareness 
of ERA’s in-work incentives during the pre-employment phase.71 Therefore, any 
impact ERA might have on moving customers into work is most likely to be due 
primarily to the incentives provided by the employment retention bonus.
3.3 Patterns of engagement with Jobcentre Plus among 
 working customers
The remainder of the chapter focuses on the post-employment support received 
by working programme group customers. However, it is important to note that 
only about half of the ND25+ programme group entered work and hence, became 
eligible for this in-work support. Separate analyses (not shown) show that there are 
some small key demographic differences between those who entered work and 
69 Apart from the differences in favour of the control group in Wales, as 
discussed in Chapter 2. These differences are explored in more detail in 
Chapter 4.
70 The survey asks about all help and advice received when out of work and 
is unable to distinguish support received prior to entering work and that 
received after leaving a job. The latter would be expected to differ more for 
programme and control group customers. Qualitative data suggest that the 
programme-control group differences on the receipt of help with staying 
in work or advancing in future jobs most likely stem from a combination of 
the two types of support. More detail is provided later in the chapter on re-
engagement efforts when customers left jobs.
71 Dorsett et al., 2007.
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those who did not. Those who entered work had fewer barriers to employment72 
than those who did not. They were also younger, more likely to have educational 
qualifications and more likely to have worked in the three years before random 
assignment. This suggests that the population that was eligible for in-work support 
differed in important ways from the full ND25+ programme group and that these 
differences might also have influenced their receptivity to in-work support. This 
should be borne in mind when considering the level and types of in-work help and 
support received, which are discussed in the remainder of this chapter.
3.3.1 In-work contact with Jobcentre Plus
While the New Deal programme requires that ND25+ customers meet with 
Jobcentre Plus staff while they are out of work, there is no case management 
requirement after a customer becomes employed.73 Survey data show that less 
than a third of control group members who worked during the two years after 
random assignment had any post-employment contact with Jobcentre Plus staff 
(Figure 3.1). In contrast, 74 per cent of customers in the programme group who 
worked within the first two years after random assignment had some form of 
contact with Jobcentre Plus while employed.74 Similar levels of in-work support were 
seen for working programme group members in both the first and second years 
of the programme, while for working control group members, levels of contact 
were lower in the second year. This suggests that ERA substantially increased the 
level of in-work contact with Jobcentre Plus among working ND25+ customers, 
compared with what would have typically happened in the programme’s absence. 
This finding is particularly noteworthy, given the problems that ASAs reported in 
keeping this group of customers engaged in the programme (as described over).
72 These barriers to employment include, for example, problems with housing, 
transport, childcare or health or a lack of basic skills.
73 The exception to this rule occurs if the job is for less than 16 hours per week, 
in which case the individual continues to receive Jobseeker’s Allowance 
(JSA).
74 A small amount of this contact, for both groups, may reflect continuing 
enrolment in the New Deal programme while working less than 16 hours 
per week, rather than in-work support provided in a post-New Deal job.
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Figure 3.1 Patterns of contact with Jobcentre Plus staff among 
  ND25+ ERA customers who worked within 
  two years after random assignment
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Programme group members who worked were also more likely than those in the 
control group to report that they had received help and advice from Jobcentre Plus 
staff to assist them with employment retention or advancement. On this measure, 
47 per cent of workers in the programme group said that they had received such 
help and advice while in work, while the rate was only 12 per cent for the control 
group (Figure 3.1).
In addition to experiencing a higher level of overall contact while in work, working 
programme group members experienced a higher frequency of in-work contact. 
For example, compared with working control group members, workers in the 
programme group were more than three times as likely to have had more than 
one or two face-to-face contacts over the two-year follow-up period (Table D.2). 
Working programme group members were also substantially more likely than 
those in the control group to have been contacted by an adviser without having 
requested contact and to meet with staff outside of the Jobcentre Plus office 
(Figure 3.1). These findings suggest that the frequency and variety of in-work 
engagement of programme group members were indeed different from ‘normal’ 
Jobcentre Plus practice.
3.3.2 Patterns of engagement among the programme group
Qualitative data from customers and staff indicate that most programme group 
customers who maintained contact with Jobcentre Plus while in work, organised 
their contacts around receipt of the retention bonus. As described in the previous 
chapter, ASAs struggled with in-work contact, particularly in the early days of the 
programme. They were not sure how often to contact customers or how proactive 
they should be in cases where customers seemed uninterested. Advisers viewed 
this as a particular problem with the ND25+ customer group, since this group 
traditionally has very little contact with Jobcentre Plus once they enter work and 
leave benefits. The administration of the retention bonus, however, provided a 
convenient mechanism for ASAs to maintain contact (as was envisaged in the 
design of ERA), since customers received the bonus at regular intervals and (in 
most cases) were required to go into the office to fill out paperwork in order to 
receive it. It, therefore, gave ASAs a specific ‘hook’ to encourage customers to 
come in to the office and gave customers a specific reason to visit their ASA.
ASAs spoke of how contact organised around the retention bonus could also be 
used as an opportunity to promote other retention and advancement services. 
However, qualitative data suggest that there was considerable variety across advisers 
and customers in the nature of this additional support. There was also change over 
time as ERA ‘bedded in’. In early interviews (autumn 2004), customers often spoke 
of posting in their pay slips (which were required for receipt of the bonus) and 
even those who went in to the Jobcentre Plus office with their paperwork often 
just left it there, in many cases not meeting with their ERA adviser. This was partly 
because taking time off work for meetings was a struggle for some customers 
but it was also because advisers took time to adjust their way of working to fit in 
with their customers’ needs. As ERA progressed, advisers were more likely to visit 
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customers at their workplaces, near their work or outside office hours. They were 
also more proactive in using these meetings to talk to their customers about their 
work and about training possibilities.
Survey data at year 2 show that the majority (71 per cent) of those who received 
the employment retention bonus said that they talked with Jobcentre Plus staff 
about work and/or retention and advancement issues when they visited the office 
to pick up their bonus (Table 3.1). Nonetheless, qualitative data suggest that the 
quality and depth of these discussions varied among customers. In some cases, 
claiming the retention bonus did lead to discussions about work retention and 
advancement, but in other cases there was a very short and cursory discussion 
about work. The following comments illustrate this variability:
‘There’s been a couple of times I’ve been going to go down in my dinner 
hour, and obviously she’s on hers, so I’ve never been able to be in touch with 
her, I’ve left my pay slips,…When I have caught her, as I say, she’s asked how 
I’m doing, had a quick word with her and that’s about it.’ 
 
‘He’d asked me how I was doing, how things were going, how could he help, 
was there anything I needed. I was actually enquiring about the retention 
bonus at the time, he said, “Oh great, no problem, this is what you need, 
bring it in”, and I took everything that I needed to, and … he also reminded 
me at the time that there is still money there should I want to do training or 
a course or anything.’ 
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Table 3.1 ND25+ ERA bonus recipients’ assessments of the   
 influence of employment retention bonuses on their  
 decisions concerning employment 
Outcome ERA group
‘How much did this bonus influence your decision to work 30 hours or 
more per week?’ (%)
A lot 31.0
A little 19.5
None 49.4
‘How much did the bonus encourage you to stay in full-time work?’ (%)
A lot 31.8
A little 21.6
None 46.6
Talked with Jobcentre Plus staff about work or work prospects when 
claimed bonus (%)
71.3
Topic discussed, for those who claimed a bonus (%)
Getting job with better pay or conditions 24.3
Increasing hours of work 6.8
How to negotiate a pay rise 4.9
How to get a promotion in present work 8.8
How to get a more permanent job or contract 13.7
Working out long-term career goals 23.3
Finding an education or training course 31.7
Other topics discussed 21.4
Topic discussed, for those who talked with Jobcentre Plus staff when 
claimed bonus (%)
Getting job with better pay or conditions 34.7
Increasing hours of work 9.7
How to negotiate a pay rise 7.0
How to get a promotion in present work 12.7
How to get a more permanent job or contract 19.7
Working out long-term career goals 33.3
Finding an education or training course 45.2
Other topics discussed 30.6
Sample size 185
Source: MDRC calculations from ERA 12- and 24-month customer surveys.   
Similarly, there was variation in the extent to which ASAs maintained contact 
with customers between the scheduled bonus meetings. Resource issues (staff 
shortages, heavy workloads) made it difficult for ASAs to reach out proactively to 
all customers on their caseloads. However, as ASAs became more experienced, 
they also started to tailor the pattern of in-work contact to customers’ needs. A 
benchmark of monthly contact for all working customers was set during 2005 in 
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some districts but was quickly relaxed as staff and customers developed their own 
routines. Those customers who had contact with their adviser between bonus 
meetings tended to be either individuals who were taking up training, whose 
contacts focused around sourcing training or organising training payments or 
those in temporary jobs who kept in contact to look for new work.
Not all customers maintained contact with Jobcentre Plus once they were employed. 
A quarter of ND25+ working participants had no in-work contact with Jobcentre 
Plus and around half said that they did not receive help or advice on retention and 
advancement once they were in work. Advisers generally reported much more 
difficulty maintaining engagement with working ND25+ customers, compared 
with the lone parent groups. They gave a number of reasons for this, including a 
lack of interest in advancement among their customers (see Section 3.5), a dislike 
of Jobcentre Plus and/or a desire to be ‘independent’, an ethos of self-reliance and 
little expectation of in-work support. Advisers also spoke about having to work 
harder to encourage continued contact among their ND25+ customers once they 
entered work, because the mandatory nature of the ND25+ programme (which 
customers followed before entering work) encouraged them to see Jobcentre Plus 
as a requirement rather than as a service which was of use to them. This is seen in 
the following discussion in an ASA focus group:
‘They do phone if there’s a problem or if they need something, but…I think 
it’s because when they’ve signed on for a long time, 18 months, they’re just 
glad to see the back of the Jobcentre, you know. I think that’s one thing that 
they just think, “Right”…’ 
 
‘[They] think, “Well I’m glad to be rid of this place really”, you know. I mean 
they want the money but they don’t want to be – I suppose they just feel 
that’s past, that’s gone in my life, you know.’
Qualitative data from customers suggest that negative attitudes towards advisers 
were uncommon among working programme group customers interviewed. 
Indeed, customers who progressed into work and maintained engagement 
with the programme spoke very positively of their relationship with their ASA, 
and some acknowledged that their experiences had challenged their negative 
preconceptions about Jobcentre Plus staff. Among those who did not maintain 
contact, the reason often given was that they did not feel that they needed any 
support. The idea of ongoing advancement coaching from ASAs was unfamiliar 
to them. Many customers said that they would not get in touch with an adviser 
unless they had a specific ‘problem’ in work or needed to look for a new job:
‘As I haven’t actually had any major issues regarding my job, I’ve had no 
reason to actually call the adviser, so no, but I know that he’s there if I did 
have a problem.’
Some customers also found it difficult to maintain contact with Jobcentre Plus 
staff while in work because they worked long hours and/or did shift work.
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In addition to customers’ attitudes and beliefs, the actions of ASAs also contributed 
to the disengagement of some customers. Particularly in the early days of the 
programme, when ASAs were unfamiliar with in-work support and caseloads were 
sometimes higher than planned, customers who had not been in contact for some 
time often ‘dropped to the bottom of the pile’ in terms of ASAs’ outreach work. 
Therefore, some customers who were not initially aware that in-work support was 
available might not have found out about it.
There were also some customers who moved between engagement and 
disengagement over the course of their time in the ERA programme. Some of 
this movement reflected changes in customers’ circumstances. These included, 
for example, taking up or finishing training; retention problems, such as a job 
finishing; or dissatisfaction with work which might prompt a customer to make 
renewed contact. There were also other changes related to Jobcentre Plus capacity 
and staffing. For example, some customers had regular contact with an ASA which 
was disrupted if the adviser left; others were re-engaged when a new ASA took 
over their case. However, ASAs generally found it difficult to re-engage customers 
once they had lost contact with them.
3.4 Support with retention
This section looks at the retention-focused support offered to working programme 
group customers, including help dealing with problems at work or outside of 
work, efforts to encourage re-employment if customers moved out of work, and 
assistance provided through the Emergency Discretion Fund (EDF). The subsequent 
section then goes on to look at advancement-focused support.
3.4.1 Help dealing with problems that made work difficult
The survey asked customers whether Jobcentre Plus staff assisted them with 
problems that made it hard for them to keep a job. Ten per cent of working 
programme group members received help dealing with problems at work (Table 
3.2). While the receipt of such retention-focused support was rather low, it was 
twice as high for customers in the programme group than in the control group. 
The survey also asked working customers if Jobcentre Plus staff helped with any 
personal or family problems that made it hard for them to keep a job. Receipt of 
this support by working programme group members was even lower (six per cent) 
and was comparable to the rate for the control group.
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Table 3.2 Receipt of in-work help or advice from Jobcentre Plus 
 staff within two years after random assignment among 
 ND25+ customers who worked
  
Outcome
ERA 
group
Control 
group
While in work, received help or advice dealing with personal or 
family problems that made job retention hard (%) 5.9 5.1
While in work, received help or advice dealing with problems at  
work (%) 10.4 4.7
While in work, received any help or advice on (%)
Getting job with better pay or conditions 21.4 5.7
Increasing hours of work 15.5 4.8
Negotiating a pay rise 6.4 1.0
Negotiating better job terms, e.g. more convenient hours 6.2 2.6
Getting a promotion in present work 7.4 0.0
Getting a more permanent job or contract 11.3 3.8
Working out long-term career goals 23.7 6.0
Finding an training or education course 35.0 9.8
Other type of help 7.6 2.8
Any in-work help/advice 46.5 12.4
Sample size 190 203
Source: MDRC calculations from ERA 12- and 24-month customer surveys.
Notes: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
Comparisons are non-experimental since statistics were calculated for non-random subsets of 
the sample. Statistical tests were not performed.
Qualitative staff and customer data paint a similar picture. Advisers generally felt 
that their ND25+ customers were more self-sufficient once in work than their lone 
parent customers. There were some instances of ND25+ customers contacting 
their advisers for help claiming tax credits and other in-work benefits, as well as 
with personal problems that were making work difficult but this was not common 
among the qualitative respondents. Some customers also spoke of valuing the 
support of their ASA in talking through problems they were going through at 
work but again this was relatively uncommon.
3.4.2 Re-employment efforts
Qualitative data from staff and customers suggest that the main form of retention-
focused support for ND25+ working customers related to seeking new employment. 
In some cases, a temporary contract was finished or coming to an end, while in 
other cases a customer was seeking a better job. Hence, these activities could 
support both retention and advancement goals.
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A significant proportion of ND25+ customers become unemployed after starting 
work, often because they had been employed in temporary contract work. 
Therefore, an important aspect of ASAs’ retention-focused support with this 
customer group entailed intervention after a job finished in order to facilitate 
the transition back into work. A number of customers who were on temporary 
contracts continued to search for permanent work while they were employed, 
and others started to look shortly before their employment ceased. In other cases, 
ASAs contacted customers when they knew a contract was coming to an end in 
order to initiate re-employment efforts.
However, in some cases advisers were not aware in advance that a job was finishing 
(perhaps because of limited engagement with the customer while in work) and 
so could not start re-employment efforts until after the customer had returned to 
benefits, as in the following case:
‘Well, what happens is, the last time I finished a job, not this one, the one 
before, the adviser was on to me as soon as I signed back on. I didn’t get on 
to him; he said, “I see that you have just signed on, so why don’t you come 
back up to me?” So that’s how I got that job there, very helpful.’ 
Advisers commented that it was difficult to change the behaviour of customers 
by encouraging them to make contact before a job ended, because they were so 
used to ‘cycling’ between work and benefits:
‘When people are in this cycle of coming back on to benefit, I think despite 
your best efforts sometimes, no matter what you say, they will leave the 
job, come back to benefit, and then think about another job, and that is 
the problem. But I think you can try and educate people by slowly changing 
attitudes,…it does take time.’
If customers did leave work, advisers felt that the eligibility rules for the retention 
bonus75 assisted them in their re-employment efforts, since it allowed a window 
of time for customers to return to work without compromising the bonus. Yet 
ASAs also sometimes reported that they were not immediately aware that a 
customer had returned to JSA (as reported in Chapter 2) and by the time they 
were informed, the customer had lost eligibility for the bonus.
3.4.3 EDF payments
ERA customers who entered work could receive assistance from an EDF to take 
care of minor financial emergencies that might prevent them from continuing 
in work. Financial payment records indicate that only 12 per cent of all working 
programme group customers received EDF assistance (Figure 3.2). Two-thirds of 
all customers who received an EDF payment received just one, while just 13 per 
cent received three or more payments (Table D.3). For those who received EDF 
assistance,	total	per-person	payments	averaged	£230.
75 To receive the retention bonus, customers had to be in work for 13 out of 17 
weeks.
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Figure 3.2 Receipt of EDF payments among ND25+ ERA    
  customers within two years after random assignment
The limited take-up of the EDF relates partly to difficulties with its delivery. At the 
start of ERA, advisers were uncertain about how best to use the EDF and they did 
not proactively promote its availability to customers as part of the ERA package. 
This was reflected in early interviews with customers (in autumn 2004), when very 
few knew of the availability of the EDF. Customers who received those funds did 
not request them straight away; rather, they learned about them only after having 
told their advisers that they were in financial difficulty, at which point the advisers 
may have indicated that a flexible pot of money could be used to help them. 
Although advisers became more confident about using the EDF, its use remained 
low among ND25+ customers.
Advisers also attributed limited use of the EDF to the fact that there was less need 
for it among ND25+ customers than among lone parents, because they did not 
have to pay childcare costs and also because they were generally more self-reliant 
(as discussed earlier) and were less likely to come to advisers for help with financial 
difficulties.
Financial payment records show that the most common uses of the EDF for ND25+ 
customers were for travel expenses, followed closely by work-related expenses, 
including tools, clothes and other equipment (figures not shown in tables). 
Reflecting this, those customers in the qualitative sample who had drawn on the 
EDF used it mainly for transport. One customer, for example, was helped with 
car repairs when he needed the car to get to work (a job further from home that 
was difficult to get to with public transport). This customer maintained regular 
contact with his adviser and saw the EDF as part of the package of support he was 
receiving from ERA, commenting:
‘Any obstacle that I’ve felt that I had, he’s been there to offer a solution.’ 
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Another customer was struggling to afford to run the car he had bought with his 
retention bonus, and the emergency fund was used for petrol. In this case, the use 
of the EDF was like an extra wage supplementation.
ASAs also talked about the need for reliable transport as a common retention 
issue. In one case, a customer was about to leave his job because an employer had 
changed his hours of work and he could no longer get there on public transport. 
An EDF payment was processed at the same time as one of his retention bonuses 
and the adviser suggested that he spend the money on a car. Another example 
was where a customer had his bicycle stolen and was in danger of losing his job 
until the EDF was used to replace the bicycle.
Reflecting on the range of help available through ERA, one manager was certain 
that if it were used well, the EDF could make a difference to retention:
‘[The] one I think really makes a difference is the EDF, with the customer 
coming in saying, “I’m about to jack me job in, my car’s off the road,” 
“What’s the matter with it?” “It needs two new tyres, you know, I travel so 
far to work,” “Well, we’ll give you EDF for two new tyres,” [and] he stays in 
work.’
3.5 Support with advancement
Turning to advancement-focused support, the survey data show that the most 
common types of help or advice received by working customers on advancement 
were help finding education or training, determining career goals, increasing work 
hours,  and getting a job with better pay or conditions (Table 3.2). The least common 
forms of support were in getting a promotion, negotiating better job terms and 
negotiating a pay rise. Working programme group members received more than 
twice the level of support for each of these advancement efforts than working 
control group members. At the same time, the receipt rate of working programme 
group members was still quite low – only 35 per cent of these customers received 
help finding a training course, for example, which was the most common type of 
advancement support received.
The research evidence suggests that ASAs made more of an effort to promote 
advancement among ND25+ customers who claimed a retention bonus. 
Programme group members who received an employment retention bonus were 
asked about the help and advice they received when claiming the bonus at the 
Jobcentre Plus office. The survey data show that those who spoke with their 
adviser when picking up the bonus were more likely to get advancement-focused 
support than others (although this was still far from universal) (Table 3.1). The 
most common advancement topics discussed when customers were claiming a 
bonus were the same as those discussed by all working participants. However, the 
proportion of customers receiving advancement-focused advice was considerably 
larger for those who talked to their adviser when receiving the retention bonus 
than for all working programme group members.
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Reflecting the relatively low levels of advancement support received by customers, 
qualitative data show that advisers found it difficult to promote the advancement 
agenda with many of their working ND25+ customers. Advisers distinguished a 
small subgroup among their customers who were very positive about training and 
advancement and took advantage of the incentives on offer. These were often 
customers who had an idea of where they wanted to go before starting on ERA 
and many of them were customers who took up self-employment. However, they 
also identified a large group of working customers whom they felt were happy 
with a ‘steady job’ and were indifferent towards the idea of advancing further. For 
example, speaking of one of her ERA customers, one ASA said:
‘He comes in and sees me every time his work retention bonus is due, and I 
talk to him about, “How’s things in the job?” “You doing any more hours?” 
“No, everything’s just the same.” “Would you not like to do training?” 
“Would you not like to change your job to do something different?” No, 
he’s quite happy,…but he had been unemployed a long, long time, and I 
think even for him to have a job is an achievement in itself, and he’s just 
quite happy at that.’
This reiterates the findings of earlier qualitative research on customers’ attitudes 
to retention and advancement.76 Advisers referred to having particular difficulty 
promoting advancement with older customers (50 or over), those who had 
worked all their lives in a particular industry and were not interested in re-skilling, 
and those who had difficult personal situations to overcome. However, it was not 
only these types of customers who were uninterested in advancement; younger 
customers could be, too, as one adviser commented:
‘I’ve got a couple of them, they are security guards…and they love it and 
they will go out and do the overtime, and they are on good wages, and 
they really enjoy it, and, you know, you speak about stuff to them, and 
“your goal”, and whatever, and “I’m doing it!” Because they have been 
unemployed for quite a long time some of them, they have managed to 
get these jobs, they feel they are safe, they feel they are secure, they are 
bringing in a good wage, they’re getting an increment…and for them it’s all 
done for me basically, you know, there is obviously bits and pieces, they ring 
up and they want help with something,…but as far as [advancement], you 
know, they are just happy.’
Many advisers felt that the notion of advancement envisioned in the ERA 
programme was not always relevant to such customers, who saw advancement 
as simply retaining work.
At the same time, as suggested in Chapter 2, ASAs grew more confident over 
time in their ability to deliver advancement support to customers. This was very 
evident in qualitative interviews with ASAs. In the first round of interviews (spring 
2004), the majority of ASAs, when asked about how they promoted advancement 
with customers, mentioned only their marketing of the training incentives. In later 
76 See Hoggart et al., 2006.
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waves of interviews, many ASAs had developed a more sophisticated and nuanced 
understanding of advancement and how to promote it among customers.
These later understandings and practices included the view that advancement 
could potentially mean a range of different things for different people and, hence, 
advisers’ efforts should be individually tailored; also that advancement coaching 
could be effective if approached creatively, even among those customers who 
appeared initially to be unreceptive. The key, as several advisers commented, 
was to maintain the customers’ engagement, since it took a considerable time 
to develop advancement work with some customers. Some ASAs felt that they 
had not had enough time to work on advancement effectively with some of their 
ND25+ customers, particularly if the customers had taken a lengthy period of time 
to get into work:
‘…[A] lot of them especially, they’ve been out of work, the New Deal 25, 
for a long time, and probably could do with another extra year added on to 
this, because…some of them are only just starting to ask for training,…and 
it’s just a pity, [because] then, all of a sudden, “thank you very much, that’s 
it, the end”.’
3.6 Customers’ receipt of ERA’s in-work financial 
 incentives
In addition to in-work job coaching and financial support from the EDF, ERA offered 
a range of financial incentives designed to promote steady full-time employment 
and skills training while employed. Using survey and administrative data, this 
section describes the extent to which ERA programme group members received 
those incentives. Using qualitative data, it also describes how staff marketed the 
incentives to customers, how customers viewed the offer and responded to it and 
how the incentive payments were used by customers.
3.6.1 Employment retention bonus
ERA	customers	could	receive	an	employment	retention	bonus	of	£400,	payable	
every 17 weeks, if they worked for at least 30 hours a week for 13 out of the 17 
weeks. They could claim a maximum of six bonus payments.
Knowledge and take-up of the employment retention bonus
Most programme group customers, 86 per cent, said that they had heard of the 
employment retention bonus (Figure 3.3). However, only 31 per cent actually 
received a bonus. To an important extent, this relatively low rate reflects significant 
barriers to employment among ND25+ customers, many of whom had not entered 
work at all by the time of the two-year follow-up period. When the sample is 
restricted to only those customers who worked full-time at some point, the rate of 
bonus receipt climbed to 70 per cent, although only 48 per cent of the customers 
who were ever in full-time work received more than one bonus.
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Figure 3.3 Awareness and receipt of employment retention 
  bonuses among ND25+ ERA customers within two   
  years after random assignment
Among all customers who did receive a bonus, the largest proportion (27 per cent) 
received just one; however, just over a fifth (22 per cent) received two bonuses 
and similar numbers received three (22 per cent) and four (18 per cent) bonuses 
(Table D.4). Only 11 per cent received five or more bonuses. It is important to 
note also that bonus receipt rates continued to climb after the two-year follow-up 
period that is the focus of this report.77 
Seventy per cent of those who worked full-time received a bonus; this number 
was not higher, partly because some customers did not stay in work long enough 
to be eligible but also because some customers who were eligible for the bonus 
failed to claim it. According to staff interviews, the main reasons for this were 
that customers believed that there was a ‘catch’ somewhere or were reluctant to 
maintain contact with Jobcentre Plus once in work. In addition, some customers 
may not have been aware that they were eligible. Although awareness of the 
77 For example, looking at the period of ERA operations through July 2007 
reveals that 34 per cent received a bonus over this extended period (Table 
D.4). In addition, of those customers who ever received a bonus during this 
period, 14 per cent received all six bonuses.
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retention bonus was generally high (Figure 3.3), it was not universal. Moreover, in 
qualitative interviews, some recipients of the bonus indicated that they had not 
known about the incentive until their adviser reminded them.
How customers used the employment retention bonus
In the qualitative interviews, customers talked about using the retention bonus 
in a number of different ways. These can be categorised into three main types of 
uses: to ‘get by’, for ‘extras’ and for work-related expenditure.
To get by financially
For many customers, the retention bonuses were used to supplement a low wage 
in order to ‘get by’. For such customers, the bonus was ‘swallowed up’ by general 
living expenses. One customer, for example, indicated that the payments could 
‘make the difference between struggling to pay the bills and being able to pay the 
bills’. In many of these cases, the incentive was consciously used to supplement 
low-paid work. Customers who used it in this way talked about being able to 
accept a poorly paid job and still be better off in work.
For ‘extras’
Those who viewed the bonus as an ‘extra’ talked about being able to afford 
to go out or to buy things for their home. In these cases, the customers were 
glad to receive the bonus and it clearly improved their financial well-being but 
they thought that they would be able to manage without it. Hence, it could be 
described as a ‘windfall’. As one customer put it, ‘It’s a bonus – I can manage on 
my wages’. Some customers started off using the payments to pay off debts and 
then later used them for ‘extras’.
Work-related expenditure
The most common work-related use of the incentives was to buy and/or maintain 
a car. As in the case of some of the EDF expenditures, customers felt that using the 
funds in this way helped them to retain their jobs. For one customer, the incentive 
enabled him to accept a job some distance from home, in the knowledge that he 
could use the money to ‘keep the car on the road’. 
Did the retention bonus influence customer behaviour?
Chapter 4 provides statistical evidence on the impact of ERA on customers’ 
experiences in the labour market in the two years after random assignment. As 
will be seen, it shows that ERA led to a small increase in employment in year 2. 
However, the impact analysis cannot easily isolate the effects of the retention 
bonus from the other features of ERA with which it is bundled. It is possible to 
gain some insight into this, however, by exploring data on staff and customers’ 
views on the influence of the bonuses. In general, the findings suggest that the 
bonuses were a relevant influence, but that it may have been tempered by other 
considerations of importance to customers.
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Survey data show that customers varied as to whether they felt that the bonus 
influenced them to work full-time. About half of customers who received a 
retention bonus said that it had no influence at all on their decision to work 30 
hours or more per week (Table 3.1), although almost a third (31 per cent) said 
that the bonus influenced their decision ‘a lot’.78 Customers’ responses followed a 
similar pattern when they were asked whether the bonus offer encouraged them 
to stay in work.79
The qualitative data suggest that how well the bonus worked as an incentive to 
enter and retain work was related to the way in which individual customers used 
the bonus and their attitudes towards it. When they used it for ‘extras’, customers 
were clearly happy to be getting the extra money but usually said that it was ‘not 
enough to stay in work’ if they wanted to leave for other reasons. This could be 
the case even when it may have influenced customers to move into work. One 
customer, for example, talked about ERA giving him the incentive to find work – 
‘If I could get £400 six times for nothing’ – and he took a night-time job shortly 
afterwards. He was then certain that if he found a job with more sociable hours 
elsewhere, he would take it, even if that might mean that he would lose his last 
three incentive payments.80 Another customer changed jobs to move closer to 
home and was not able to work 30 hours in his new post. Not getting any more 
payments ‘didn’t bother’ him, as the money was not as important as working 
closer to home. 
As well as operating as an incentive to enter work, the qualitative research indicates 
that there were cases when the bonus acted as an enabler. This was clearest when 
the bonus payments were used for work-related expenditures:
‘The retention fund has enabled me to get a new job, literally, because without 
the car I couldn’t, so the financial side is definitely the biggest thing.’
When the payments were used to supplement poor pay, customers were more 
likely to say that it did make a difference in their decision-making. Firstly, it meant 
that they were able to accept a poorly paid job. For example, one customer who 
took a minimum wage job, said: 
78 It should be noted that customers were asked in the survey if the retention 
bonus influenced their decision to take up work of 30 hours or more but they 
were not asked separately if it influenced their decision to work. Qualitative 
data suggest that some customers might have answered no to this question 
because they wanted to work over 30 hours (rather than part-time) anyway 
(in the absence of the bonus), even though they said that the retention 
bonus did influence their decision to work at all or to take a specific job.
79 It is important to bear in mind that these are customers’ self-reported 
perceptions about whether the bonus influenced them and are not an impact 
assessment.
80 This customer was unclear about the conditions attached to receiving the 
payments and thought that he would lose his entitlement to them if he 
moved jobs.
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‘I obviously had concerns when applying for it. Can I afford to take a job that 
is just basic wage? And thinking that, well, every four, five months, if I’m 
getting some extra money, that will come in handy.’ 
There were also a number of cases where customers were motivated to stay in 
poorly paid work in order to claim the bonus payment. 
One final category was customers who found work difficult, for whom the bonus 
provided an incentive to ‘stick with it’. One customer found the first few weeks of 
work very difficult and felt the bonus to be an incentive to keep going:
‘I think maybe if the financial wasn’t there, I might have turned round and 
said, “No, I’ve had enough”. I know it sounds terrible, but money is a great 
incentive.’ 
Another way in which the financial incentives appeared to change the behaviour 
of some of the ND25+ customers was in prompting them to agree to be randomly 
assigned to the ERA programme in the first place. When asked why they had been 
attracted to ERA, some customers spoke about the importance of the retention 
bonus. It is worth bearing in mind that these customers differed from the lone 
parents discussed in the companion report, in that they were being mandated 
onto the ND25+ programme rather than voluntarily requesting support to find 
work (as was the case for the NDLP customers). Given this, and some customers’ 
negative experiences with New Deal, advisers found it more difficult to recruit 
ND25+ customers onto the ERA programme.81
Customers’ reactions to the bonus ending
While a number of ND25+ customers said that the bonus had encouraged them 
to enter work or to take a particular job, none of the customers interviewed said 
that they would stop working when the payments came to an end. This included 
those who spoke of accepting poorly paid work because of the extra money. 
3.6.2 Training fees and bonus
Two types of incentives were available in ERA to encourage the take-up of training. 
To be eligible for either of these training incentives, customers had to be working 
16 or more hours per week. As the first incentive, ERA staff could authorise 
payment	 for	customers’	 fees	 for	 training	courses,	up	to	a	maximum	of	£1,000	
per person for all courses. As the second incentive, ERA customers could receive 
a	 training	 completion	 bonus.	 This	 incentive	 paid	 £8	 for	 every	 hour	 of	 training	
completed,	up	to	a	maximum	of	£1,000	(or	125	hours	of	completed	training).	The	
latter was paid to customers once they had successfully completed training. Both 
forms of incentive payments were to be made only for courses approved by ERA 
staff and could not include employer-provided, on-the-job training. Customers 
could, however, receive the completion bonus for courses that did not charge a 
tuition fee, if the course satisfied the other criteria.
81 See also Walker et al., 2006.
Use of ERA’s post-employment services and financial incentives
71
Knowledge and take-up of the training fees and bonus
Financial payment records for the programme group customer survey sample 
members indicate that just six per cent of all customers received assistance with 
training fees within the two-year follow-up period (Figure 3.4), although this 
figure rose slightly to ten per cent for the full period of ERA operations through to 
July 2007 (Table D.5). The amounts paid towards fees varied widely but for those 
who	received	this	assistance,	they	averaged	£395	(Table	D.5).
Figure 3.4 Awareness and receipt of ERA training fee assistance 
  and training completion bonuses among ND25+ ERA  
  customers within two years
Looking just at those who had been in work at some point and reported that 
they had participated in training while in work, 19 per cent received training fee 
assistance. This indicates that the majority of customers who combined training and 
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work did not receive fee assistance through ERA.82 One reason for this is that these 
customers were not necessarily working 16 hours per week while participating in 
training, one of the requirements for receiving the training fee assistance. It is also 
possible that much of this training was employer-provided, on-the-job training, 
which was ineligible for assistance. Lastly, some of these customers may have 
become disengaged from the programme and were not aware of the incentives. 
In partial support of this, customer survey data show that only 67 per cent of 
programme group members who combined training and work were aware of the 
training incentives83 as of the second-year customer survey (Figure 3.4). This is a 
lower figure than for those who were aware of the employment retention bonus, 
and suggests that ASAs were less successful in marketing the training incentives 
among ND25+ customers.
Looking at receipt of the training completion bonus, a smaller proportion of ND25+ 
customers received this than received fee assistance. Financial payment records 
show that only four per cent of all programme group customers received a bonus 
within the two years after random assignment (Figure 3.4), rising to seven per cent 
when the full period of ERA operations through to July 2007 is considered (Table 
D.5).84 Among those who received a training completion bonus, the majority (79 
per cent) received just one training bonus during the two-year follow-up period, 
while just seven per cent received three or more bonuses. The average amount 
of	each	bonus	was	approximately	£295,	while	the	average	amount	of	all	bonuses	
received	was	£357	within	two	years	(Table	D.5).
Delivery of the training incentives
As they did with regard to other aspects of post-employment support, ASAs talked 
about how the advice and help they were giving customers on training improved 
over time. In particular, they felt that they improved their skills in ensuring that the 
training was relevant to individual customers. In the later focus groups, staff noted 
that, in the early stages of ERA, they were so keen for customers to undertake 
training that they did not always consider whether a customer was really ready 
for the course or if it was the most appropriate course. As advisers became more 
82 It is somewhat surprising that nearly one in five ND25+ customers in the 
programme group participated in training while working, given the many 
employment barriers this group often faces.
83 This measure refers to awareness of the training assistance fees and the 
training completion bonus.
84 These data show that around a third of customers who received assistance 
with training fees did not receive the completion bonus. This suggests that 
not all who took up the fee assistance successfully completed their training 
courses (within the timescale for eligibility) and indeed, there are examples 
of this in the qualitative data. Alternatively, some may have completed their 
training but failed to claim their entitlement. However, these results should 
be interpreted with caution, given the small sample sizes.
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comfortable in delivering post-employment support, they also became more 
skilled at selecting appropriate training and motivating their customers to pursue 
training. They developed and shared their knowledge of training available locally 
and some mentioned particular techniques they used to market it to customers 
who were initially unreceptive. One adviser, for example, said that he asked his 
ND25+ customers to think about work colleagues who were a little bit ‘higher up 
the ladder’ and, having established that the customers felt that they could also do 
that type of job, he talked to them about what training they would need to make 
that step.
Despite this growing expertise on marketing the training incentives, ASAs also felt 
that it was more difficult to promote the uptake of the training incentives among 
ND25+ customers, compared with the lone parent groups. This was primarily 
because ND25+ customers had a lukewarm response to the advancement agenda, 
as discussed earlier, and particularly to the idea of advancing by pursuing training. 
However, it also seemed to be partly because customers had difficulties combining 
full-time work with training, particularly if the work was shift work or required 
long hours. Some advisers also spoke about the prevalence of short-term contract 
work among their ND25+ customers, which made it more difficult for them to 
combine training with work:
‘I had a lot of people who did contract work,…they wanted to do a particular 
type of training that would lead to more permanent work, but it was getting 
everything done while they were in work. A lot of them worked all over 
the country,…they just got a phone call and that was it, they were off, 
with maybe two weeks work. Now if I don’t get to see them and do the 
paperwork…within that two weeks, I couldn’t help them.’
As customers began to reach the end of their 33-month eligibility for ERA, staff 
would again encourage them to take up training before the incentives on offer 
ran out. They usually began to remind customers of the offer six months before 
the end of their eligibility for the programme. Advisers thought that for some 
customers, this was like ‘flogging a dead horse’. However, as with the lone parent 
customers, they also felt that take-up of training for ND25+ customers did improve 
at this time and noted that some customers appeared to have been previously 
unaware of the training possibilities. There was some confirmation of this last 
minute take-up in customer interviews, too. For example, one customer took up 
an IT training course just before her eligibility was due to run out, stating:
‘The ERA runs out, I think it’s January for me,…beginning of January it is. So 
if I wanted to do anything it would be best to get it sorted out now. So that’s 
why I have decided it’s time to do that.’ 
Perhaps because of the strategy to promote training towards the end of ERA, 
just over a third of those customers that ever received training fee assistance 
or a completion bonus did so for the first time within the last nine months of 
their enrolment in ERA (Table D.5). This may have occurred simply because they 
had become established in work and were more receptive to the idea of training 
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and advancement. However, it is also likely that the combination of the financial 
incentives and continued encouragement from advisers – and reminders that time 
was running out – did indeed influence some customers to undertake training. 
How did the training incentives influence customer behaviour?
Qualitative data suggest that ND25+ customers reacted in a number of different 
ways to the training opportunities that ERA offered. While a few enthusiastically 
embraced the training opportunities available, many felt that training was not 
something they were interested in, as they were more focused on the financial 
gains of employment and/or did not feel that they had the skills necessary to 
pursue training.
In qualitative interviews, customers who had undertaken training often said that 
the financial incentives had been very important to them, either by providing them 
with the financial means to undertake a course that they otherwise would not 
have been able to afford, or as an incentive which prompted them to look around 
to see what training was available. For example, one customer working as a 
receptionist said that she would not have been able to afford to take an IT course 
without the ERA payment for the course fees, because it was too expensive:
‘Honestly speaking, I don’t think I would have done it if I didn’t have ERA, 
because of the cost of it,…so it’s nice to have ERA behind you to be able to 
get that qualification.’ 
Another customer, working as a lorry driver, was spurred into looking into courses 
that he might take up, after being told that he had ‘up to a thousand pound to 
do anything to better myself.’ 
It was relatively rare, however, for customers to say that they had been motivated 
to take up or continue training because of the bonus completion payments they 
would receive at the end of the course. One customer who took up an IT course 
partly because the training fee payments were available later gave up the course. 
When asked why the bonus payments had not motivated her to continue, she said 
that the incentive effect of the bonus was overridden by the fact that the course 
was ‘too much like hard work on top of a full-time job’. What would have made 
a difference, to her, she stated, is if the employer had allowed her to complete 
the course during her working hours. However, as a new and temporary member 
of staff, she was not entitled to this, nor to any paid holidays in which she might 
have completed the course.
This example highlights a common barrier to customers’ taking up training, 
despite the offer of the incentives: the constraints imposed by working hours. 
Some customers said that they would like to do training, but that they could 
not fit it into the hours they were working. For example, one customer who was 
working as an electrician, said:
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‘[T]here is another few courses I could go and do, but it’s trying to get the 
time to do them, because I’ve not been unemployed or anything since I 
[started work], so it’s hard to. If I’m taking time off, I’d be losing wages to do 
a course, so it doesn’t make sense just now…all the courses would benefit 
me are during the day, you know?’ 
Another customer talked about how it was not until he had moved from his 
factory job working ‘12-hour days’ to a standard hours day job, where he ‘had the 
evenings to himself’, that he was able to take up training in photography, an area 
of work that he wanted to move into in the future.
In some instances, advisers recommended that customers take unpaid leave to 
access training, and there were one or two examples of this in the customer 
interviews. However, as noted previously, this was often difficult for people 
undertaking temporary or agency work who only accrued holiday entitlement 
over a period of time. Customers were notably more likely to be undertaking 
training when it was supported by their employers.
In other instances, customers were not aware that training incentives were 
available, felt that they did not have the skills necessary to complete training or 
were simply not aware of what training they might benefit from. While ASAs were 
able to help in identifying courses, this support was not always proactively sought 
by customers or offered by advisers.
3.7 Comparison with the New Deal for Lone Parents 
 customer group
This section compares overall levels of engagement and participation for the ND25+ 
and NDLP groups. Results cited below for the NDLP group are not presented in 
this report. See the companion report for participation rates for both lone parent 
groups (NDLP and Working Tax Credit (WTC)).85
Engagement
Overall, qualitative data from customers and, particularly, from staff indicate that 
the ND25+ customer group was the most difficult of the three target groups to 
engage in in-work support. There were a variety of reasons for this difficulty, which 
were mentioned earlier: the mandatory nature of the ND25+ regime; the lack of 
expectation of in-work support; an association of Jobcentre Plus with benefits 
claiming, which had negative connotations for many customers; an ethos of self-
reliance; and fewer administrative problems with in-work benefits (for example, 
claiming the childcare portion of WTC) that required advisory assistance. Given this, 
it is perhaps surprising that the rate of in-work contact for working programme 
group members was only slightly lower for the ND25+ group than it was for 
the NDLP group – 74 and 81 per cent, respectively. This is especially noteworthy, 
85 Riccio et al., 2008.
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given that workers in the ND25+ control group received a much lower level of 
in-work support than workers in the NDLP control group. Thus, it seems that 
the ERA programme did generate a considerable amount of additional in-work 
engagement of ND25+ customers. The offer of the retention bonus may have 
been at least partly responsible for this, given the positive views expressed towards 
the bonus by ND25+ customers and the fact that most customers’ engagement 
and advisers’ help and advice took place in the context of claiming the bonus.
When looking at the receipt of retention and advancement-focused help and 
advice, however, the levels are lower for the ND25+ group, compared with the 
NDLP group. While 61 per cent of working programme group members in the 
NDLP group reported receiving help and advice on retention and advancement, 
only 47 per cent of working programme group members in the ND25+ group 
received this type of assistance. This difference suggests that more of the contact 
recorded for the ND25+ group was unrelated to retention and advancement. 
Judging from the qualitative data, this is likely to have been routine contact (filling 
in forms, having ‘a quick chat’) when claiming the retention bonus or going to the 
Jobcentre Plus office to search for other work without receiving help and advice 
from an adviser.86 
Retention
As might be expected, ND25+ and NDLP customers faced different kinds of 
challenges in retaining and advancing in work and, hence, the type of help they 
received differed. For example, ND25+ customers were much less likely to receive 
help dealing with family problems that affected job retention and slightly less 
likely to receive help dealing with problems at work. In addition, NDLP customers 
were much more likely to receive an EDF payment than those in the ND25+ group. 
Many NDLP customers received payments for childcare assistance, a support that 
few ND25+ customers required. Thus, despite the retention problems faced by the 
ND25+ group, they were less likely than the other target groups to take up these 
retention-focused supports. The challenges the ND25+ customers faced were more 
often related to labour market issues (e.g. temporary and agency work), which 
support services such as the EDF were not designed to address. Instead, efforts by 
ASAs to help their customers become re-employed were the most important type 
of retention-focused work for the ND25+ group.
Similar proportions of ND25+ and NDLP programme group members received a 
retention bonus – 31 and 30 per cent, respectively. This similarity remained when 
considering only those customers who ever entered full-time work (70 and 75 per 
cent, respectively). However, among those who entered full-time work, only 48 
per cent of the ND25+ group received more than one retention bonus during the 
follow-up period, while 60 per cent of the NDLP group received multiple bonuses. 
86 As discussed earlier, some of the assistance provided by ASAs was related 
to re-employment. This assistance is not included in measures of help with 
retention and advancement.
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This indicates that the ND25+ members who entered full-time work may have 
either done so later in the follow-up period than those in the NDLP group or may 
not have been able to retain full-time work long enough to receive more than one 
bonus.
Advancement
Advisers generally found it difficult to deliver the advancement agenda to the 
ND25+ customer group. This is reflected in the fact that the rates of receiving 
help and advice on advancement-focused issues for working ND25+ programme 
group members ranged from about one-half to three-quarters the levels of 
those for the NDLP customers.87 However, both groups received similar types of 
advancement support – help for both customer groups centred around finding 
training or education, working out long-term career goals and finding a job with 
better pay or conditions. As expected, there was considerably less focus for the 
ND25+ group on increasing hours, since this group was less likely to work part-
time in the absence of ERA.
Finally, far fewer ND25+ customers than NDLP customers undertook training. 
Thirty-five per cent of programme group NDLP customers both entered work and 
at some point took up training while in work, compared with 19 per cent of 
ND25+ customers (not shown in the tables). For both groups, these figures were 
far higher than the numbers for those who received either training fee assistance 
or a training completion bonus through ERA. This is likely to be because much 
of this training was employer-provided, on-the-job training that did not qualify 
for the incentives or because these customers were not working the required 
16 hours per week while engaging in training. Nonetheless, larger numbers of 
NDLP customers than ND25+ customers received both fee assistance (ten per cent 
compared with six per cent) and a completion bonus (eight per cent compared 
with four per cent) from ERA.88 However, receipt rates for both groups are very 
low, reflecting the difficulties in encouraging both of these groups of customers 
to engage in work and then to also participate in eligible training courses. This 
contrasts with WTC customers, who were already working at least 16 hours per 
week and were, therefore, much more likely to take up the training incentives. 
3.8 Conclusions
This chapter has explored ND25+ ERA customers’ receipt of in-work job coaching 
and support, as well as their use of the programme’s financial incentives for full-
time work and for combining work and training. Along with Chapter 2, it provides 
87 This includes all advancement-focused issues listed in Table 3.2, other than 
negotiating a pay rise, which was higher for working programme group 
customers in the ND25+ group than in the NDLP group.
88 Care should be exercised in interpreting these comparisons, given the small 
sample size of the ND25+ customer group.
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a basis for assessing the ‘strength’ of the ERA ‘treatment’ delivered to customers 
in the ND25+ group. Again, it is important to remember that more than half of 
ND25+ customers did not enter work during the follow-up period and so were 
not eligible for ERA’s post-employment services.
The findings suggest that the post-employment intervention for ND25+ working 
programme group customers differed in both content and intensity from what 
those customers would have experienced had ERA not existed. When considering 
only customers who entered work, programme group members were more than 
twice as likely as control group members to be in touch with Jobcentre Plus staff 
while in work and over three times as likely to receive in-work help and advice 
on employment retention and advancement. Most programme group customers 
were aware of the employment retention bonus and a third of them received at 
least one. In addition, many customers who received a bonus also spoke with 
their advisers when they went to the Jobcentre Plus offices to claim the bonus, 
providing an opportunity for advisers to promote other ERA services. Together, 
these findings suggest that the implementation of ERA, as intended, created a 
substantial post-employment ‘treatment contrast’ between the programme and 
control groups.
However, the chapter points to a number of challenges that Jobcentre Plus 
staff encountered in implementing the ERA model with ND25+ customers. For 
example, although most working programme group customers received post-
employment support, receipt was far from universal. A quarter had no contact 
with Jobcentre Plus staff while in work. In addition, the nature and quality of the 
support that customers received varied substantially. Less than half of working 
programme group members received in-work support related to retention and 
advancement and only a third were contacted proactively by Jobcentre Plus staff 
without initiating the contact. While the majority spoke with their advisers while 
picking up the retention bonus, the depth and content of this contact also varied. 
In addition, while awareness of the financial incentives was generally high, a 
portion of programme group customers reported that they had not heard of these 
incentives.
Qualitative data show that, especially in the early stages of implementation, ASAs 
struggled to remain proactive in contacting customers once they found work. 
ASAs did become more comfortable and skilled in delivering in-work support and 
in administering the financial incentives over time, although disengagement of 
working customers in the early days of the programme meant that many customers 
had limited awareness of the full range of post-employment support that ERA 
offered. This suggests that perhaps with better implementation (staff support 
and training), customers’ receipt of in-work support and take-up of the financial 
incentives might have been higher. At the same time, there were also hurdles 
that a better administration of ERA would not easily have overcome. Customers 
in the ND25+ group traditionally do not maintain contact with Jobcentre Plus 
staff once in work and proved to be more self-reliant in work than customers in 
the NDLP group. Hence, many were uninterested in receiving post-employment 
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support. Moreover, because of problems of short-term and contract work, ASAs’ 
focus for this group of customers was often on helping them to maintain steady 
employment and to become re-employed when they left work, which left little 
time for advancement work within the time-frame of the ERA programme.
Together, these findings provide reason to expect that ERA may have positive, but 
perhaps modest, effects on ND25+ customers’ labour market outcomes. ERA was 
designed primarily to be a post-employment treatment, but a large proportion of 
programme group customers never entered work or never had the chance to take 
advantage of many of the programme’s services. For those who did enter work, 
some were able to take advantage of the full range of programme supports, but 
many struggled with short-term work and were unable or unwilling to focus on 
advancement. It is likely that extra time would be needed for such low-skilled and 
long-term unemployed customers to find work, settle into work and then make 
efforts to advance.
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4 Impacts of ERA on 
 labour market outcomes 
 and benefits receipt
4.1  Introduction
This chapter presents Employment Retention and Advancement programme’s 
(ERA’s) effects on employment, earnings, and benefits receipt after two years of 
follow-up. The two-year focus allows the analysis to capture ERA’s effects as its 
implementation matured, moving beyond some of the problems encountered in 
the first year of operation. It also extends the analysis into a period in which more 
New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+) customers had a chance to fully take advantage of the 
programme. By their second year in the study, more of them had moved into work 
or had established some stability in work and could benefit from ERA’s in-work 
services and benefits. However, it is also important to remember that participation 
in ERA could last for up to 33 months or nine months after the two-year point.
Results are presented for the full sample, pooled across all districts, and also for 
each district separately. Effects for selected subgroups are presented in Chapter 
5. This chapter uses administrative data to estimate ERA’s effects, given that 
the survey data have been assessed as unreliable for this purpose.89 While the 
administrative data have advantages over survey-based data, such as a larger 
sample sizes and no recall bias, they do limit the analysis in some ways. The 
administrative employment data will not capture self-employment, jobs under 16 
hours per week and some types of informal and low-paid work, which may be 
especially prevalent in this population and they contain no information on hours 
worked or job characteristics. Thus, any effects on advancement that ERA might 
have on non-earnings aspects of work, such as more suitable working patterns or 
89 See Chapter 1 and Appendix B. The survey data are used in this chapter only 
to provide a rough portrait of the types of jobs held by programme group 
members.
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improved benefits, will not be captured here. In addition, administrative data on 
earnings are currently available only for the 2005/06 tax year. This tax year, which 
roughly captures year 1 of follow-up for sample members randomly assigned late 
in the intake period and year 2 for those assigned earlier, does not allow for an 
analysis of effects on earnings in year 1 compared to year 2. Finally, the chapter 
presents vignettes from the qualitative interview data to highlight key findings.
4.2 Overview of findings  
After one year, as reported in Dorsett et al., 2007, ERA’s effects were characterised 
as more mixed and uncertain for the ND25+ group than for the two lone parent 
groups. The programme was found to have little effect for the ND25+ group on 
their rates of employment, earnings or hours worked. For example, 27 per cent of 
the ERA group worked full time at month 12, compared with 24 per cent of the 
control group.
The two-year results are somewhat more encouraging but only mildly so. ERA 
led to small increases in employment and small reductions in benefits receipt, 
effects that emerged only in year 2. ERA had no effect on earnings during the 
2005/06 tax year. Although the results are not encouraging up to this point, the 
final verdict on ERA for the ND25+ group must await longer-term follow-up to 
examine whether the effects grow or fade over time. 
Although there were some important differences in effects by district, these 
differences were driven largely by counterintuitive negative effects in Wales, which 
appear to be partly due to implementation difficulties in that district.
The findings for the ND25+ group stand in contrast to those for the two lone 
parent groups.90 For the New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) group, ERA substantially 
increased earnings in years 1 and 2, largely by encouraging more lone parents to 
move from part-time to full-time work. ERA also increased full-time employment 
for the Working Tax Credit (WTC) group in both follow-up years, with positive 
effects on earnings emerging in year 2. A number of hypotheses might be raised to 
explain the lack of effects for the ND25+ group. When they do work, for example, 
the majority of the ND25+ customers work full-time, suggesting little room for the 
type of effects observed for the two lone parent groups. In addition, less than half 
of this group entered work during the two-year period, meaning that relatively 
few were able to benefit from post-employment services, the most important part 
of the ERA treatment. The results highlight the continuing importance of both 
pre- and post-employment services to help address the labour market barriers 
faced by the long-term unemployed.
90 See Riccio et al., 2008. 
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4.3 The expected effects of ERA
Given the relatively low employment rates of ND25+ customers in the absence of 
ERA, the first effect to consider is that of moving into work. ND25+ customers are 
first exposed to the programme’s pre-employment component. This may influence 
job search behaviour in two ways, relative to the services routinely provided as 
part of the New Deal: First, advisers may encourage customers to seek longer-
lasting jobs that offer more potential for advancement. Restricting potential jobs 
in this way may have the effect of extending the period of job search. There is 
little evidence from the process analysis that advisers systematically offered such 
advice. The more important differential between the ERA and control group in 
pre-employment treatment is probably the retention bonus. Because that bonus 
rewards any type of full-time work, it may encourage individuals to consider jobs 
that they might otherwise have regarded as too poorly paid. This may expand the 
pool of jobs deemed acceptable and thereby speed up the job search process. 
At the same time, because the retention bonus is payable only for full-time work 
(defined as 30 or more hours per week), ERA should prompt individuals to favour 
such jobs over part-time positions. 
An important consideration is the extent to which any change in employment 
caused by ERA might affect earnings. For individuals who start working as a result 
of ERA, the effect on earnings, independent of the retention bonus, will clearly 
be positive. The same is also true for those who increase their hours but keep the 
same hourly rate. However, there are two more complicated scenarios: First, ERA 
may cause some individuals to work more hours but at a lower wage than they 
would have otherwise. This may be because the combination of earnings and the 
retention bonus leaves them better off, such that they may be willing to accept 
lower-paying, full-time positions or because the lower-paying jobs have attractive 
characteristics – perhaps they are more conveniently located or offer better 
employment benefits. For such individuals, the effect on earnings may be small or 
even negative. Second, for individuals who would otherwise work in excess of 30 
hours per week, the availability of the retention bonus under ERA may allow them 
to achieve the same level of income while working fewer hours (although still 
more than 30). Should they choose to reduce their hours to a level closer to the 
retention bonus threshold, the effect on earnings is likely to be negative. Overall, 
it is not necessarily the case that ERA will increase earnings. 
4.4 ERA’s impacts on work and earnings
This section presents ERA’s effects on employment and earnings using 
administrative data. As mentioned earlier, although the administrative data have 
several advantages over survey data, such as full sample coverage and no recall 
bias, they do have some limitations. For example, these data cover only individuals 
whose employers participate in the Pay-As-You-Earn system (a method of paying 
income tax whereby the employee receives wages with the tax already deducted 
by the employer). This means that self-employment spells are not captured and 
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there is only partial coverage of employees who earn less than the PAYE threshold 
(currently	£100	per	week).	Thus,	they	will	understate	employment	to	some	extent.91 
Although there is little reason to believe that this underestimation of employment 
will differ for the ERA and control groups, the limitations of these data should be 
kept in mind when interpreting the results. 
Outcomes for the control group are the benchmark used to judge the effects of 
ERA, given that they represent what would have happened to the ERA group 
in the absence of the programme. Figure 4.1 presents employment rates over 
the two-year period for the control group. Employment rates remained very low 
over the entire period, never increasing much beyond 20 per cent in any given 
month. In contrast, monthly employment rates for the NDLP group (not shown) 
increased to a little over 40 per cent by the later part of the follow-up period. A 
comparison of the percentage of ND25+ customers who worked at some point 
over the two-year period (42 per cent) with the percentage employed in any given 
month (20 per cent) illustrates that a fair number of people who worked did not 
stay employed for long. (See Box 4.1 for an example of one ND25+ customer’s 
challenges of sustaining work.)
Figure 4.1 Control group employment rates over the first two 
  years after random assignment for ND25+ customers,  
  estimated from administrative records
91 The employment records also required cleaning for them to be suitable for 
evaluation purposes. A fair number of cases, for example, had unknown 
job start and end dates. However, the extent of data cleaning did not differ 
between the ERA and control groups.
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Box 4.1 Case study 1, The challenge of breaking out of the ‘no pay, low 
pay’ cycle: Tom
In common with many customers, Tom was moving between employment 
and benefits, because of the nature of the labour market in which he wanted 
to work. He worked in predominantly low-skilled, manual jobs that were 
often offered only as fixed-term contracts or through agencies. As Tom said 
of his most recent job during his second interview:
‘If it weren’t agency work, I’d still be working, you know what I mean. That 
was what, I don’t need a kick up bum, like, to tell me to work. If one of them 
jobs had just said, “Well, you’re on permanent”, that would make my day.’
Like many customers with these types of experiences, Tom was striving for 
full-time, permanent work but was finding this difficult to attain. He was out 
of work at the time of the first interview but had just finished a six-month 
contract job. This was a continuation of unstable – mainly short-term contract 
– manual employment. By the time of the second interview (one year later), 
he had had three more jobs. Two of these were temporary, and he had lost 
the third, which he had expected to be permanent, when he became ill. He 
said that his ERA adviser did help him between jobs. Although he went back 
to the main Jobcentre Plus section to claim his benefits, he retained the help 
of an ERA adviser, whom he says helped him find work again. His adviser also 
contacted his employer at one point to make sure things were going well. He 
was not keen on undertaking training, however. What he really wanted was 
steady manual labour:
‘I’ve been slogging all my life, but I’ve never been one for, well…not education, 
but learning a skill. I just like getting stuck in on a job, earning a wage at end 
of week, and that’s it, looking after my family.’
Tom talked about how he had worked since he left school and the importance 
to him of being a worker and earning a wage to support his family. He was 
receptive to the idea of in-work training, if it was necessary for his job, but 
not as an ‘extra’ in order to gain new skills and move into better work. The 
in-work advice and help he received from ERA appeared to act as a support. 
However, the nature of his employment (that he was keen to continue), 
combined with his reluctance to move in a different direction, meant that his 
labour-market position remained fragile and he continued to cycle between 
benefits and low-paid, temporary work. 
 
Table 4.1 summarises ERA’s impacts on employment and earnings (for guidance 
on reading an impact table, see Box 4.2). Although ERA had no significant effects 
on total months worked during the period or on earnings in the 2005/06 tax year, 
it did increase the fraction of ND25+ customers who worked at some point during 
year 2, by nearly three percentage points. Figure 4.2 presents effects on monthly 
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employment and shows a slight divergence in rates between the programme 
and control groups in year 2, although most differences are quite small and not 
statistically significant. 
Table 4.1 Effects of ERA on employment and earnings within two 
 years after random assignment for ND25+ customers,  
 estimated from administrative records
Outcome
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Difference 
(impact) P-value
Ever employed during (%)
Year 1 35.8 35.0 0.7 0.526
Year 2 33.9 31.3 2.6** 0.020
Years 1-2 44.2 42.2 2.0* 0.082
Average number of months 
employed during
Year 1 2.3 2.3 0.0 0.812
Year 2 2.7 2.5 0.2 0.113
Years 1-2 5.0 4.8 0.2 0.289
Employed during month 24 (%) 22.2 21.0 1.3 0.191
Average earnings during 2005/06  
tax	year	(£)
2,848 2,679 169 0.235
Sample size = 6,782 3,424 3,358
Source: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment records.
Notes: Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for  
pre-random assignment characteristics of sample members. 
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the 
control group. Statistical significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; 
and *** = 1 per cent.
Includes all customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005.
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Figure 4.2 ERA group and control group employment rate trends 
  over the first two years after random assignment for 
  ND25+ customers, estimated from 
  administrative records
Although the administrative data provide no information on hours worked, it 
can be inferred from the lack of effects on earnings that ERA did not encourage 
a movement from part-time to full-time work, as found for the two lone parent 
groups. This finding is somewhat expected, given that the majority of employed 
ND25+ customers work full-time (see Table 4.4 and the report on ERA’s first-year 
findings). Effects on hours worked were also not found at the one-year point, as 
shown in the earlier report.92 However, these data do not provide any evidence on 
other aspects of jobs held, such as employer-provided benefits. 
 
92 See Dorsett et al., 2007.
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Box 4.2 How to read the impact tables in this report
Most impact tables in this report use a similar format, illustrated below. The 
example below shows employment outcomes for the ERA group and the 
control group, indicating the percentage ever employed in years 1 and 2. 
For example, about 44 (44.2) per cent of ERA group members and about 42 
(42.2) per cent of control group members worked at some point over the 
two-year period. 
Because individuals were assigned randomly either to the ERA programme or 
to the control group, the effects of the programme can be estimated by the 
difference in outcomes between the two groups. The ‘Difference’ column in 
the table shows the difference between the two groups on several outcomes. 
These differences represent the programme’s impact on various outcomes. 
For example, the impact on employment in years 1-2 can be calculated 
by subtracting 44.2 from 42.2, yielding 2.0 percentage points. Thus, ERA 
increased the likelihood that people would work during this period.
Differences marked with asterisks are ‘statistically significant’, meaning that it 
is quite unlikely that the differences arose by chance. The number of asterisks 
indicates whether the impact is statistically significant at the one per cent, 
five per cent, or ten per cent level (the lower the level, the less likely that the 
impact is due to chance). For example, as shown below, the ERA programme 
had a statistically significant impact of 2.6 percentage points at the five per 
cent level on customers working in year 2. (One asterisk corresponds to the 
ten per cent level; two asterisks, the five per cent level; and three asterisks, the 
one per cent level.) The p-value indicates the probability that the difference 
arose by chance.
Some measures in Chapter 4 are shown in italics and are considered ‘non-
experimental’ because they include only a subset of the full report sample. For 
example, because workers in the ERA group may have different characteristics 
than workers in the control group, differences in these outcomes between 
those workers may not be attributable to the ERA programme. Statistical 
significance tests are not conducted for these measures. 
ERA Control Difference
Outcome group group (impact) P-value
Ever employed (%)
Year 1 35.8 35.9 0.7 0.526
Year 2 33.9 31.3 2.6** 0.020
Years 1-2 44.2 42.2 2.0* 0.082
Average duration of first employment 
among workers (months) 9.7 9.8
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4.5 Impacts on benefits receipt
Table 4.2 presents impacts on benefits receipt. ND25+ customers were all receiving 
Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) at the time of study entry. By month 24, 44.7 per cent 
of the control group were still receiving JSA, compared with 42.2 per cent of 
the ERA group, for a statistically significant reduction of 2.6 percentage points. 
Matching the effects on employment, ERA’s effects on JSA receipt did not emerge 
until the second follow-up year. As with employment, however, the effects are 
quite small. The programme group received JSA for 0.4 months (or almost two 
weeks)	less	than	the	control	group	in	year	2,	for	an	average	saving	of	£72.
Table 4.2 Effects of ERA on benefits receipt within two years 
 after random assignment for ND25+ customers,  
 estimated from administrative records 
Outcome
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Difference 
(impact) P-value
Average number of months receiving JSA in
Year 1 7.9 7.9 0.0 0.879
Year 2 5.4 5.7 -0.4*** 0.003
Years 1-2 13.3 13.6 -0.3* 0.070
Receiving JSA in month 24 (%) 42.2 44.7 -2.6** 0.027
Average JSA payment received in (£)
Year 1 2,267 2,274 -7 0.862
Year 2 1,433 1,505 -72* 0.062
Years 1-2 3,700 3,779 -79 0.254
Number of months received IS in years 1-2 2.3 2.3 0.0 0.729
Average	total	IS	received	in	years	1-2	(£) 626 616 11 0.795
Number of months received IS or JSA in years 1-2 15.4 15.7 -0.3 0.119
Average	total	IS	and	JSA	received	in	years	1-2	(£) 4,327 4,394 -68 0.339
Number of months received IB in years 1-2 2.6 2.7 -0.1 0.457
Ever received IB in years 1-2 (%) 22.2 24.3 -2.1** 0.041
Sample size = 6,782 3,424 3,358
Source: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study benefit receipt records.
Notes: Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for  
pre-random assignment characteristics of sample members. 
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the 
control group. Statistical significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; 
and *** = 1 per cent.
Includes all customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005.
JSA = Jobseeker’s Allowance; IS = Income Support; IB = Incapacity Benefit.
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4.6 Impacts on retention
Although ERA increased employment rates in the second year, it is not clear whether 
the programme had this effect by encouraging individuals to move into work or 
by increasing employment retention among workers. As shown in Chapter 3, 
among working customers, programme group members were considerably more 
likely than control group members to have received in-work support, suggesting 
the possibility of impacts on retention. If ERA increased retention, for example, 
programme-control differences in employment rates would emerge as those in 
the control group began losing their jobs. This section takes a closer look at ERA’s 
effects on employment retention, using a variety of measures.93
The number of employment and non-employment spells provides an indication of 
movement from job to job and can provide a measure of employment instability. 
The time to first employment demonstrates ERA’s effects on helping ND25+ 
customers move into work more quickly, either through pre-employment advising 
or the retention bonus or both. Several outcomes are included that measure the 
duration of the employment, to provide a broad picture of employment retention. 
This includes continuous employment in the first job spells and in employment 
that began in year 1.
Table 4.3 presents the results. Overall, the results suggest that ERA did not increase 
employment in year 2 by increasing retention but instead encouraged those who 
would not have worked to enter work in year 2. This can be seen from the lack of 
impacts on the duration of first employment and on the continuity of employment 
among those who entered work in year 1. In addition, under the outcome ‘time to 
first employment’, the effect of ERA was to reduce the number of customers who 
never worked (by 2.0 percentage points) and increase the number who entered 
employment for the first time in the months 13 to 23 (by 1.7 percentage points). 
93 It is difficult to capture ERA’s effects on retention, given that employment 
length is examined only among workers. In this case, even experimental 
outcomes, or those including zeroes for non-workers, are difficult to interpret 
with certainty. Nonetheless, the variety of measures presented here gives 
some indication of the programme’s effects. 
Impacts of ERA on labour market outcomes and benefits receipt
91
Table 4.3 Effects of ERA on employment dynamics within two 
 years after random assignment for ND25+ customers,  
 estimated from administrative records
Outcome
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Difference 
(impact) P-value
Average number of employment spells 0.6 0.5 0.0 0.265
Average number of non-employment spells 1.2 1.2 0.0 0.561
Average number of months to first employment 16.0 16.1 -0.1 0.648
Time to first employment (%)
Employed in the month of random assignment 9.9 10.1 -0.2 0.803
1 to 6 months 18.9 19.1 -0.1 0.900
7 to 12 months 7.9 7.3 0.6 0.336
13 to 23 months 7.5 5.8 1.7*** 0.005
Never employed 55.8 57.8 -2.0* 0.082
Average duration of first employment (months) 4.3 4.1 0.2 0.245
Average duration of first employment among 
workers (months) 9.7 9.8
Duration of first employment (%)
Never employed 55.8 57.8 -2.0* 0.082
1 to 6 months 20.7 19.6 1.1 0.241
7 to 12 months 8.9 8.9 0.1 0.935
13 to 23 months 12.2 11.3 1.0 0.219
Employed continuously 2.3 2.5 -0.1 0.724
Employed in year 1 and worked consecutively 
for (%)
Less than 6 months 10.2 10.0 0.1 0.857
6 to 12 months 9.4 9.6 -0.2 0.794
More than 12 months 16.2 15.4 0.8 0.379
Employed in year 1 and worked consecutively for 
6 months or more (%) 25.6 25.0 0.6 0.572
Of all customers who worked in year 1, 
percentage who worked consecutively for 6 
months or more 71.6 71.2
Of all customers who worked in year 1, 
percentage who worked consecutively for 12 
months or more 48.3 46.8
Sample size = 6,782 3,424 3,358
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Table 4.3 Continued
Source: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment records.
Notes: Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for  
pre-random assignment characteristics of sample members. 
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the 
control group. Statistical significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; 
and *** = 1 per cent.
Includes all customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005.
Italics indicate comparisons that are are non-experimental since statistics were calculated for 
non-random subsets of the sample. Statistical tests were not performed.
Aside from demonstrating where ERA had its effects, the table is suggestive of the 
severe employment barriers many of the ND25+ customers faced. The population 
appears to consist of a small fraction of individuals who can find stable work – 
about 15 per cent worked in year 1 and worked stably thereafter. Another fifth 
found work early but stayed employed for less than a year. However, more than 
half of this group (58 per cent) did not work at any point during the two-year 
period. Of course, the administrative data are unlikely to capture all employment 
taken up by this group but the low rates of formal work are striking. 
4.7 A descriptive look at jobs held by the programme 
 group
Although the survey is not used to estimate programme impacts, these data can 
be used to provide a look at the types of jobs ND25+ customers held over the two-
year period. Table 4.4 presents selected job characteristics for the ERA group. Note 
that, given the low response rates for the survey and the fact that it is comprised of 
an early cohort of participants, the survey sample is not necessarily representative 
of the full sample. This caution should be kept in mind when considering the 
results.
According to the survey data, about 56 per cent of the ERA group reported 
working at some point during the follow-up period. This rate is somewhat higher 
than the rate obtained using administrative data, a difference that may have 
occurred because informal employment was not captured in the administrative 
data and because respondents to the 24-month survey may represent a more 
employable group than the full sample. The data show that only about half of 
these jobs were considered ‘permanent’ and that ten per cent were reported as 
self-employment.
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Table 4.4 Characteristics of the current or most recent job held 
 by the ND25+ ERA group within two years after   
 random assignment
Outcome
ERA 
group
Among those who worked at some point in years 1-2
Had permanent job (%) 51.3
Was self-employed (%) 10.0
Among those working at the 24-month survey
Hourly	wage	(£) 6.8
Working 30 or more hours (%) 70.9
Has fringe benefits offered by respondent’s employer (%)
Pension 35.1
Paid holidays 67.0
Flexible working hours 40.1
Paid or unpaid time off for family reasons 43.8
Sick pay 52.5
Car or van for own private use 5.5
Creche or nursery at workplace 6.4
Trade union membership 21.6
Is a trade union member (%) 7.7
Received promotions or increases in responsibility (%) 11.3
Foresees further opportunities for promotion or increases in responsibility (%) 33.7
Received a pay rise (%) 40.1
Sample size 190
Source: MDRC calculations from the ERA 12- and 24-month customer surveys.
Notes: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
Among those employed at the 24-month survey (37 per cent), most worked full-
time.	However,	hourly	wages	were	fairly	low,	at	£6.80,	as	were	rates	of	fringe	
benefits receipt. For example, only a third were in a pension scheme and 44 per 
cent received paid or unpaid time off. Very few of those working were union 
members. Finally, promotions and promotion possibilities were fairly limited for 
the ND25+ group. Only 11 per cent of workers received a promotion on the 
job and a third foresaw opportunities for promotion. Overall, the data paint a 
picture of fairly low-quality jobs held by the ND25+ group, even though the 
majority of jobs are full-time. Thus, once the programme meets the challenge 
of helping more of this group move into, and stay in, work, there is much room 
for improvement in helping them advance to better jobs. (See Box 4.3 for an 
example of one ND25+ customer’s advancement challenges.)
A comparison with the NDLP group (data not shown) also highlights the low 
quality of jobs for the ND25+ group. Although average wages were similar 
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for the two groups, only a third of ND25+ workers received a pension from 
work, compared with 48 per cent of the NDLP workers. Only eight per cent 
of ND25+ workers reported being a trade union member, compared with 14 
per cent of NDLP workers. Finally, the lower-quality jobs appear to come with 
fewer opportunities for promotion. Only 11 per cent of ND25+ workers received 
a promotion on the job, and a third foresaw opportunities for promotion, 
compared with 17 per cent and 47 per cent, respectively, for the NDLP group.
 
Box 4.3 Case study 2, The challenges of advancement: Kevin
Kevin is a single male with no dependents who left school with no qualifications 
and then had an unstable work history. He was helped by his adviser to find 
work through an employment agency to do grounds maintenance and street 
cleaning for a local council. By the third interview, he had moved to another 
council. Throughout this period, he was continuously employed, only missing 
a period of a few weeks while recovering from a minor operation. However, 
he was unsuccessful in his efforts to secure permanent employment. 
At the time of the first interview, Kevin was unaware of the training possibilities 
on ERA but he was keen to develop his skills and undertake training. His goal 
was to get permanent work and he thought that taking on more responsibilities 
and learning new skills would make him more attractive to his employer or to 
another employer in the future. By the second interview, he had been trained 
to do different types of work and felt that this put him in a stronger position 
to keep his job.
Q: ‘What does advancement in the work mean to you?’
R: ‘Getting more responsibility. That’s why I want to use machines, because 
it’s getting more responsibility.’ 
Q: ‘So because of that do you feel you have advanced at work?’
R: ‘Yes, I got another step up the ladder, so if they wanted to sack me they 
might not because they would have to find another driver.’
His position, however, was fragile. Without a permanent contract, he had 
poor conditions at work. At the time of the third interview, he had moved 
to a different council, because he had been laid off after convalescing for 
three weeks after his operation. Although he was once more working 
continuously, this council laid him off every winter and then hired him in a 
different department. He still had no sick pay or pension. He stated that he 
would have more rights if he worked solidly for one year but his employer 
stops this from happening through the lay-off device: 
‘If you get there for a year, you get more chance of getting a job at the end of 
a year,…that’s why they split the firm into two; they keep you for six months 
in one firm, one part and then chuck you in the other part for six months, so 
you can’t say you’ve been here a year.’
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Box 4.3 (continued)
In terms of his involvement in ERA, Kevin did take advantage of the training 
and claimed the incentive payments. He used the retention bonus to buy a car 
and said that he probably would not have taken or kept the job without the 
bonus, as the journey on public transport would have been too difficult and he 
would not have been able to buy a car with his low wages. He felt, however, 
that he had not had much adviser support and that he had to persuade his 
adviser to arrange ERA funding for some training. By the time of the third 
interview, he had failed the course and was regretting not taking a number 
of smaller, less demanding courses. 
Kevin was one type of customer that ERA was designed to help. His aim had 
been to advance from agency work and secure permanent employment with 
the council he was working for. However, he had not succeeded in this. In 
common with a number of customers with a steady work history, he had 
combined his work with some training to gain new skills and qualifications, 
but this had not resulted in any work progression during the study’s time 
frame. 
4.8 Effects across districts
This section considers whether ERA’s effects vary across districts. The possibility 
of district-level variation arises because of differences in local labour market 
conditions, staffing patterns, and implementation practices. The primary focus 
in the following analysis is whether the variation in effects across districts is 
statistically significant. Such a significance test is necessary, given the natural 
variation around the average impact that will occur when the sample is divided 
into subsamples, and indicates whether the observed variation is more than what 
would be expected to occur by chance. If this variation is not statistically significant, 
it cannot be concluded that ERA worked better in some districts than others. 
4.8.1 Labour market and benefits outcomes
Figure 4.3 presents effects by district on three key outcomes. The top panel 
presents effects on the number of months employed, ranging from +1.1 months 
in Scotland to -1.4 months in Wales. The variation across districts is statistically 
significant, as indicated by the daggers in the upper right corner. Typically, in 
a case where the full sample shows no significant effects, evidence of district 
variation would signal good news that ERA did appear to have effects at least in 
some areas. However, further analyses (not shown) revealed that this variation is 
statistically significant largely because of the negative effects in Wales. With this 
district excluded, there is no significant variation in effects across the other five 
districts. 
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Figure 4.3 Effects of ERA on employment, earnings, and benefits 
  receipt within two years after random assignment 
  for ND25+ customers, estimated from administrative  
  records, by district
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Figure 4.3 Continued
 
For earnings in the 2005/06 tax year, the variation across districts is not statistically 
significant, even with the relatively large negative effect in Wales. Finally, effects 
on JSA receipt, shown in the bottom panel, show statistically significant variation 
across districts. With Wales excluded, however, this variation is not statistically 
significant.
The negative effects in Wales are counterintuitive, given that there is nothing 
about the ERA treatment that should lead to large negative effects. The pre-
employment phase did call for more consideration of the advancement aspects of 
particular jobs, which might have led to some delay in job entry. But there is little 
evidence that this treatment difference occurred. Nor would it have led to such 
large negative effects. 
However, there are several reasons to suggest that the effects in Wales may be 
related to programme implementation. As documented in the first-year report, 
staff shortages in Wales meant that the intensity of pre-employment treatment 
was likely to be greater for the control group than the programme group. In fact, 
administrative data indicate that progression through the ND25+ programme 
and each of its stages was slower for the programme group than the control 
group. Thus, the Wales results, while disappointing, do point to some important 
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lessons for staffing a programme with both a pre- and post-employment phase 
(see Chapter 2 and Box 4.4).94 
Nonetheless, the Wales results cannot be excluded from the analysis when 
considering the overall effects of ERA. First, it is difficult to determine how much of 
this district’s negative effects are due to implementation differences compared to 
natural variation around an overall average impact. Second, when implementing a 
programme such as ERA in various districts, it may be the case that some districts 
will experience the types of staffing shortages and implementation difficulties 
faced by Wales. In any case, the effects observed in Figure 4.3 for the other five 
districts suggest that the overall conclusion about ERA’s effectiveness would not 
change much, even if Wales were excluded. Effects on earnings and employment 
were small and statistically insignificant in three of the five districts. Although two 
districts did show positive and significant impacts, the statistical test for district 
variation suggested that these two effects may have arisen simply by chance. Thus, 
there is no strong evidence to suggest that ERA ‘worked’ in these two districts. 
 
Box 4.4 Lessons learned from Wales: Staffing for pre-employment 
support
Although several districts experienced staffing shortages to some degree, 
they were much more severe in Wales. In this district, staffing shortages 
occurred for the ND25+ programme group but not for the control group 
(or for the NDLP group), with the result that the control group was likely to 
have received a more intensive pre-employment treatment. Thus, the pre-
employment component of ERA was not implemented in a way that was 
consistent with the programme model. Although it cannot be determined 
definitively, the weaker pre-employment intervention received by the ERA 
group in Wales may help explain the negative effects observed in that district 
– the programme group worked less and earned less over the course of the 
follow-up period than the control group. The results highlight the importance 
of not losing sight of pre-employment services, even within a programme 
that is largely directed towards post-employment services. This is particularly 
relevant for the ND25+ sample, for whom retention and advancement depend 
on receiving adequate support to find employment. 
 
4.8.2 Receipt of incentives
Figure 4.4 presents the receipt of retention and training bonuses across districts. 
Receiving the training bonus was dependent on completing a course of training, 
while the employment retention bonus was paid to those who worked for 30 
hours or more for 13 weeks during a 17-week period. Therefore, receiving a 
94 Because Job Entry Targets were also a priority for this district, there was 
pressure on staff to maximise job entries. ERA advisers, in contrast, were not 
subject to the same pressures.
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training bonus was dependent on being offered and accepting the opportunity to 
undertake training and on successful completion of the course. The receipt of the 
training bonus was highest in the East Midlands and Wales. Differences between 
districts were statistically significant (not shown), suggesting that there may have 
been a greater emphasis placed on training in some areas. However, employment 
rates were relatively high in the East Midlands as well, which likely explains some 
part of this difference.
Figure 4.4 Receipt of ERA work and training bonuses within two 
  years after random assignment for ND25+ customers, 
  estimated from administrative records, by district  
  (ERA group only)
There was also statistically significant variation across districts in the receipt of 
the retention bonus, with only 19.7 per cent of the treatment group in London 
receiving this bonus, compared with 37.2 per cent in Wales. These differences 
seem to be driven, in part, by variation in employment rates. The programme 
group in London, for example, had relatively low employment rates over the 
period, indicating less opportunity to take up the incentive. Take-up of the bonus, 
although also affecting programme impacts, will depend, in large part, on the 
level of employment for the programme group, irrespective of the programme-
control difference. The high receipt rates in Wales are somewhat surprising, given 
the negative employment and earnings effects in this district and suggest that the 
problems of delivering pre-employment services did not carry over into the post-
employment phase. 
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4.9 Conclusions
After two years, ERA has had small effects on the ND25+ group. Although ERA 
increased employment rates by a small amount in year 2, fewer than half of the 
ND25+ customers worked during the two-year period. The programme had no 
significant effects on earnings during the 2005/06 tax year or on other measures 
of retention. Also, aside from the negative effects in Wales, which suggest some 
policy lessons in terms of the importance of staffing for pre-employment services 
even in a programme focused on post-employment, there is little evidence that the 
programme worked better in some districts. A later report will examine whether 
these effects grow over time, suggesting that this group needed more lead time to 
move into work and take advantage of the post-employment supports or whether 
the effects are short-lived.
In contrast to the findings reported here, ERA had notable, positive effects for the 
two lone-parent groups, largely by encouraging people who would have worked 
part time to increase their hours. What might explain the smaller effects for the 
ND25+ group? First, when they work, ND25+ customers tend to work full-time, 
leaving less room for a large change in hours worked. However, the ND25+ group 
also had much lower employment rates over the follow-up period than the lone 
parent groups, raising the question of why ERA was not able to move more of 
them into work. As noted in Chapter 1, the ND25+ population as a whole (beyond 
the research sample) exhibits very low employment and retention rates and a 
range of important barriers to work, including high rates of disability and illness, 
few skills, criminal records and drug or alcohol dependence. The research sample 
resembles the broader population on a select set of demographic characteristics 
and, judging by their low rates of employment over the two-year period, faces 
many of the same employment barriers. In addition, and in contrast to the lone 
parent groups, the ND25+ group appears to face important structural barriers to 
retention and advancement in the form of heavy reliance on low-skilled, manual 
jobs that are often offered only through fixed contracts or temp agencies. 
The existence of these barriers suggests that ERA, as a largely post-employment 
programme, may have simply not been enough for the ND25+ group. The pre-
employment services did not significantly differ from what they would have received 
anyway and the ‘carrot’ of the incentives was not enough to move substantially 
more customers into work. The programme did not set out to provide extensive 
pre-employment services to address barriers to work. The results suggest, however, 
that this may be a first step in helping this group advance.
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5 Impacts across subgroups
5.1  Introduction
This chapter explores whether Employment Retention and Advancement 
programme’s (ERA’s) effects varied across subgroups of customers. Although 
there was little evidence that ERA affected employment, earnings and benefits 
receipt in the aggregate, it may have been more or less effective, for example, 
for those facing particular barriers to employment. This is an important area for 
investigation, as it may be the case that, even if ERA has no overall impact, it 
improves the prospects of the most disadvantaged groups, with implications for 
future policymaking. This chapter assesses whether this was the case.
Since the impact of ERA would be expected to vary across subgroups, this chapter 
focuses on whether this variation is consistent with natural variation around the 
average effect for the full sample or is more than would be expected by chance. If 
the variation in the impact of ERA among subgroups is statistically significant, this 
indicates that it has a fundamentally different effect on some groups of individuals. 
Systematic variation across subgroups is informative in terms of knowing which 
groups might be most affected by ERA. Conversely, a lack of significant variation 
could be taken as evidence that the effect of ERA is more universally distributed. 
Less focus is given to whether the impacts for a given subgroup are statistically 
significant, given that small sample sizes reduce the likelihood of detecting a 
statistically significant impact. 
This chapter begins by considering ERA’s effects across subgroups on employment, 
earnings, and benefits receipt for subgroups of New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+) 
customers. The chapter then moves on to consider subgroup differences in the 
likelihood of receiving the ERA training and employment retention bonuses. 
5.2 Economic impacts across subgroups
A variety of hypotheses might be proposed regarding the expected variation in 
ERA’s effects across different types of individuals. One possibility, for example, 
is that ERA might address relative disadvantage, assisting those who face the 
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greatest barriers to employment more than those who would find it easier to 
enter work. Alternatively, it may be most effective for those who have recent work 
experience or are more highly qualified. 
In identifying whether some groups benefit more from ERA, it is important to 
note that there is likely to be some overlap among groups. For example, many 
of the individuals with low educational qualifications will probably also have 
limited recent work experience, given the association between education and 
employment. Therefore, if the impact of ERA varied at all by subgroup, it would be 
unsurprising to find that these differences are apparent across a number of similar 
groups. Some degree of overlap also implies that the effects for a given subgroup, 
say, those with low qualifications, may not be due to education, per se but to 
the correlation between education and work history. Conditional impact analysis 
helps to allocate the observed subgroup effect to the subgroup characteristic, per 
se or to its association with other factors.95 When relevant, the results from this 
analysis are discussed in the text. 
Table 5.1 presents effects on the number of months that the ND25+ group 
spent in employment over the two years following random assignment and their 
average earnings in the 2005/06 tax year. Overall, there is very little statistically 
significant subgroup variation, as indicated by daggers in the table. For example, 
ERA increased the amount of time that individuals with no qualifications spent 
in employment over the two years following random assignment by 0.6 months. 
However, when impacts for those with no qualifications were compared with 
those with higher-level qualifications, there is no evidence that the impact of ERA 
varied by educational attainment. In other words, the variation across the three 
groups is not more than would be expected by chance. 
95 Technically, the analysis involves regressing the outcome of interest on 
treatment status interacted with the subgroup of interest and interacted with 
a range of demographic variables that define other subgroups of interest.
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The only exceptions to the general pattern of ERA having a fairly similar impact 
on different subgroups of ND25+ customers was for housing status and the 
timing of random assignment. ERA raised average earnings in the 2005/06 tax 
year by a greater amount for those in social housing than for those in family or 
private accommodation, to some extent addressing the relative disadvantage of 
this group (shown by the lower earnings of the control group). However, given 
that these two effects are the only statistically significant findings in tests across 
multiple subgroups, their significance could be due to chance and should not be 
overstated.96 The overall conclusion from the table is that the evidence that the 
effects of ERA varied across different types of people is weak. 
Table 5.2 presents effects on benefits receipt. Across most subgroups, there was 
no evidence that ERA affected particular groups of individuals differently. The 
exception to this was employment history. Those who worked for 13 or more 
months from the three years before random assignment spent over a month less 
on Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) than the control group over the two-year period 
considered, while ERA reduced time spent on JSA by only half a month for those 
who had not worked at all in the three years before random assignment. Again, 
some caution should be taken when interpreting these results, given that they 
occurred for only one of many subgroups examined. 
96 When multiple subgroup differences are tested, a few will be statistically 
significant simply by chance. The results should be interpreted with this 
caution in mind. Although there are ways to correct for the number of tests 
conducted, they are not used here, given the lack of consensus about the 
most appropriate method.
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5.3 Receipt of incentives across subgroups
Table 5.3 presents the receipt of training and employment retention bonuses 
by the programme group and so is based on non-experimental analysis. The 
table shows that receipt of the bonuses was more common among particular 
subgroups of ND25+ customers. Generally, the subgroups that were more likely 
to receive the training completion bonus were also more likely to receive the 
employment retention bonus, suggesting that the factors which made it more 
likely for customers to complete training also had a positive impact on their 
ability to maintain employment. The only subgroup difference, which was not 
statistically significant in predicting the likelihood of receiving the training bonus, 
was the age of the youngest child. This was probably explained by the small 
sample size for this comparison, since only 16 per cent of the ND25+ group had 
dependent children who were residing with them, while only four per cent of the 
ND25+ group received the training bonus (see Chapter 3). In addition, receipt 
of the employment retention bonus was not affected by the timing of random 
assignment.
The likelihood of receiving both the training and employment retention bonuses 
was greater for whites, compared with those from an ethnic minority, and for those 
who spent a greater proportion of the three years before random assignment in 
work, compared with those who had not worked at all in this period. There were 
also differences in the likelihood of receiving either bonus which were dependent 
on housing status, with only 2.4 per cent of those living with parents, friends, 
or relatives receiving the training bonus. However, it was those in social housing 
who were least likely to receive the employment retention bonus. This finding is 
somewhat surprising, given that this group appears to have shown larger effects 
on earnings. However, the receipt of the retention bonus depends as much on 
the employment levels of the programme group as on impacts. Employment and 
earnings were relatively low for the social housing group, particularly relative to 
those in private housing, meaning that fewer customers would have been eligible 
to receive the bonus.
Both the training and the retention bonuses were more likely to be paid to those 
with higher existing qualifications and to those who faced fewer barriers to 
employment. This suggests that these barriers affected the ability to participate in 
training and to maintain employment. And, in fact, employment rates for these 
two subgroups were higher than those for individuals with low qualifications or 
many barriers to work. 
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Table 5.3 Bonus receipt rates for ND25+ customers, estimate from 
 administrative records, by subgroup
 
Ever received 
work retention 
bonus within 24 
months follow-
up
Ever received 
training bonus 
within 
24 months 
follow-up
Sample 
size
All participants 31.3 4.1 3,424
Race/ethnicity ††† ††
White 32.4 4.5 2,703
Ethnic minority 26.2 2.6 709
Age of youngest child ††
Under 7 years 37.8 4.7 301
7 to 11 years old 27.7 5.8 95
12 to 16 years old 23.7 2.9 71
Number of months worked in 3 years 
prior to random assignment ††† †††
None 21.3 2.6 1,596
1-12 36.1 4.4 1,110
13+ 44.8 6.8 718
Housing status †† †††
Family 32.7 2.4 744
Social 29.7 4.8 1,488
Private 33.7 4.6 1,079
Qualifications ††† †††
None 23.9 1.8 1,229
GCSE 34.2 4.8 942
A-Level 38.3 6.2 794
Cohort †††
Early (October 2003 - May 2004) 31.4 3.3 1,626
Late (June 2004 - April 2005) 31.0 4.8 1,798
Number of barriers to employment ††† ††
None 36.0 5.5 1,296
One 29.7 3.2 1,480
Two or more 25.5 3.6 648
Severely disadvantaged ††† †††
Yes 18.6 1.4 711
No 34.5 4.9 2,713
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Table 5.3 Continued
Source: MDRC calculations from DWP financial incentives data and baseline information forms 
completed by DWP staff.
Notes: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
Includes all customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005.
A statistical test was performed to measure whether outcomes differed significantly among sub-
group categories. Statistical significance levels are indicated as: † = 10 per cent; †† = 5 per cent; 
and ††† = 1 per cent.
Family housing refers to situations where the customer is living with his/her parents or other 
friends or relatives. Social housing refers to housing in which the Local Authority (local govern-
ment) or a private housing association is the landlord. Private housing refers to owner-occupied 
housing or housing that the customer rents privately.
Barriers to employment include transport, childcare, health, housing, basic skills, or other self-
identified problems.
Severely disadvantaged refers to those participants with General Certificate of Secondary Educa-
tion (GCSE) qualifications or lower, no work in the three years prior to random assignment, and 
at least one barrier to employment.
Child’s age is asked only for children who are living with the customer.
The clear differences between subgroups in receipt of the training completion and 
employment retention bonuses suggest a number of possibilities. Some groups 
might be more likely than others to be offered training opportunities. This could 
be for a variety of reasons, including an assessment of whether the available 
training is likely to enhance the likelihood of the individual advancing in work. 
For those who face multiple barriers to employment, it might be thought that 
training is unlikely to be of benefit when these barriers reduce their likelihood 
of sustaining work. Related to this is the fact that some subgroups are no doubt 
less likely to receive the training completion bonus because they are less likely to 
take up the training opportunities that are offered or to complete the training. 
This may be because their personal circumstances make it difficult for them to 
take part in training or because they are not sufficiently motivated to participate 
in, and complete, the course. Hoggart et al.97 categorised attitudes towards 
advancement as falling into three broad types – positive, indifferent and ambiguous 
or ambivalent – and these attitudes are likely to affect willingness to undertake 
training. Similarly, receipt of the employment retention bonus is dependent both 
on the ability to find stable employment and the motivation to find and remain in 
work. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the personal circumstances of customers 
(for example, their educational qualifications) might determine their likelihood of 
finding and maintaining employment. 
97 Hoggart et al., 2006, p. 59.
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5.4 Conclusions
Overall, ERA had a fairly similar impact on employment, earnings and benefits 
receipt across individuals in the ND25+ group, regardless of their personal 
characteristics, their employment history or the timing of random assignment. 
There was no consistent and reliable evidence that ERA assisted some groups of 
customers and failed to help others or that the minimal aggregate effects masked 
subgroup differences.
While there was little evidence that, in terms of economic outcomes, ERA was 
more effective for either the relatively disadvantaged or for those who were likely 
to be easier to help, receipt of the training completion bonus and the employment 
retention bonus did vary by subgroup. This suggested that personal circumstances 
were important in determining whether an individual received these bonuses. The 
non-experimental analysis for the ERA programme group showed that those who 
are usually viewed as the hardest to help (because of their poor qualifications or 
limited work experience, for example) were less likely to receive training completion 
and employment retention bonuses. However, it should be borne in mind that, 
while potentially available to all, receipt of these bonuses is dependent on being 
in employment. Consequently, those who face barriers to entering and sustaining 
employment are also most likely to face barriers to receiving the bonuses available 
under ERA.
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6 Conclusions
This report has presented the implementation and effects of the Employment 
Retention and Advancement (ERA) programme for the New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+) 
target group. The impacts for this group were restricted to small gains in the rate 
of employment (between two and three percentage points) and correspondingly 
small reductions in the proportions who claimed out-of-work benefits and in 
the aggregate amounts claimed. These small improvements emerged only in 
the second year of their participation in ERA and they were not accompanied by 
substantially greater earnings or effects on other aspects of advancement. 
Effects for the two lone parent groups are presented in a companion report and, 
in contrast to those presented here, were quite positive. Lone parents in the ERA 
groups worked more, earned more, participated more in education and training 
while they worked and were less likely to return to claiming benefits, compared 
with their respective lone parent control groups. These effects were visible both 
12 and 24 months after random assignment. 
Why did ERA have less effect for the ND25+ group? The reason probably does not 
fall to implementation differences. Although staff reported that, for a variety of 
reasons, ND25+ customers were more difficult to engage in programme services, 
they still delivered the core features of the model to this group, as they did to 
the two lone parent groups. ND25+ customers in the ERA group, for example, 
received substantially more in-work supports and services than their control group 
counterparts. In addition, receipt rates of the retention bonus were fairly similar 
among workers in all three target groups. 
One possible reason for the different effects may be the nature of the different 
customer groups and, therefore, what their experiences would have been in the 
absence of the programme. As shown by the control groups, when New Deal 
for Lone Parents (NDLP) customers take jobs, they tend to work part-time. ERA 
increased earnings for this group largely by encouraging those who would have 
worked part-time to move to full-time work, presumably to become eligible for 
the retention bonus. Effects on employment rates, although positive, were small. 
In contrast, most ND25+ customers who take jobs work full-time. Thus, increasing 
earnings for this group would require pulling large numbers of them into work, 
something the programme was not able to do for any of the target groups.
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For the ND25+ target group, however, increasing employment rates was a key 
challenge – fewer than half of them worked during the two-year period. While 
this low rate also means that fewer of the ND25+ customers were able to take 
advantage of ERA’s in-work supports, which may help to explain the programme’s 
limited effects, it highlights the importance of pre-employment support.98 ERA 
was not designed to provide more pre-employment support than typically offered, 
but the results suggest that many in this group may need more.
This ND25+ target group is quite distinct from the lone parent target groups in the 
evaluation, and part of this difference stems from the ways in which they entered 
the study. ND25+ is a mandatory programme for long-term unemployed people, 
whereas NDLP is a voluntary programme for lone parents who have decided that 
now, or soon, may be the right time to enter the labour market. In addition, the 
ND25+ group as a whole can be characterised as facing more barriers to work 
than the NDLP group. Many face severe labour market disadvantages, such as 
lack of skills and/or outdated skills, a short or patchy work history and transport 
difficulties. More than a third have no educational qualifications at all and almost 
half had not worked in the three years before they entered the demonstration. 
Nationally, about 30 per cent of ND25+ participants report that they are suffering 
from some long-term illness or disability, while others have criminal records, drug 
or alcohol dependence or mental or physical health problems.99
Given their poor record in the labour market, their inclusion in a post-employment 
programme like ERA was ambitious, as an effort to try to do something new 
and bold to move them towards sustainable employment. The findings to date 
suggest that something more may be necessary to help move this group into work 
so that they are positioned to take advantage of the programme’s distinctive in-
work supports. 
The findings presented here are not the final story on ERA. Longer-term follow-
up is necessary to examine whether the small effects observed in year 2 grow 
over time. In addition, ERA services and benefits were available for 33 months, 
meaning that an additional nine months of enrolment will not be captured here. 
Finally, advancement and even retention are gradual processes that can take years 
to unfold. The evaluation of ERA will continue for several more years, following 
sample members for five years after they entered the study. The next set of results 
is scheduled to be published in early 2009.
98 The negative effects on employment and earnings in Wales, which may have 
resulted, in part, from staffing problems that caused the ERA group in that 
district to receive less job-placement assistance than the control group, also 
highlight the importance of pre-employment services for the ND25+ target 
group.
99 Adebowale, 2004. 
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Appendix B 
Non-response analysis for the 
two-year customer survey
The analysis in this report focuses on the 6,782 New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+) 
customers who were randomly assigned to the programme or control group in 
the UK ERA study between October 2003 and April 2005. This group is referred 
to as the full sample in the following tables. Programme outcomes presented in 
this report are based on administrative data as well as on responses to a customer 
survey. The first wave of the survey covered the first 12 months since random 
assignment and the second wave covered the second 12 months. Due to the 
time and resources required to conduct the survey, not every customer who was 
randomly assigned was selected to participate. Instead, a subset of the full sample 
was randomly selected to participate in the survey and represent the larger group. 
This group is referred to as the fielded sample. However, several customers 
selected to participate in the survey could not be located, refused to participate or 
could not be interviewed. Sample members who were unable to participate in the 
survey are referred to as non-respondents, while those members who completed 
the survey are referred to as respondents. Those customers who did not respond 
to the first wave of the survey were not approached in the second wave. 
Because of the lack of success in contacting customers in the ND25+ group for the 
second-year survey, a decision was made to reallocate survey resources and field a 
larger sample of the Working Tax Credit (WTC) group, a group with a smaller first-
year fielded sample but with a much higher response rate than the ND25+ group. 
As a result, the ND25+ fielded sample represents an early cohort of customers 
randomly assigned between December 2003 and March 2004. 
This appendix assesses the extent to which the respondent sample is representative 
of the full sample and whether the impacts estimated using the responses to the 
survey can be regarded as applying equally to the full sample. To preview the key 
results, the level of survey response was rather low and tended to be particularly 
associated with certain characteristics. In addition, the available evidence suggests 
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that economic impact estimates based on the respondent sample do not agree 
with estimates based on the full sample. This discrepancy is driven by both a 
response bias and a cohort effect. This report does not present economic impacts 
based on survey data; however, it does use the customer survey data to suggest 
the level of participation in activities and attitudes towards the programme.
Response rates
As previously mentioned, the response rate for the ND25+ group is fairly low 
by conventional standards for random assignment impact evaluations. However, 
considering that that this is a particularly difficult population to contact and that 
those who did not respond to the first wave of the survey were not contacted 
for the second wave, the response rate is within expectation. Table B.1 shows 
that of the 6,782 customers in the full sample, 1,016 were selected to be in 
the fielded sample and 661 responded to the second-year survey, yielding a 65 
per cent response rate. (Survey sample sizes by research group and district are 
presented in Table B.2.)
Table B.1  Survey response rates for ND25+ customers, 
 24-month customer survey    
Total ERA group Control 
group
Full sample size 6,782 3,424 3,358
Fielded sample size 1,016 507 509
Respondent sample size 661 340 321
Non-respondent sample size 355 167 188
Response rate (%) 65.1 67.1 63.1
Source: MDRC calculations from the ERA 24-month customer survey.
Note: Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between response rates for the ERA group 
and the control group. Statistical significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per 
cent; and *** = 1 per cent.
Table B.2 Survey respondent sample size for ND25+ 
 customers, by customer group and district  
District ERA group Control group
East Midlands 65 68
London 60 48
North East England 65 64
North West England 52 47
Scotland 60 52
Wales 38 42
Total 340 321
Source: MDRC calculations from the ERA 24-month customer survey.
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Comparison of impact estimates from administrative data 
across samples
Regardless of the level of response, it is possible that impact estimates for the 
group for which survey data are available may not agree with impact estimates 
based on the full sample. Although survey data are not available for the full 
sample, employment, earnings and benefits data from administrative records are. 
Using administrative data, estimates based on the full and fielded samples can 
be compared with estimates based on the respondent sample. This provides an 
insight into whether estimates based on the smaller (respondent) sample can be 
regarded as unbiased estimates for the full sample. Should this be the case for 
the outcomes held in administrative records, one can be more confident that the 
impact estimates for the outcomes available only in the survey data also apply to 
the full sample.
Table B.3 contains impact estimates from administrative data for average earnings 
for the 2005/06 tax year, as well as the number of months receiving benefits, the 
number of months employed, ever received benefits and ever employed in the first 
and second years after random assignment for the full, fielded and respondent 
samples. Both the fielded and respondent samples show statistically insignificant 
impacts on earnings, though the impact on the fielded sample is positive while the 
impact on the respondent sample is negative. There is little difference in impacts 
on benefits between the two samples as well. Most notably, this table shows a 
statistically insignificant positive impact on ever being employed during the follow-
up period for the fielded sample and a statistically insignificant negative impact 
for the respondent sample, as well as a statistically significant negative impact 
on the number of months employed. Overall, the comparison of administrative 
data shows slightly concerning discrepancies in impact estimates. While not all 
of the impacts are statistically significant, administrative data suggest that the 
fielded sample experienced slightly positive impacts on earnings and employment, 
while the respondent sample experienced the reverse. This is the best available 
test of whether the respondent sample is capable of delivering unbiased impact 
estimates and the suggestion is that it may not be reasonable to generalise the 
survey response findings on economic outcomes to the full sample.
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Table B.3 Comparison of impacts on the benefits receipt and 
 employment of the full, fielded, and respondent 
 samples for ND25+ customers, estimated using   
 administrative records    
Outcome ERA group Control group Difference 
(impact)
P-value
Full sample
Number of 
months on 
benefits
Year 1 7.9 7.9 0.0 0.879
Year 2 5.4 5.7 -0.4*** 0.003
Year 1-2 13.3 13.6 -0.3* 0.069
Ever receiving 
benefits during
Year 1 97.3 97.7 -0.3 0.351
Year 2 59.6 62.4 -2.8** 0.013
Year 1-2 97.7 97.9 -0.2 0.584
Number of 
months employed
Year 1 2.3 2.3 0.0 0.812
Year 2 2.7 2.5 0.2 0.113
Year 1-2 5.0 4.8 0.2 0.289
Ever employed 
during
Year 1 35.8 35.0 0.7 0.526
Year 2 33.9 31.3 2.6** 0.020
Year 1-2 44.2 42.2 2.0* 0.082
Earnings in the 
2005/06 tax year 
(£)
2,848 2,679 169 0.235
Sample size 3,424 3,358
Continued
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Table B.3 Continued
Outcome ERA group Control group Difference 
(impact)
P-value
Fielded Sample
Number of 
months on 
benefits
Year 1 7.8 7.7 0.1 0.732
Year 2 5.4 5.5 -0.1 0.742
Year 1-2 13.2 13.2 0.0 0.961
Ever receiving 
benefits during
Year 1 98.9 98.9 -0.1 0.921
Year 2 58.4 62.5 -4.1 0.174
Year 1-2 98.9 99.1 -0.2 0.694
Number of 
months employed
Year 1 2.2 2.4 -0.2 0.442
Year 2 2.8 2.9 -0.1 0.597
Year 1-2 5.0 5.3 -0.3 0.481
Ever employed 
during
Year 1 34.3 35.4 -1.1 0.699
Year 2 35.1 34.4 0.8 0.788
Year 1-2 44.9 43.1 1.8 0.545
Earnings in the 
2005-2006 tax year 
(£) 2,848 2,782 66 0.852
Sample size 507 509
Respondent 
sample
Number of 
months on 
benefits
Year 1 7.9 7.9 0.0 0.996
Year 2 5.6 5.6 0.0 0.959
Year 1-2 13.5 13.5 0.0 0.975
Ever receiving 
benefits during
Year 1 98.8 99.1 -0.2 0.754
Year 2 59.6 64.3 -4.7 0.204
Year 1-2 98.9 99.3 -0.5 0.527
Continued
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Table B.3 Continued 
Respondent 
sample
ERA group Control group Difference 
(impact)
P-value
Number of 
months employed
Year 1 2.1 2.6 -0.5* 0.065
Year 2 2.9 3.3 -0.5 0.195
Year 1-2 5.0 6.0 -1.0* 0.090
Ever employed 
during
Year 1 32.5 37.8 -5.3 0.139
Year 2 36.5 38.3 -1.7 0.638
Year 1-2 44.6 45.9 -1.2 0.743
Earnings in the 
2005/06 tax year 
(£) 2,998 3,096 -98 0.821
Sample size 340 321
Source: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Survey employment, earnings, 
and benefits data and the ERA 24-month customer survey.
Notes: Benefits refers to Jobseeker’s Allowance.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the 
control group. Statistical significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; 
and *** = 1 per cent.
Comparison of impact estimates across cohorts
If the fielded sample were a truly random subset of the full sample, one would 
expect to see similar impacts for the full and fielded samples; however, when 
comparing the results in Table B.3, it is clear that that is not the case. The table 
shows that the full sample has a statistically significant negative impact on benefits 
receipt and a statistically significant positive impact on employment in the second 
year of follow-up, while the fielded sample does not. 
In most cases this discrepancy would suggest a ‘bad draw’, but the fielded sample 
in this study was not completely random by design. Due to a reallocation of funds, 
only customers randomly assigned between December 2003 and March 2004 
were attempted to be contacted for the second-year survey. Table B.4 compares 
economic impacts using administrative data for the full sample by random 
assignment cohort. The first panel includes customers randomly assigned in the 
same months as customers selected to be in the fielded sample, and the second 
panel includes all other customers. This table shows that the cohort from which 
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the fielded sample was selected exhibited particularly weak impacts. The fielded 
sample cohort showed statistically insignificant negative impacts on employment 
during the two years of follow-up and on earnings, while the rest of the full sample 
showed statistically significant positive impacts on both earnings and employment. 
This suggests that it would be inappropriate to generalise the results of the fielded 
sample, and, therefore, the respondent sample, to the full sample due to a cohort 
effect. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Advancement Support Advisers (ASAs) felt that 
the programme improved over time, so it is not surprising that this early sample is 
not presenting impacts of the same magnitude. Findings based on survey results 
would be testing the impact of ERA at its weakest stage of implementation.
Table B.4 Comparison of impacts on the benefits receipt and 
 employment of the full sample by cohort for ND25+   
 customers, estimated using administrative records 
Outcome ERA group Control group Difference (impact)
Fielded sample cohorta
Number of months on benefits
1-12 months post-RAb 7.9 7.9 0.0
13-24 months post-RA 5.3 5.7 -0.3
1-24 months post-RA 13.2 13.6 -0.3
Ever on benefits during (%)
1-12 months post-RA 99.0 99.0 0.0
13-24 months post-RA 58.4 62.6 -4.2*
1-24 months post-RA 99.0 99.1 -0.1
Number of months employed
1-12 months post-RA 2.1 2.3 -0.2
13-24 months post-RA 2.6 2.6 0.0
1-24 months post-RA 4.7 4.9 -0.2
Ever employed during (%)
1-12 months post-RA 34.1 36.1 -2.0
13-24 months post-RA 32.9 32.6 0.4
1-24 months post-RA 43.5 44.1 -0.6
Earnings	in	the	2005-2006	tax	year	(£) 2,774 2,818 -44
Sample size 952 953
Continued
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Table B.4 Continued 
ERA group Control group Difference (impact)
Non-fielded sample cohortc
Number of months on benefits
1-12 months post-RA 7.9 7.9 0.0
13-24 months post-RA 5.4 5.8 -0.4**
1-24 months post-RA 13.3 13.6 -0.3
Ever on benefits during (%)
1-12 months post-RA 96.7 97.2 -0.5
13-24 months post-RA 60.1 62.4 -2.3*
1-24 months post-RA 97.1 97.4 -0.3
Number of months employed
1-12 months post-RA 2.4 2.3 0.1
13-24 months post-RA 2.7 2.5 0.2*
1-24 months post-RA 5.1 4.8 0.3
Ever employed during (%)
1-12 months post-RA 36.4 34.7 1.7
13-24 months post-RA 34.3 30.8 3.5***
1-24 months post-RA 44.4 41.4 3.0**
Earnings	in	the	2005-2006	tax	year	(£) 2,888 2,613 274*
Sample size 2,472 2,405
 
Source: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Survey employment, earnings, 
and benefits data and the ERA 24-month customer survey.
Notes: Benefits refers to Jobseeker’s Allowance.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. 
Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the 
control group. Statistical significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; 
and *** = 1 per cent.
a The fielded sample cohort refers to all customers randomly assigned between December 
2003 and March 2004.
b RA refers to random assignment.
c The non-fielded sample cohort refers to all customers randomly assigned between October 
2003 and November 2003 or April 2004 and April 2005.
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Comparison of baseline characteristics
It is of interest to understand the factors influencing whether an individual in the 
fielded sample responds to the survey. To some extent, this can be explored by 
comparing the characteristics of respondents with those of non-respondents.
Table B.5 presents means of selected baseline characteristics for the full sample, 
the fielded sample, and for respondents and non-respondents to the survey. 
Statistically significant differences between the characteristics of respondents and 
non-respondents are denoted by asterisks in the table. Overall, respondents and 
non-respondents are statistically significantly different in a number of regards. 
This is common in surveys and may have a variety of explanations. For example, 
members of the fielded sample who have ties to a community through family 
are easier to locate for survey participation than those who do not, so it is not 
surprising that response rates are higher among those who are married or who 
have more than one child.
Table B.5  Comparison of the baseline characteristics of the full, 
 fielded, and survey samples for New Deal 25 Plus 
 customers
Characteristic
Full 
sample
Fielded 
sample
Respondents 
to 24-month 
survey
Non-respondents 
to 24-month 
survey
District (%)
East Midlands 16.6 16.6 18.3 13.6*
London 16.7 16.7 15.5 19.0
North East England 16.7 16.6 17.7 14.6
North West England 16.7 16.7 15.4 19.1
Scotland 16.7 16.7 15.9 18.2
Wales 16.6 16.6 17.2 15.6
Date of random assignment (RA) 
(%)
October 2003 - December 2003 10.3 15.2 16.1 13.5
January 2004 - March 2004 23.3 84.8 83.9 86.5
April 2004 - June 2004 22.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
July 2004 - September 2004 25.9 0.0 0.0 0.0
October 2004 - December 2004 15.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
January 2005 - April 2005 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
Female (%) 18.4 18.3 20.4 14.3**
Single (%) 61.3 57.7 54.1 64.4***
Continued
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Table B.5  Comparison of the baseline characteristics of the full, 
 fielded, and survey samples for ND25+ customers 
Full 
sample
Fielded 
sample
Respondents 
to 24-month 
survey
Non-respondents 
to 24-month 
survey
Number of children (%)
None 84.6 83.6 82.4 85.7
One 6.0 5.8 6.3 4.9
More than one 9.4 10.6 11.3 9.5
Education (%)
O-level 27.7 26.7 24.9 30.0*
A-level 23.1 22.8 24.5 19.7*
Other 13.5 13.6 15.8 9.7***
None 35.8 36.9 34.8 40.7*
Number of months worked in 
three years prior to RA (%)
12 or fewer 78.0 77.3 75.9 79.9
13 - 24 15.5 15.5 17.2 12.4**
More than 24 6.5 7.2 6.9 7.7
Worked in the past year (%) 23.6 23.1 24.1 21.3
Age (%)
Under 30 16.2 15.8 14.7 17.8
30 - 39 36.3 35.7 34.4 38.0
40 or older 47.6 48.5 50.9 44.1**
Age of youngest child (%)
Under 8 9.1 10.4 10.5 10.3
8-12 2.7 2.9 3.3 2.1
13-16 2.0 2.0 2.7 0.6**
Ethnic minority (%) 16.5 17.1 15.3 20.3**
Weekly earnings in the past year for 
current/most	recent	job	(£) 35.1 31.9 32.0 31.8
Number of months on benefits in 
the two years prior to RA 19.2 19.6 19.5 19.7
Sample size 6,782 1,016 661 355
Source: MDRC calculations from baseline information forms completed by DWP staff, ERA 
24-month customer survey, and Work and Pensions Longitudinal Survey benefits receipt records.
Notes: Benefits refers to Jobseeker’s Allowance.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the respondent group and 
the non-respondent group. Statistical significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent;  
** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent.
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Since some of these characteristics may be correlated – for example, education and 
weekly earnings – multiple regression is used to determine which characteristics 
differ statistically significantly across respondents and non-respondents while 
taking all other characteristics into account. Table B.6 shows the results of 
regressing an indicator of response status on the characteristics shown in Table 
B.5, as well as an indicator of research group, in order to better understand the 
process governing response. The ‘parameter estimate’ column captures the effect 
of each characteristic on the probability of responding to the survey; asterisks 
denote the significance level of this effect.
Table B.6  Ordinary least squares estimates from a model 
 predicting survey response
Characteristic
Parameter 
estimate
(Standard 
error)
Treatment Status 0.041 0.030
District
East Midlands 0.091 0.054*
North East England 0.072 0.055
North West England 0.030 0.053
Scotland -0.005 0.056
Wales 0.048 0.054
Date of random assignment (RA) January 2004 - March 2004 -0.033 0.042
Female 0.074 0.040*
Single -0.069 0.037*
Number of children
One 0.058 0.077
More than one 0.090 0.079
Education
O-level -0.004 0.038
A-level 0.105 0.040***
Other 0.144 0.048***
Number of months worked in three years prior to RA
12 or fewer 0.039 0.061
13 - 24 0.080 0.069
Worked in the past year 0.070 0.063
Continued
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Table B.6  Continued 
Characteristic
Parameter 
estimate
(Standard 
error)
Age
30 - 39 0.027 0.046
40 or older 0.042 0.046
Age of youngest child under 8 years -0.091 0.082
Ethnic minority -0.076 0.046*
Weekly	earnings	in	the	past	year	for	current/most	recent	job	(£) 0.000 0.000
Number of months on benefits in the two years prior to RA 0.001 0.00
Sample size 1,016
 
Source: MDRC calculations from baseline information forms completed by DWP staff, ERA 12- 
and 24-month customer surveys, and Work and Pensions Longitudinal Survey benefits receipt 
records.
Notes: Data include only the fielded sample.
Benefits refers to Jobseeker’s Allowance.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per 
cent.
The results show that many of the characteristics that differed by response status 
in Table B.5 were not statistically significant predictors of response status in the 
multiple regression analysis. Still, several characteristics remained statistically 
significant predictors, including gender and marital status, education, and ethnicity. 
Overall, although some differences in characteristics between the respondents 
and non-respondents still exist, these differences are in line with expectation. 
The use of survey data to measure programme participation
The evidence from administrative data described above suggests that the economic 
impacts of the respondent sample do not reflect those of the fielded or full sample. 
A similar test is not available to examine the validity of participation survey data 
since participation data is only available from the customer survey and not from 
administrative data. However, the first-year participation survey outcomes for the 
first-wave sample, a sample that exhibited no bias,100 and those for the second-
wave sample were quite similar (not shown in tables), indicating that the bias 
suggested in previous sections may not be as prevalent when using participation 
data. Therefore, this report includes participation data from the customer survey 
to suggest the level of take-up of post-employment services, but not to estimate 
impacts.
100 Dorsett et al., 2007.
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Conclusion
The survey achieved a response rate within expectation, given the population 
in question, though rather low when compared with other random assignment 
programmeme evaluation studies. As expected, there are some characteristics that 
differ between respondents and non-respondents, but this does not necessarily 
indicate bias. However, the available evidence from administrative data suggests 
that the economic impact estimates based on the respondent sample do not hold 
for the fielded sample due to a slight response bias or for the full sample due to a 
cohort effect. Taken as a whole, the assessments presented in this appendix support 
the exclusion of the survey data for evaluating economic impacts. However, due 
to the similarity of first-year participation impacts of the first-wave and second-
wave respondent samples, this report will use the survey data to measure non-
experimental participation outcomes.
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Appendix C 
Implementation features of 
ERA districts
Table C.1 Implementation features of ERA districts
East Midlands
Structure Centralised management through ERA District Manager. Three regional 
Advancement Support Adviser (ASA) Managers phased in between 
2004 and 2005, covering 19 offices among them. Three District Adviser 
Managers were in place from April 2005 to March 2007, running three 
teams of ASAs (north, central, and south). This structure remained until 
April 2007, when it was reduced to two teams (north and south). 
Staffing Initially, ASAs were specialists for ERA customer groups but increasingly 
served all customer groups. A single ASA worked in smaller offices. Some 
peripatetic advisers experienced downtime travelling between multiple 
offices. Central management assured the ring-fencing of adviser resources, 
although in smaller offices advisers performed occasional mainstream 
adviser duties.
Intake Mainstream New Deal advisers performed random assignment and passed 
on programme group customers to ASAs. Intake of Working Tax Credit 
(WTC) customer group was the largest of all districts, concentrated at end-
of-intake period.
Targets Little pressure on ASAs to contribute to Job Entry Targets meant more time 
could be devoted to delivering ERA. ASA benchmarks for post-employment 
contact introduced in early 2005 but were quickly relaxed and a flexible 
approach assumed. Key Work Objectives for ASAs introduced in 2005 
and a post-employment QAF (Quality Assurance Framework) for post-
employment interviews in early 2006.
ERA profile ERA considered to have lower profile than Incapacity Benefit (IB) Pathways 
pilot. Given centralised management, less understanding of and support for 
ERA from Business Managers.
Continued
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Table C.1 Continued
Events Closure of pensions centre in district in summer 2004 led to redeployment 
of staff to ERA. From end 2004, pressures on office space meant some 
ASAs lost customer-facing desks. Regional ASA managers phased in 
between 2004 and 2005 due to large size of district. New ERA manager 
assigned in autumn 2004. New District Manager appointed in early 2005.
Issues Large geographical district made staffing and management difficult. Large 
customer caseloads in bigger offices detracted from ERA delivery, with 
major pressure on staffing during summer 2004. Large proportion of ASAs 
had no previous advisory experience because they were redeployed from 
other parts of the organisation following restructuring. Pressures on office 
space had mixed impacts: In larger city offices ASAs relocated to separate 
premises as ‘ERA unit’; in some smaller offices ASAs had to ‘hot desk’.
Achievements Centralised ERA management structure effective for maintaining and 
protecting programme resources. Innovative marketing to attract sufficient 
numbers to the WTC customer group. Promoted work retention and 
advancement concepts early in implementation. System of regional ASA 
managers facilitated contact between ASAs and the development of 
mechanisms for monitoring and supporting ASAs’ post-employment work.
Change over 
time
Most effective period of ERA delivery from spring 2005 to end 2006. 
Adequate management structure and staffing in place by then, plus intake 
had finished. Through training and peer support, more effective strategies 
for engaging and working with post-employed customers had developed. 
From end 2006, the transfer of caseloads between advisers as ASAs left 
meant that the quality of contact was diminished; also ASAs anxious about 
their post-ERA employment opportunities.
ERA ending Due to centralised structure and specialist ASAs, difficult to manage 
reducing caseloads. ERA manager consulted individual ASAs on when 
they wanted to leave and drew up a plan for passing caseloads to those 
advisers staying the longest so that customers would not have a succession 
of advisers. ASAs experienced this as unsettled period when having to take 
on new customers with minimal time left to build a relationship. Six-month 
and three-month ERA ending letters sent out to customers, with three-
month letters eliciting the most interest from customers.
London
Structure Until the formation of a Post-Employment Team (PET), management 
structure differed depending on the New Deal customer group. The 
New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) and WTC ASAs were coordinated and 
managed centrally. The New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+) ASAs were coordinated 
at the district level but line-managed at the office level.
Staffing Initially, some resistance to staffing ERA. ASAs were specialists by ERA 
customer groups. NDLP ASAs served both control and programme group. 
Ring-fencing of the PET started in early 2005. Non-working ERA customers 
were then served by a pre-employment team. 
Intake Lone parents randomly assigned by NDLP advisers (who also delivered ERA). 
ND25+ randomly assigned by mix of ASAs and support staff.
Targets Same Job Entry Targets applied to ASAs, which detracted from ERA delivery. 
Once the PET was formed, ASAs were assigned benchmarks and key work 
objectives.
ERA profile Perceived to be low because post-employment delivery of ERA did not 
contribute to Job Entry Targets. 
Continued
 
Appendices – Implementation features of ERA districts
135
Table C.1 Continued
Events New District Manager in Spring 2004. PET formed in early 2005. 
Issues Tension with Job Entry Targets. Large customer caseloads and mainstream 
Jobcentre Plus work. These reduced when the PET was set up, when 
advisers had manageable caseloads and no mainstream Jobcentre Plus 
work.
Achievements In spring 2005, District Manager agreed to commit more resources to ERA. 
Established PET in 2005. Developed innovative customer re-engagement 
publicity materials.
Change over 
time
Setting up the PET was a major breakthrough. The first few months were 
taken up with processing retention payments that had fallen behind. In 
May 2005 more advisers joined the team, the backlog had been cleared, 
and ASAs thought that from this time ERA delivery improved continuously 
right until the end. This was especially evident with training take-up.
ERA ending In March 2007, caseloads again became an issue when ERA customers 
moved off the project. ASAs talked about the difficulty of taking on new 
customers as they were nearing the end of ERA. ERA ending letters sent 
out to customers. ‘Rush’ of customers wanted to take advantage of the 
training.
North East 
England
Structure Centralised ERA District Manager but without line management 
responsibility for ASAs. ASAs line-managed locally and remained part 
of office ND25+ or NDLP teams. A number of reorganisations of NDLP 
management took place over course of ERA, shifted from local to district 
level management and back again. NDLP ASAs report having 13 different 
line managers over a three-year period.
Staffing ASAs were specialists by ERA customer group. The district experienced 
problems generating interest in the ASA posts and had to undertake a 
number of awareness sessions for advisers highlighting the role of the ASA. 
The district staffing situation up to 2006 caused problems, as if the full ERA 
allocation was used, then the district would have been left with no ND25+ 
advisers and very few NDLP advisers. A management decision was made 
on the resource allocation, and after discussions with advisers, agreement 
was made to give staff ASA roles alongside other duties (especially in the 
smaller offices where full posts were not possible). Although no ASAs dealt 
with programme as well as control group customers, all ASAs had at times 
served customers who were not involved in ERA at all. 
Intake Random assignment performed by both New Deal and ERA advisers.
Targets ASAs expected to contribute to district Job Entry Targets, but their targets 
were half those of New Deal advisers.
ERA profile Perceived to be low; IB Pathways pilot given more priority. Priority in the 
district dipped after Technical Adviser (TA) left, reflected in a winding down 
of district ASA meetings.
Events District without TA support during spring 2004. Reorganisation in spring 
2006 split the district in half.
Issues Concentration on ERA work suffered due to tension with Job Entry Targets, 
large customer caseloads, and mainstream Jobcentre Plus work. Contact 
between ASAs diminished after TA finished in mid 2005. Perceived to be 
ineffective support for ASAs by line managers, exacerbated by numerous 
management reorganisations for NDLP.
Continued
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Table C.1 Continued
Achievements Most ASAs ring-fenced during 2005, some for longer. Individual ASAs 
developed innovative ways of working with employed customers, but not 
always shared or co-ordinated throughout the district.
Change over 
time
ERA delivery most effective during 2005: Majority of ASAs ring-fenced; 
regular networking meetings between ASAs and TA provided district-
wide support for ASAs. Visit of ASAs to New York in 2004 also stimulated 
development of tactics for post-employment customer engagement. 
From end 2005, network meetings dwindled and some ASAs lost ring-
fencing. TA remained as line manager in one office for another year, where 
consequently ASAs felt better supported.
ERA ending ASAs remained part of mainstream ND25+ and NDLP teams and so simply 
took on additional mainstream customers as ERA caseloads diminished. 
However, ASAs in some teams concerned about overstaffing and being 
surplus to requirements. Six-month, six-week, and final ERA ending letters 
sent. Some customers responded to six-week letter with requests for 
training payments.
North West 
England
Structure Centralised ERA District Manager, but ASAs locally line-managed at the 
office level. 
Staffing ASAs were generalists and served all customer groups. Ring-fencing of a 
PET started in 2005, when working customer caseloads were assigned to 
ASAs, while non-working customers were assigned to administrative staff, 
who performed job search activities.
Intake Random assignment performed by mix of New Deal and ERA advisers. All 
ASAs and New Deal advisers were given full intake training.
Targets Same Job Entry Targets applied to ASAs, which detracted from ERA delivery. 
Once the PET was formed, ASAs were assigned benchmarks and key work 
objectives. 
ERA profile Perceived to be low because post-employment delivery of ERA did not 
contribute to Job Entry Targets. 
Events Delayed start, three months later than other districts. Was a priority district 
from the start of ERA until March 2007. District reorganisation in April 
2005. New District Manager in mid-2005. PET started in July 2005. Started 
to take on pre-employment caseloads in January 2006. Less securely ring-
fenced spring 2006.
Issues Decentralised line management detracted from ERA delivery. Tensions with 
Job Entry Targets
Achievements Established PET in 2005. Developed innovative customer re-engagement 
publicity materials. ‘End of an ERA’ information pack distributed to 
customers nearing the end of their 33 months of support. 
Change over 
time
District felt it reached a peak in its delivery in January 2006, which was 
maintained for approximately nine months. Delivery started to tail off when 
staff started to exit from ERA, and ring-fencing slowly dissolved from about 
March 2007.
ERA ending Customers had contact letters at eight months, six months, and three 
months to go; and then (as appropriate) a final letter and disengagement 
folder.
Continued
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Table C.1 Continued
Scotland
Structure Management and budget decentralised to office level. No ERA District 
Manager. 
Staffing Some mixed, some specialist ASAs. Most offices had only one ASA. ASAs 
ring-fenced in two offices in spring 2005, while those remaining served 
non-ERA as well as ERA customers. 
Intake Random assignment performed by various New Deal, ASA, and support 
staff. 
Targets Same Job Entry Targets applied to ASAs, which detracted from ERA delivery. 
No ERA-specific benchmarks.
ERA profile Perceived to be low. Upper and some local managers tended to favour IB 
Pathways pilot.
Events District reorganised in 2004. New District Manager in spring 2004. Change 
in ERA District Co-ordinator in autumn 2005, then dissolution of role in 
autumn 2006, when office Business Managers asked to co-ordinate ERA 
management for office clusters. In November 2005 held customer Town 
Hall events to encourage re-engagement.
Issues Decentralised line management detracted from ERA delivery. Office 
geographical distribution awkward for support and meetings. Tensions with 
Job Entry Targets. Large customer caseloads and mainstream Jobcentre Plus 
work. Other pilot given more priority. 
Achievements ASAs in some offices ring-fenced during 2005. 
Change over 
time
Ongoing changes to district Jobcentre Plus structure brought in new senior 
management who needed to be apprised of ERA. Dissolution of TA and 
ERA District Co-ordinator roles put strain on support and communications 
across offices. By 2005, ASAs concentrated contact with working 
customers and felt that between spring 2005 and spring 2006 programme 
delivery was at its strongest. 
ERA ending Disengagement letters at six months and one month prior to customers 
ending ERA. Preferential treatment was given to those who were engaged 
with the programme. ASAs increasingly absorbed into mainstream activity 
as ERA customers flowed off the programme.
Wales
Structure Centralised management. ERA District Manager also responsible for delivery 
of NDLP across the district. 
Staffing ASAs were specialists by ERA customer groups. A single ASA worked in 
smaller offices. Some peripatetic advisers experienced downtime travelling 
between multiple offices. ASA staffing levels affected by long-term sick 
leave. Continual problems with staff being pulled onto mainstream 
Jobcentre Plus activities.
Intake Mainstream New Deal advisers performed random assignment and passed 
on programme group customers to ASAs.
Targets Same Job Entry Targets applied to ASAs, which detracted from ERA delivery. 
Benchmarks for post-employment contact and key work objectives around 
advancement and retention from April 2004. 
ERA profile ERA perceived to be supported at office level but devalued at upper 
management level due to tensions with Job Entry Targets. 
Continued
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Table C.1 Continued
Events Intake of New Deal customer groups ended in summer 2004. From March 
2006 tended to work with only engaged customers as did not have the 
resources to re-engage customers. From August 2006 ASAs worked with 
only post-employment customers, with pre-employment going back to 
mainstream Jobcentre Plus.
Issues Tension with Job Entry Targets. Limited number of ND25+ ASAs. 
Understaffing, large customer caseloads, and mainstream Jobcentre Plus 
work. 
Achievements Promoted work retention and advancement concepts early in the 
implementation. In spring 2004 established innovative advancement 
materials for use with non-working customers and set benchmarks for 
contacting working customers. 
Change over 
time
Staff thought there had never been enough ASAs in the district. The most 
effective period of ERA delivery was from spring 2004 to spring 2005. From 
May to September 2005 there was a big push on job entries in the district, 
and ASAs struggled to do ERA work. From September 2005 ASAs were 
supposed to be ring-fenced but they were still being asked to do other 
work, and still did not have enough staff on ERA. In January 2006 an ERA 
‘team’ was formed but in March the team lost staff, the ASAs had a big 
caseload, and worked only with ‘active’ customers.
ERA ending Staffing reduced to just one ASA in spring 2007. Six-month, six-week, 
and final ERA ending letters sent. Had responses to six-week letter, with 
some customers requesting retention payments backdated. Struggled with 
transferring caseloads and losing continuity with customers.
 
Appendices – Implementation features of ERA districts
139
Appendix D 
Customers’ contacts with 
Jobcentre Plus, receipt of help 
and advice, and receipt of 
Emergency Discretion Funds
Table D.1  Effects of ERA on job search advice or help received 
 among ND25+ customers within two years after   
 random assignment    
Outcome
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Not in work and received help or advice from Jobcentre Plus staff 
on (%)
Looking at job vacancies 73.9 73.3
Applying for a job 57.2 57.4
Working out long-term career goals 45.3 39.7
Help to stay in or advance in future jobs 40.3 25.5
Help to find out about or arrange childcare 5.1 5.9
Looking for training or education courses 57.8 53.0
Looking for volunteer work 18.8 16.3
Setting up own business 24.6 16.1
Other type of help 10.0 6.1
Any type of help or advice 80.2 79.6
Sample size 329 314
Source: MDRC calculations from ERA 12- and 24-month customer surveys.
Notes:  Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for  
pre-random assignment characteristics of sample members.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
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Table D.2  Frequency of various types of in-work contact with   
 Jobcentre Plus staff among ND25+ customers who   
 worked within two years after random assignment  
  
Outcome
ERA 
group
Control 
group
Frequency of face-to-face contact with Jobcentre Plus staff (%)
None 34.6 74.4
Once or twice 14.8 10.5
3-9 times 25.7 6.7
10 or more times 24.9 8.4
Frequency of telephone contact with Jobcentre Plus staff (%)
None 51.7 86.2
Once or twice 14.4 5.9
3-9 times 18.8 6.2
10 or more times 15.1 1.7
Sample size 190 203
Source: MDRC calculations from the 12- and 24-month customer surveys.
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Table D.3 Receipt of ERA Emergency Discretionary Fund (EDF) 
 payments among ND25+ customers 
 
Outcome
ERA 
group
Within two years after random assignment
Received EDF payments (%) 9.8
Average number of payments received among customers with any payments 1.6
Number of payments received among customers with any payments (%)
One 67.7
Two 19.5
Three 6.0
Four or more 6.9
Average	amount	of	each	EDF	payment	among	customers	with	any	payments	(£) 169
Average	total	amount	of	EDF	payments	among	customers	with	any	payments	(£) 230
Through July 2007a
Ever received EDF payments (%) 13.1
Average number of payments received among customers with any payments 1.6
Number of payments received among customers with any payments
One 63.8
Two 22.8
Three 6.5
Four or more 6.9
Average	amount	of	each	EDF	payment	among	customers	with	any	payments	(£) 173
Average	total	amount	of	EDF	payments	among	customers	with	any	payments	(£) 241
Received EDF assistance for first time in last 9 months of eligibility (%) 2.3
Sample size 3,424
Source: MDRC calculations primarily from DWP financial incentives data.
Notes: The sample for this table consists of all those randomly assigned from October 2003 and 
April 2005, not just those who responded to the customer survey. 
a ERA group customers were eligible to receive payments until December 2007. At present, 
financial incentives data are only available through July 2007.
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Table D.4 Receipt of ERA employment retention bonuses among 
  ND25+ customers
 
Outcome
ERA 
group
Within two years after random assignment
Received bonus (%) 30.3
Average number of bonuses received among customers with any bonuses 2.7
Number of bonuses received among customers with any bonuses (%)
One 27.0
Two 21.7
Three 22.0
Four 18.3
Five 8.7
Six 2.4
Through July 2007a
Ever received bonus (%) 33.9
Average number of bonuses received among customers with any bonuses 3.3
Number of bonuses received among customers with any bonuses (%)
One 21.2
Two 15.5
Three 16.6
Four 15.7
Five 17.3
Six 13.7
Received bonus for first time in last 9 months of eligibility (%) 2.9
Sample size 3,424
Source: MDRC calculations primarily from DWP financial incentives data.
Notes: The sample for this table consists of all those randomly assigned from October 2003 and 
April 2005, not just those who responded to the customer survey. 
a ERA group customers were eligible to receive payments until December 2007; at present 
financial incentives data are only available through July 2007.
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Table D.5 ND25+ ERA customers’ receipt of ERA training fee   
 assistance and training completion bonuses
 
Outcome
ERA 
group
Training/tuition fee asssistance
Received tuition fee assistance within two years after random assignment (%) 5.6
Average	amount	paid	towards	fees	(£) 395
Ever received tuition fee assistance through July 2007 (%)a 10.3
Average	amount	paid	towards	fees	(£) 431
Received tuition fee assistance for first time in last 9 months of eligibility (%) 4.2
Training completion bonus
Within two years after random assignment
Received bonus (%) 3.9
Average number of bonuses received among customers with any bonuses 1.3
Number of bonuses received among customers with any bonuses (%)
One 79.3
Two 13.3
Three 5.9
Four or more 1.5
Average	amount	of	each	bonus	among	customers	with	any	bonuses	(£) 295
Average	total	amount	of	bonuses	among	customers	with	any	bonuses	(£) 357
Through July 2007a
Ever received bonus (%) 6.6
Average number of bonuses received among customers with any bonuses 1.5
Number of bonuses received among customers with any bonuses (%)
One 70.4
Two 19.5
Three 6.6
Four or more 3.5
Average	amount	of	each	bonus	among	customers	with	any	bonuses	(£) 333
Average	total	amount	of	bonuses	among	customers	with	any	bonuses	(£) 430
Received bonus for first time in last 9 months of eligibility (%) 2.3
Sample size 3,424
Source: MDRC calculations primarily from DWP financial incentives data.
Notes: The sample for this table consists of all those randomly assigned from October 2003 and 
April 2005, not just those who responded to the customer survey.
a ERA group customers were eligible to receive payments until December 2007; at present 
financial incentives data are only available through July 2007.

145
References
Adebowale, V. (2004) A New Deal for all, report of the National Employment 
Panel’s Working Group on New Deal 25 plus, London: National Employment Panel, 
Web site: http://www.nationalemploymentpanel.gov.uk/publications/nep/2004/
anewdealforall/pdf
Arulampalam, W. (2001) ‘Is unemployment really scarring? effects of unemployment 
experiences on wages’, Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Vol. 111, 475, 
pp F585-606.
Bell, A., Finch, N., La Valle, I., Sainsbury, R. and Skinner, C. (2005) A Question of 
balance: Lone parents, childcare and work, Department for Work and Pensions 
Research Report No 230, Leeds: Corporate Document Services.
Bivand, P., Brooke, B., Jenkins, S. and Simmonds, D. (2006) Evaluation of StepUP 
pilot: Final report, Department for Work and Pensions Research Report No 337, 
Leeds: Corporate Document Services.
Carpenter, H. (2006) Repeat Jobseeker’s Allowance spells, Department for Work 
and Pensions Research Report No 394, Leeds: Corporate Document Services.
Dean, H. and Shah, A. (2002) ‘Insecure families and low-paying labour markets: 
comments on the British experience’, Journal of Social Policy 31 (1) 61-80.
Department for Work and Pensions (2007) In work, better off: next steps to full 
employment, website: 
www.dwp.gov.uk/welfarereform/in-work-better-off/in-work-better-off.pdf
Department for Work and Pensions (2005) Principles of welfare reform: the values and 
principles which shape the government’s vision of the future welfare state, website: 
www.dwp.gov.uk/welfarereform/docs/Principles_of_Welfare_Reform.pdf 
Dex, S. and Smith, C. (2001) Employees’ access to family-friendly policies and 
practices: analysis of the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey, Cambridge: 
University of Cambridge.
References
146
Dickens, R. (unpublished 2000a) The low pay – no pay cycle: a report for the 
welfare to work team, HM Treasury, London: Centre for Economic Performance, 
London School of Economics.
Dickens, R. (2000b) ‘Caught in a trap? Wage mobility in Britain: 1975-1994’, 
Economica 67, pp 477-497.
Dorsett, R., Campbell-Barr, V., Hamilton, G., Hoggart, L., Marsh, A., Miller, C., 
Ray, K., Riccio, J.A., Rich, S. and Vegeris, S. (2007) Implementation and first-year 
impacts of the UK Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) demonstration, 
Department for Work and Pensions Research Report No 412, Leeds: Corporate 
Document Services.
Evans, D. (2007) Delivering full employment: From the New Deal to personal 
employment accounts, London: Social Market Foundation.
Evans, M., Harkness, S. and Ortiz, R.A. (2004) Lone parents cycling between work 
and benefits, Department for Work and Pensions Research Report No 217, Leeds: 
Corporate Document Services.
Furlong, A. and Cartmel, F. (2004) Vulnerable young men in fragile labour markets; 
employment, unemployment and the search for long-term security, York: JRF.
Goodman, A. and Sianesi, B. (2007) Non-participation in the Employment Retention 
and Advancement Study: A quantitative descriptive analysis, Department for Work 
and Pensions Working Paper No 39, Leeds: Corporate Document Services.
Gregg, P. and Wadsworth, J. (1999) The state of working Britain, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press.
Hales, J., Roth, W., Barnes, M., Millar, J., Lessof, C., Gloyer, M. and Shaw, A. 
(2000) Evaluation of the New Deal for Lone Parents: ‘Early Lessons from the Phase 
One Prototype - Findings of surveys’, Department for Work and Pensions Research 
Report No 109, Leeds: Corporate Document Services.
Hall, N., Hamilton, G., Hoggart, L., Marsh, A., Phillips, J., Ray, K. and Vegeris, S. 
(2004) The Employment Retention and Advancement scheme: the first months, 
Unpublished report.
Hall, N., Hamilton, G., Hoggart, L., Marsh, A., Phillips, J., Ray, K. and Vegeris, S. 
(2005) The Employment Retention and Advancement scheme – the early months 
of implementation: Summary and conclusions, Department for Work and Pensions 
Research Report No 265, Leeds: Corporate Document Services.
Harker, L. (2006) Delivering on child poverty: What would it take? website: www.
dwp.gov.uk/publications/dwp/2006/harker/harker-full.pdf
HM Treasury (2006) Leitch Review of Skills, Prosperity for all in the global economy 
– world class skills: final report, London: HM Treasury.
References
147
Hoggart, L., Campbell-Barr, V., Ray, K. and Vegeris, S. (2006) Staying in work 
and moving up: Evidence from the UK Employment Retention and Advancement 
(ERA) demonstration, Department for Work and Pensions Research Report No 
381, Leeds: Corporate Document Services.
Kemp, P., Bradshaw, J., Dornan, P., Finch, N., and Mayhew, E. (2004) Routes out 
of poverty: a research review, York: JRF.
Machin, S. (1999) Wage inequality in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, in Gregg, P. 
and Wadsworth, J. (eds), The state of working Britain, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press.
McDowell, L. (2003) ‘Masculine identities and low-paid work: young men in urban 
labour markets’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 27 (4).
Millar, J. (2006) ‘Better off in work? Work, security and welfare for lone mothers’ 
in Glendinning, C. and Kemp, P. (eds), Cash and care, Bristol: Policy Press.
Morris, S., Greenberg, D., Riccio, J., Mittra, B., Green, H., Lissenburgh, S., and 
Blundell, R. (2003) Designing a demonstration project: an Employment Retention 
and Advancement demonstration for Great Britain, London: Cabinet Office.
Nixon, D. (2006) ‘“I just like working with my hands”: employment aspirations 
and the meaning of work for low-skilled unemployed men in Britain’s service 
economy’, Journal of Education and Work 19 (3) 237-253.
Nunn, A., Johnson, S., Kelsey, S. and Usher, D. (2007) Job Outcome Target National 
Evaluation, Department for Work and Pensions Research Report No 462, Leeds: 
Corporate Document Services.
Office for National Statistics. ‘Nomis official labour market statistics’, website: 
www.nomisweb.co.uk
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (1997) ‘The 
definition of part-time work for the purpose of international comparisons’, 
in Labour market and social policy, Occasional Paper No 22, website: 
http://www.olis.oecd.org/OLIS/1997DOC.NSF/LINKTO/OCDE-GD(97)121 
Ray, K., Vegeris, S., Brooks, S., Campbell-Barr, V., Hoggart, L., Mackinnon, K. and 
Shutes, I. (2007) The Lone Parents Pilots: A qualitative evaluation of Quarterly 
Work Focused Interviews (12+), Work Search Premium and In Work Credit, 
Department for Work and Pensions Research Report No 423, Leeds: Corporate 
Document Services.
Riccio, J.A., Bewley, H., Campbell-Barr, V., Dorsett, R., Hamilton, G., Hoggart, H., 
Marsh, A., Miller, C., Ray, K. and Vegeris, S. (2008) Implementation and second-
year impacts for lone parents in the UK Employment Retention and Advancement 
(ERA) demonstration, Department for Work and Pensions Research Report No 
489, Leeds: Corporate Document Services.
References
148
Smith, N. and Middleton, S (2007) Poverty dynamics research in the UK, York: 
JRF.
Stewart, M. and Swaffield, J. (1999) ‘Low pay dynamics and transition probabilities’, 
Economica 66, pp 23-42.
Vegeris, S. and Perry, J. (2003) Families and children 2001: Living standards and 
the children, Department for Work and Pensions Research Report No 190, Leeds: 
Corporate Document Services.
Walker, R., Hoggart, L. and Hamilton, G. (2006) Making random assignment 
happen: evidence from the UK Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) 
demonstration, Department for Work and Pensions Research Report No 330, 
Leeds: Corporate Document Services.
Winterbotham, M., Adams, L., and Kuechel, A. (2002) Evaluation of New Deal 25 
Plus: qualitative interviews with ES staff, providers, employers and clients, London: 
IFF Research.
References
